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BL  181  .B76 

1835 

Brougham,  H. 

Lord,  1778- 

1868. 

A  discourse 

of  natural 

theology 

TRUSTED  BT  ODE  AND  WODO>\ 


A 
DISCOURSE 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY 


THE  NATURE  OF  THE  EVIDENCE  AND  THE 
ADVANTAGES  OF  THE  STUDY. 

H.  LORD  BROUGHAM,  F.  R.  S.  , 

AND    MEMBER     OF    THE    NATIONAL    INST1TT1T    OF    FRANCE. 


LEWIS   HAUMAN    AND    COMP. 

1835 


A  DISCOURSE 


NATURAL   THEOLOGY 


JOHN  CHARLES  EARL  SPENCER. 


The  composition  of  this  Discourse  was  under- 
taken in  consequence  of  an  observation  which 
I  had  often  made,  that  scientific  men  were  apt 
to  regard  the  study  of  Natural  Religion  as  little 
connected  with  philosophical  pursuits.  Many  of 
the  persons  to  whom  I  allude  were  men  of  reli- 
gious habits  of  thinking  ;  others  were  free  from 
any  disposition  towards  scepticism,  rather  be- 
muse they  had  not  much  discussed  the  subject , 


6 

than  because  they  had  formed  fixed  opinions 
upon  it  after  inquiry.  But  the  bulk  of  them 
relied  little  upon  Natural  Theology ,  which  they 
seemed  to  regard  as  a  speculation  built  rather  on 
fancy  than  on  argument ;  or,  at  any  rate,  as  a 
kind  of  knowledge  quite  different  from  either 
physical  or  moral  science.  It  therefore  appeared 
to  me  desirable  to  define,  more  precisely  than 
had  yet  been  done  ,  the  place  and  the  claims  of 
Natural  Theology  among  the  various  branches  of 
human  knowledge. 

About  the  same  time  our  Society  l,  as  you 
may  recollect,  was  strongly  urged  to  publish  an 
edition  of  Dr.  Paley's  popular  work,  with  co- 
pious and  scientific  illustrations.  We  both  fa- 
voured this  plan ;  but  some  of  our  colleagues 
justly  apprehended  that  the  adoption  of  it  might 
open  the  door  to  the  introduction  of  religious 
controversy  among  us,  against  our  fundamental 
principles  ;  and  the  scheme  was  abandoned.  I 
regarded  it,  however,  as  expedient  to  carry  this 
plan  into  execution  by  individual  exertion;  and 

'  For  the  Diffusion  of  Useful  Knowledge. 


7 
our  worthy  and  accomplished  colleague ,  Sir 
C.Bell — whose  admirable  treatiseon  Animal  Me- 
chanics pointed  him  out  as  the  fellow-labourer 
I  should  most  desire — fortunately  agreed  to 
share  the  work  of  the  illustrations.  In  these  we 
have  made  a  very  considerable  progress  ;  and  I 
now  inscribe  this  publication  ,  but  particularly 
the  Preliminary  Discourse,  to  you.  It  was,  with 
the  exception  of  the  Third  Section  of  Part  I , 
and  the  greater  portion  of  the  Notes,  written  at 
the  end  of  1830,  in  1831,  and  the  latter  part 
of  1833,  and  a  portion  was  added  in  the  autumn 
of  1834.  In  those  days  I  held  the  Great  Seal  of 
this  kingdom  ;  and  it  was  impossible  to  finish 
the  work  while  many  cares  of  another  kind 
pressed  upon  me.  But  the  first  leisure  that  could 
be  obtained  was  devoted  to  this  object ,  and  to  a 
careful  revision  of  what  had  been  written  in  a 
season  less  auspicious  for  such  speculations. 

I  inscribe  the  fruits  of  those  studies  to  you, 
not  merely  as  a  token  of  ancient  friendship — for 
that  you  do  not  require  ;  nor  because  I  always 
have  found  you,  whether  in  possession  or  in 
resistance  of  power,  a  fellow-labourer  to  main- 


8 

tain  our  common  principles,  alike  firm,  faithful, 
disinterested — for  yourknown  public  character 
wants  no  testimony  from  me  ;  nor  yet  because  a 
work  on  such  a  subject  needs  the  patronage  of  a 
great  name — for  it  would  be  affectation  in  me 
to  pretend  any  such  motive ;  but  because  you 
have  devoted  much  of  your  time  to  such  inqui- 
ries— are  beyond  most  men  sensible  of  their  im- 
portance —  concur  generally  in  the  opinions 
which  I  profess  to  maintain  —  and  had  even 
formed  the  design  of  giving  to  the  world  your 
thoughts  upon  the  subject,  as  I  hope  and  trust 
you  now  will  be  moved  to  do  all  the  more  for 
the  present  address.  In  this  view,  your  authority 
will  prove  of  great  value  to  the  cause  of  truth  , 
however  superfluous  the  patronage  of  even  your 
name  might  be  to  recommend  the  most  impor- 
tant of  all  studies. 

Had  our  lamented  friend  Romilly  lived,  you 
are  aware  that  not  even  these  considerations 
would  have  made  me  address  any  one  but  him, 
with  whom  I  had  oftentimes  speculated  upon 
this  ground.  Both  of  us  have  been  visited  with 
the  most  severe  afflictions ,  of  a  far  nearer  and 


9 

more  lasting  kind  than  even  his  removal,  and 
we  are  now  left  with  few  things  to  care  for  ;  yet 
ever  since  the  time  I  followed  him  to  the  grave, 
I  question  if  either  of  us  has  read,  without  rae- 
ditating  upon  the  irreparable  loss  we  and  all 
men  then  sustained,  the  words  of  the  ancient 
philosopher  best  imbued  with  religious  opi- 
nions—  u  Proficiscar  enim  non  ad  eos  solum 
viros  de  quibus  ante  dixi;  sed  etiam  ad  Catonem 
meum ,  quo  nemo  vir  melior  natus  est,  nemo 
pietate  proestantior  ;  cujus  a  me  corpus  crema- 
tum  est ,  animus  vero  non  me  deserens  sed 
respectans,  in  ea  profecto  loca  discessit  quo  mihi 
ipsi  cernebat  esse  veniendum  ;  quern  ego  meum 
casum  fortiter  ferre  visus  sum ,  non  quod  eequo 
animo  ferrem  ;  sed  me  ipse  consolabar,  existi- 
mans;  non  longinqwum  inter  nos  digressum  et 
discessum  fore  l.  » 

1  DeSeneetule. 


INTRODUCTION. 


ARRANGEMENT    OF    SUBJECTS    AND    EXPLANATION 
OF    TERMS. 


The  words  Theology  and  Religion  are  often  used 
as  synonymous.  Thus  Natural  Theology  and  Natu- 
ral Religion  are  by  many  confounded  together.  But 
the  more  accurate  use  of  the  words  is  that  which 
makes  Theology  the  science,  and  Religionits  subject ; 
and  in  this  manner  are  they  distinguished  when  we 
speak  of  a  «  professor  of  theology  ,  »  and  a  «  sense 
of  religion.  » 

There  is ,  however ,  as  regards  Natural  Theology, 
a  more  limited  use  of  the  word  ,  which  confines  it 
to  the  knowledge  and  attributes  of  the  Deity  -  and 
regards  the  speculation  concerning  his  will ,  and  our 
own  hopes  from  and  duties  towards  him  ,  as  another 
branch  of  the  science ,  termed  Natural  Religion ,  in 
contradistinction  to  the  former.  Dr.  Paley  hardly 


12  INTRODUCTION. 

touches  on  this  latter  branch  in  his  book,  there  being 
only  about  one-sixtieth  part  devoted  to  it ,  and  that 
incidentally  in  treating  of  the  attributes.  Indeed  , 
though  in  the  dedication  he  uses  the  word  Religion 
as  synonymous  with  Theology ,  the  title  and  the  ar- 
rangement of  his  discourse  show  that  he  generally 
employed  the  term  Natural  Theology  inits  restricted 
sense.  Bishop  Butler,  on  the  other  hand,  seems 
to  have  used  Natural  Religion  in  a  sense  equally 
restricted,  but  certainly  little  warranted  by  custom; 
for  that  portion  of  his  work  which  treats  of  Natural 
Religion  is  confined  to  a  future  state  and  the  moral 
government  of  God ,  as  if  he  either  held  Natural  Re- 
ligion and  Natural  Theology  to  be  two  branches  of 
one  subject ,  or  Natural  Religion  to  be  a  branch  of 
Natural  Theology.  The  older  writers,  Clarke,  Bent- 
ley  ,  Derham  ,  seem  to  have  sometimes  used  the 
words  indifferently ,  but  never  to  have  regarded  Na- 
tural Religion  in  the  restricted  acceptation.  The  an- 
cients generally  used  Religion  in  a  qualified  sense  , 
either  as  connected  with  an  obligation,  or  as  syno- 
nymous with  superstition. 

This  Discourse  is  not  a  treatise  of  Natural  Theo- 
logy :  it  has  not  for  its  design  an  exposition  of  the 
doctrines  whereof  Natural  Theology  consists.  But  its 
object  is  ,  first,  to  explain  the  nature  of  the  evidence 
upon  which  it  rests  —  to  show  that  it  is  a  science , 
the  truths  of  which  are  discovered  by  induction  , 
like  the  truths  of  Natural  and  Moral  Philosophy  — 
that  it  is  a  branch  of  science  partaking  of  the  nature 


ttTRODUCTION.  15 

of  each  of  those  great  divisions  of  human  knowledge, 
and  not  merely  closely  allied  to  them  both.  Secondly, 
the  object  of  the  Discourse  is  to  explain  the  advan- 
tages attending  this  study.  The  work ,  therefore ,  is 
a  Logical  one. 

We  have  commented  upon  the  use  of  the  terms 
Theology  and  Religion.  As  it  is  highly  desirable  to 
keep  scientific  language  precise ,  and  always  to  use 
the  same  terms  in  the  same  sense,  we  shall  now  fur- 
ther observe  upon  the  word  «  moral »  in  relation  to 
science  or  faculties.  It  is  sometimes  used  to  denote 
the  whole  of  our  mental  faculties ,  and  in  opposition 
to  natural  and  physical ,  as  when  we  speak  of  a  mo- 
ral science,  »  «  moral  truths, »  «  moral  philosophy .  « 
But  it  is  also  used  in  contradistinction  to  «  intellec- 
tual »  or  «  mental  ,  x>  and  in  connexion  with  or  in 
reference  to  obligation ;  and  then  it  relates  to  rights 
and  duties ,  and  is  synonymous  with  ethical.  It  seems 
advisable  to  use  it  always  in  this  sense ,  and  to  em- 
ploy the  words  spiritual  and  mental  in  opposition  to 
natural  and  material  ;and  psychological ,  as  applied 
to  the  science  of  mind ,  in  opposition  to  physical. 
Again ,  a  distinction  is  sometimes  made  between  the 
intellectual  and  moral  powers  or  faculties  —  the 
former  being  directly  those  of  the  understanding, 
the  latter  those  of  the  will ,  or ,  as  they  are  often 
called,  the  «  active  powers ,  h — that  is,  the  passions 
and  feelings.  It  seems  better  to  use  the  word  active 
for  this  purpose  as  opposed  to  intellectual.  Thus  we 
shall  have  these  general  terms ,  spiritual  or  mental. 


14  INTRODUCTION. 

as  applied  to  the  immaterial  part  of  the  creation,  and 
psychological ,  as  applied  to  the  science  which  treats 
of  it.  We  shall  next  have  a  subdivision  of  the  men- 
tal faculties  into  intellectual  and  active;  both  form 
the  subjects  of  psychological  science.  Moral  science  , 
in  its  restricted  sense ,  and  properly  so  called ,  will 
then  denote  that  branch  which  treats  of  duties ,  and 
of  what  is  implied  in  those  duties ,  their  correlative 
rights;  it  will,  in  short,  be  ethical  science. 

Thus  the  science  of  mind— say  Methaphysical 
science — may  be  said  to  consist  of  two  great  bran- 
ches ,  the  one  of  which  treats  of  existences,  the  other 
of  duties.  The  one  accordingly  has  been  termed , 
with  great  accuracy,  Ontology,  speaking  of  that  which 
is ;  the  other ,  Deontology ,  speaking  of  that  which 
ought  to  be.  The  former ,  however ,  comprehends 
properly  all  physical  as  well  as  mental  science.  The 
division  which  appears  upon  the  whole  most  conve- 
nient is  this :  That  metaphysical  science ,  as  contra- 
distinguished from  physical,  is  either  psychological, 
which  treats  of  the  faculties  both  intellectual  and 
active ,  but  treats  of  existences  only ;  or  moral,  which 
treats  of  rights  and  duties ,  and  is  distinguishable 
from  psychological ,  though  plainly  connected  with 
it  nearly  as  corollaries  are  with  the  propositions  from 
whence  they  flow.  Then  physical  truths,  in  one 
respect ,  come  under  the  same  head  with  the  first 
branch  of  metaphysical  truths.  Physical  as  well  as 
psychological  science  treats  of  existences  ,  while 
moral  science  alone  treats  of  duties. 


INTRODUCTION.  15 

According  to  a  like  arrangement ,  Natural  Theo- 
logy consists  of  two  great  branches ,  one  resembling 
Ontology,  the  other  analogous  to  Deontology.  The 
former  comprehends  the  discovery  of  the  existence 
and  attributes  of  a  Creator,  by  investigating  the  evi- 
dences of  design  in  the  works  of  the  creation,  ma- 
terial as  well  as  spiritual.  The  latter  relates  to  the 
discovery  of  his  will  and  probable  intentions  with 
regard  to  his  creatures,  their  conduct,  and  their 
duty.  The  former  resembles  the  physical  and  psy- 
chological sciences,  and  treats  of  the  evidences  of 
design,  wisdom,  and  goodness  exhibited  both  in  the 
natural  and  spiritual  worlds.  The  latter  resembles 
rather  the  department  of  moral  science,  as  distin- 
guished from  both  physical  and  psychological.  We 
may  thus  consider  the  science  of  Natural  Theology 
as  consisting,  like  all  inductive  science,  of  three  com- 
partments, Natural,  Mental,  and  Moral;  or,  taking  the 
Greek  terms,  Physical,  Psychological,  and  Ethical. 

This  classification  is  convenient,  and  its  grounds 
are  very  fit  to  be  premised — at  the  same  time  that 
we  must  admit  the  question  to  be  one  only  of  clas- 
sification and  technology.  Having  so  stated  the  divi- 
sions of  the  subject  and  the  meaning  of  the  terms 
used  in  relation  to  those  divisions,  I  shall  assume 
this  arrangement  and  adhere  to  this  phraseology,  as 
convenient,  though  far  from  representing  it  to  be  the 
best.  In  such  discussions  it  is  far  more  important  to 
employ  one  uniform  and  previously  explained  lan- 
guage or  arrangement,  than  to  be  very  curious  in 


16  INTRODUCTION. 

adopting  the  best.  No  classification,  indeed,  can, 
from  the  nature  of  things,  be  rigorously  exact.  All 
the  branches  of  science,  even  of  natural  philosophy, 
much  more  of  metaphysical,  run  into  each  other,  and 
are  separated  by  gradations  rather  than  by  lines  of 
demarcation.  Nor  could  any  scientific  language  we 
possess  help  breaking  down  under  us  in  an  attempt 
to  maintain  a  perfectly  logical  arrangement 1. 


ANALYSIS  OF  THE    WORK. 

The  order  of  this  Discourse  is  thus  set  out : 

The  First  Part  treats  of  the  nature  of  the  subject, 
and  the  kind  of  evidence  upon  which  Natural  Theo- 
logy rests. 

The  Second  Part  treats  of  the  advantages  derived 
from  the  study  of  the  science. 

The  former  Part  is  divided  into  seven  sections. 

The  first  is  introductory,  and  treats  of  the  kind 
of  evidence  by  which  the  truths  of  Physical  and  Psy- 
chological science  are  investigated,  and  shows  that 
there  is  as  great  an  appearance  of  diversity  between 
the  manner  in  which  we  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of 
different  truths  in  those  inductive  sciences,  as  there 
is  between  the  nature  of  any  such  inductive  investi- 
gation and  the  proofs  of  the  ontological  branches  of 
Natural  Theology.  But  that  diversity  is  proved  to  be 

•  Note  i , 


INTRODUCTION.  17 

only  apparent  ;  and  hence  it  is  inferred,  that  the 
supposed  difference  of  the  proofs  of  Natural  Theo- 
logy may  also  be  only  apparent. 

The  second  section  continues  the  application  of 
this  argument  to  the  Physical  branch  of  Natural 
Theology,  and  shows  further  proofs  that  the  first 
branch  of  Natural  Theology  is  as  much  an  inductive 
science  as  Physics  or  Natural  Philosophy.  The  first 
section  compared  the  ontological  branches  of  Natural 
Theology  with  all  inductive  science ,  physical  as 
well  as  psychological.  The  second  compares  the 
physical  branch  of  Natural  Theology  with  physical 
science  only. 

The  third  section  compares  the  psychological 
branch  of  Natural  Theology  with  psychological 
science,  and  shows  that  both  rest  alike  upon  in- 
duction. 

The  fourth  section  shows  that  the  argumentum  a 
priori  is  unsound  in  a  great  degree — that  it  is  insuf- 
ficient for  the  purpose  to  which  it  is  applied— that 
it  serves  only  to  a  limited  extent — and  that  to  this 
extent  it  is  in  reality  not  distinguishable  from  in- 
duction, or  the  argumentum  a  posteriori. 

The  fifth  section  treats  of  the  second  or  Moral,  the 
deontologiccd  branch  of  Natural  Theology,  and  shows 
that  it  rests  upon  the  same  kind  of  evidence  with 
moral  science,  and  is,  strictly  speaking,  as  much  a 
branch  of  inductive  knowledge. 

The  sixth  section  examines  the  doctrines  of  Lord 
Bacon  respecting  Final  Causes,  and  shows  that  he 


18  INTRODUCTION. 

was  not  adverse  to  the  speculation  when  kept  within 
due  bounds. 

The  seventh  section  examines  the  true  nature  of 
inductive  analysis  and  synthesis,  and  shows  some 
important  errors  prevailing  on  this  subject. 

In  treating  of  the  proofs  of  design  displayed  by 
the  mental  constitution  of  living  creatures,  and  in 
treating  of  the  Soul's  Immortality,  it  becomes  ne- 
cessary to  enter  more  at  large  into  the  subject,  and 
therefore  the  third  and  the  fifth  sections  are  not ,  like 
the  others,  mere  logical  discourses  in  which  the 
doctrines  of  Natural  Theology  are  assumed  rather 
than  explained.  The  subjects  of  those  two  sections 
have  not  been  sufficiently  handled  in  professed  trea- 
tises upon  Natural  Theology,  which  have  been  almost 
wholly  confined  to  the  first  branch  of  the  science — 
the  proofs  of  the  Deity's  existence  and  attributes — 
and  to  the  physical  portion  of  that  branch.  This  de- 
fect I  have  endeavoured  to  supply. 


The  Second  Part,  which  treats  of  the  advantages 
of  the  study,  consists  of  three  sections. 

The  first  shows  that  the  precise  kind  of  pleasure 
derived  from  the  investigation  of  scientific  truths  is 
derived  from  this  study. 

The  second  treats  of  the  pleasures  which  arc  pe- 
culiar to  this  study. 

The  third  treats  of  the  connexion  of  Natural  with 
Revealed  Religion. 


PART  THE  FIRST. 

NATURE  OF  THE  SCIENCE,  AND  OF  ITS  EVIDENCES. 


SECTION  I. 


INTRODUCTORY     VIEW     OF     THE     METHOD    OF      INVESTIGATION 
PURSUED  IN  THE  PHYSICAL  AND  PSYCHOLOGICAL  SCIENCES. 

The  faculties ,  as  well  as  the  feelings  of  the 
human  mind,  its  intellectual,  as  well  as  its  ac- 
tive powers ,  are  employed  without  any  inter- 
mission ,  although  with  varying  degrees  of  exer- 
tion ,  in  one  of  two  ways  —  either  in  regard  to 
some  object  immediately  connected  with  the 
supply  of  our  wants ,  or  in  regard  to  subjects  of 
mere  contemplation.  The  first  class  of  exertions 
relates  to  all  the  objects  of  necessity,  of  comfort, 
or  of  physical  enjoyment  :  in  the  pursuit  of 
these,  the  powers  of  the  understanding ,  or  the 


20  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

passions  ,  or  both  together ,  are  with  nearly  the 
whole  of  mankind  employed  during  the  greater 
portion  of  their  existence  ,  and  with  the  bulk  of 
mankind,  during  almost  the  whole  of  their  exist- 
ence. The  other  class  of  mental  exertions  ,  which 
engrosses  but  a  very  few  men  for  the  greater  part 
of  their  lives,  and  occupies  the  majority  only 
occasionally  and  at  considerable  intervals,  com- 
prehends within  its  scope  all  the  subjects  of  me- 
ditation and  reflection — of  merely  speculative 
reasoning  and  discussion  :  it  is  composed  of  all 
the  efforts  which  our  understanding  can  make, 
and  all  the  desires  which  we  can  feel  upon  sub- 
jects of  mere  science  or  taste ,  matters  which 
begin  and  end  in  intellectual  or  moral  gratifi- 
cation. 

It  is  unquestionably  true  that  these  two  grand 
branches  of  exertion  have  an  intimate  connexion 
with  each  other.  The  pursuits  of  science  lend 
constant  assistance  to  those  of  active  life ;  and 
the  practical  exercise  of  the  mental  powers  con- 
stantly furthers  the  progress  of  science  merely 
speculative.  But  the  two  provinces  are  never- 
theless perfectly  distinguishable  ,  and  ought  not 
to  be  confounded.  The  corollary  from  a  scientific 
discovery  may  be  the  improvement  of  a  very  or- 
dinary machine  or  a  common  working  tool ;  yet 
the  establishment  of  the  speculative  truth  may 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  21 

have  been  the  primary  object  of  the  philosopher 
who  discovered  it ;  and  to  learn  that  truth 
is  the  immediate  purpose  of  him  who  studies  the 
philosopher's  system.  So,  the  better  regulation 
of  the  affections  or  the  more  entire  control  of 
the  passions  may  be  the  result  of  an  acquaintance 
with  our  mental  constitution  ;  but  the  object  of 
him  who  studies  the  laws  of  mind  is  merely  to 
become  acquainted  with  the  spiritual  part  of  our 
nature.  In  like  manner,  it  is  very  possible  that 
the  knowledge  of  a  scientific  truth  may  force 
itself  upon  one  whose  faculties  or  feelings  are 
primarily  engaged  in  some  active  exertion.  Some 
physical  law,  or  some  psychological  truth,  may 
be  discovered  by  one  only  intent  upon  supplying 
a  physical  want ,  or  obtaining  a  mental  enjoy- 
ment. But  here ,  as  in  the  former  case ,  the  scien- 
tific or  speculative  object  is  incidental  to  the 
main  pursuit :  the  matter  of  contemplation  is  the 
corollary  ,  the  matter  of  action  the  proposition. 
The  merely  contemplative  pursuits ,  which 
thus  form  one  of  the  great  branches  of  mental 
exertion ,  seem  again  to  be  divisible  into  two 
classes,  by  a  line  that,  to  a  careless  observer, 
appears  sufficiently  defined.  The  objects  of  our 
inquiry  and  meditation  appear  to  be  either  those 
things  in  the  physical  and  spiritual  worlds,  with 
which  we  are  conversant  through  our  senses , 


22  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

or  by  means  of  our  internal  consciousness  ;  or 
those  things  with  which  we  are  made  acquainted 
only  by  reasoning —  by  the  evidence  of  things 
unseen  and  unfelt.  We  either  discuss  the  pro- 
perties and  relations  of  actually  perceived  and 
conceived  beings  ,  physical  and  mental  —  that 
is,  the  objects  of  sense  and  of  consciousness  —  or 
we  carry  our  inquiries  beyond  those  things 
which  we  see  and  feel ;  we  investigate  the  origin 
of  them  and  ourselves  ;  we  rise  from  the  con- 
templation of  nature  and  of  the  spirit  within  us, 
to  the  first  cause  of  all ,  both  of  body  and  of  mind. 
To  the  one  class  of  speculation  belong  the  in- 
quiries how  matter  and  mind  are  framed,  and 
how  they  act ;  to  the  other  class  belong  the  in- 
quiries whence  they  proceed ,  and  whither  they 
tend.  In  a  word,  the  structure  and  relations  of 
the  universe  form  the  subject  of  the  one  branch 
of  philosophy ,  and  may  be  termed  Human 
Science ;  the  origin  and  destiny  of  the  universe 
forms  the  subject  of  its  other  branch ,  and  is  ter- 
med Divine  Science ,  or  Theology. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  this  classification 
may  be  convenient;  indeed,  it  rests  upon  some 
real  foundation,  for  the  speculations  which  com- 
pose these  two  branches  have  certain  common 
differences  and  common  resemblances.  Yet  it  is 
equally  certain ,  that  nothing  but  an  imperfect 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  23 

knowledge  of  the  subject ,  or  a  superficial  atten- 
tion to  it ,  can  permit  us  to  think  that  there  is 
any  well-defined  boundary  which  separates  the 
two  kinds  of  philosophy ;  that  the  methods  of 
investigation  are  different  in  each  ;  and  that  the 
kind  of  evidence  varies  by  which  the  truths  of 
the  one  and  of  the  other  class  are  demonstrated. 
The  error  is  far  more  extensive  in  its  consequen- 
ces than  a  mere  inaccuracy  of  classification ,  for 
it  materially  impairs  the  force  of  the  proofs  upon 
which  Natural  Theology  rests.  The  proposition 
which  we  would  place  in  its  stead  is  ,  That  this 
science  is  strictly  a  branch  of  inductive  philoso- 
phy, formed  and  supported  by  the  same  kind 
of  reasoning  upon  which  the  Physical  and  Psy- 
chological sciences  are  founded.  This  important 
point  will  be  established  by  a  fuller  explanation; 
and  we  shall  best  set  about  this  task  by  shew- 
ing, in  the  first  place,  that  the  same  apparent 
diversity  of  evidence  exists  in  the  different  sub- 
jects or  departments  of  the  branch  which  we 
have  termed  Human  Science.  It  seems  to  exist 
there  on  a  superficial  examination :  if  a  closer 
scrutiny  puts  that  appearance  to  flight ,  the  in- 
ference is  legitimate ,  that  there  may  be  no  better 
ground  for  admitting  an  essential  difference  be- 
tween the  foundations  of  Human  Science  and 
Divine. 


24  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

The  careless  inquirer  in  to  physical  truth  would 
certainly  think  he  had  seized  on  a  sound  prin- 
ciple of  classification,  if  he  should  divide  the  ob- 
jects with  which  philosophy,  Natural  and  Men- 
tal, is  conversant,  into  two  classes —  those 
objects  of  which  we  know  the  existence  by  our 
senses  or  our  consciousness;  that  is,  external  ob- 
jects which  we  see,  touch,  taste ,  and  smell,  in- 
ternal ideas  wich  we  conceive  or  remember,  or 
emotions  which  we  feel —  and  those  objects  of 
which  we  only  know  the  existence  by  a  process 
of  reasoning,  founded  upon  something  origi- 
nally presentedby  the  senses  or  by  consciousness. 
This  superficial  reasoner  would  range  under  the 
first  of  these  heads  the  members  of  the  animal , 
vegetable,  and  mineral  kingdoms;  the  heavenly 
bodies  ;  the  mind —  for  we  are  supposing  him 
to  be  so  far  capable  of  reflection,  as  to  know  that 
the  proof  of  the  mind's  separate  existence  is ,  at 
the  least,  as  short,  plain,  and  direct,  as  that 
of  the  body,  or  of  external  objects.  Under  the 
second  head  he  would  range  generally  whatever 
objects  of  examination  are  not  directly  perceived 
by  the  senses ,  or  felt  by  consciousness. 

But  a  moment's  reflection  will  shew  both  how 
very  short  a  way  this  classification  would  carry 
our  inaccurate  logician ,  and  how  entirely  his 
principle  fails  to  support  him  even  during  that 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  25 

little  part  of  the  journey.  Thus  the  examination 
of  certain  visible  objects  and  appearances  enables 
us  to  ascertain  the  laws  of  light  and  of  vision. 
Our  senses  teach  us  that  colours  differ,  and  that 
their  mixture  forms  other  hues  ;  that  their  ab- 
sence is  black,  their  combination  in  certain 
proportions  white.  We  are  in  the  same  way 
enabled  to  understand  that  the  organ  of  vision 
performs  its  functions  by  a  natural  apparatus 
resembling,  though  far  surpassing,  certain  in- 
struments of  our  own  constructing, and  that  there- 
fore it  works  on  the  same  principles.  But  that 
light,  which  can  be  perceived  directly  by  none 
of  our  senses,  exists,  as  a  separate  body,  we  only 
infer  by  a  process  of  reasoning  from  things 
which  our  senses  do  perceive.  So  we  are  ac- 
quainted with  the  effects  of  heat  ;  we  know  that 
it  extends  the  dimensions  of  whatever  matter  it 
penetrates  ;  we  feel  its  effects  upon  our  own 
nerves  when  subjected  to  its  operation  ;  and  we 
see  its  effects  in  augmenting,  liquefying,  and 
decomposing  other  bodies ;  but  its  existence  as 
a  separate  substance  we  do  not  know,  except  by 
reasoning  and  by  analogy.  Again,  to  which  of 
the  two  classes  must  we  refer  the  air  ?  Its  exist- 
ence is  not  made  known  by  the  sight ,  the  smell , 
the  taste;  but  is  it  by  the  touch?  Assuredly  a 
stream  of  it  blown  upon  the  nerves  of  touch 


26  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

produces  a  certain  effect ;  but  to  infer  from 
thence  the  existence  of  a  rare,  light,  invisible, 
and  impalpable  fluid,  is  clearly  an  operation  of 
reasoning,  as  much  as  that  which  enables  us  to 
infer  the  existence  of  light  or  heat  from  their 
perceptible  effects.  But  furthermore,  we  are 
accustomed  to  speak  of  seeing  motion  ;  and  the 
reasoner  whom  we  are  supposing  would  cer- 
tainly class  the  phenomena  of  mechanics,  and 
possibly  of  dynamics  generally,  including  astro- 
nomy, under  his  first  head ,  of  things  known 
immediately  by  the  senses.  Yet  assuredly  nothing 
can  be  more  certain  than  that  the  knowledge  of 
motion  is  a  deduction  of  reasoning,  not  a  per- 
ception of  sense  ;  it  is  derived  from  the  compa- 
rison of  two  positions ;  the  idea  of  a  change  of 
place  is  the  result  of  that  comparison  attained 
by  a  short  process  of  reasoning ;  and  the  esti- 
mate of  velocity  is  the  result  of  another  process 
of  reasoning  and  of  recollection.  Thus,  then, 
there  is  at  once  excluded  from  the  first  class 
almost  the  whole  range  of  natural  philosophy. 
But  are  we  quite  sure  that  anything  remains 
which  when  severely  examined  will  stand  the 
test  ?  Let  us  attend  a  little  more  closely  to  the 
things  which  we  have  passed  over  hastily,  as  if 
admitting  that  they  belonged  to  the  first  class. 
It  is  said  that  we  do  not  seelight,  and  we  cer- 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  27 

tainly  can  know  its  existence  directly  by  no 
other  sense  but  that  of  sight,  but  that  we  see 
objects  variously  illuminated,  and  therefore  that 
the  existence  of  light  is  an  inference  of  reason  , 
and  the  diversity  of  colour  an  object  of  sense. 
But  the  very  idea  of  diversity  implies  reasoning , 
for  it  is  the  result  of  a  comparison,  and  when 
we  affirm  that  white  light  is  composed  of  the 
seven  primary  colours  in  certain  proportions, 
we  state  a  proposition  which  is  the  result  of 
much  reasoning — reasoning,  it  is  true,  founded 
upon  sensations  or  impressions  upon  the  senses ; 
but  not  less  founded  upon  such  sensations  is  the 
reasoning  which  makes  us  believe  in  the  exist- 
ence of  a  body  called  light.  The  same  may  be 
said  of  heat,  and  the  phenomena  of  heated  bo- 
dies. The  existence  of  heat  is  an  inference  from 
certain  phenomena,  that  is,  certain  effects  pro- 
duced on  our  external  senses  by  certain  bodies 
or  certain  changes  which  those  senses  undergo 
in  the  neighbourhood  of  those  bodies  ;  but  it  is 
not  more  an  inference  of  reason  than  the  pro- 
position that  heat  extends  or  liquefies  bodies,  for 
that  is  merely  a  conclusion  drawn  from  compa- 
ring our  sensations  occasioned  by  the  external 
objects  placed  in  varying  circumstances. 

But  can  we  say  that  there  is  no  process  of  rea- 
soning even  in  the  simplest  case  which  we  have 


28  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

supposed  our  reasoner  to  put — the  existence  of 
the  three  kingdoms,  of  nature,  of  the  heavenly 
bodies,  of  the  mind  ?  It  is  certain  that  there  is  in 
every  one  of  these  cases  a  process  of  reasoning. 
A  certain  sensation  is  excited  in  the  mind  through 
the  sense  of  vision  ;  it  is  an  inference  of  reason 
that  this  must  have  been  excited  by  something,  or 
must  have  had  a  cause.  That  the  cause  must 
have  been  external,  may  possibly  be  allowed  to 
be  another  inference  which  reason  could  make 
unaided  by  the  evidence  of  any  other  sense.  But 
to  discover  that  the  cause  was  at  any  the  least 
distance  from  the  organ  of  vision,  clearly  re- 
quired a  new  process  of  reasoning,  considerable 
experience,  and  the  indications  of  other  senses; 
for  the  young  man  whom  Mr.  Cheselden  couched 
for  a  cataract  at  first  believed  that  every  thing 
he  saw  touched  his  eye.  Experience  and  rea- 
soning ,  therefore  ,  are  required  to  teach  us  the 
existence  of  external  objects  ;  and  all  that  relates 
to  their  relations  of  size,  colour,  motion,  habits, 
in  a  word,  the  whole  philosophy  of  them,  must 
of  course  be  the  result  of  still  longer  and  more 
complicated  processes  of  reasoning.  So  of  the 
existence  of  the  mind  :  although  undoubtedly 
the  process  of  reasoning  is  the  shortest  of  all,  and 
the  least  liable  to  deception,  yet  so  connected 
are  all  its  phenomena  with  those  of  the  body, 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  29 

that  it  requires  a  process  of  abstraction  alien 
from  the  ordinary  habits  of  most  men,  to  be  per- 
suaded that  we  have  a  more  undeniable  evidence 
of  its  separate  existence  than  we  even  have  of  the 
separate  existence  of  the  body. 

It  thus  clearly  appears  that  we  have  been 
justified  in  calling  the  classifier  whose  case  we 
have  been  supposing,  a  careless  inquirer,  a 
superficial  reasoner,  an  imperfect  logician  ;  that 
there  is  no  real  foundation  for  the  distinction 
which  we  have  supposed  him  to  take  between 
the  different  objects  of  scientific  investigation  ; 
that  the  evidence  upon  which  our  assent  to  both 
classes  of  truths  reposes  is  of  the  same  kind  ,  na- 
mely, the  inferences  drawn  by  reasoning  from 
sensations  or  ideas,  originally  presented  by  the 
external  senses,  or  by  our  inward  consciousness. 

If,  then,  the  distinction  which  at  first  ap- 
peared solid,  is  found  to  be  without  any  warrant 
in  the  different  kinds  of  Human  Science,  has  it 
any  better  grounds  when  we  apply  it  to  draw 
the  line  between  that  branch  of  philosophy  itself, 
and  the  other  which  has  been  termed  Divine,  or 
Theology?  In  other  words  ,  is  there  any  real, 
any  specific  difference  between  the  method  of 
investigation,  the  nature  of  the  evidence,  in  the 
two  departments  of  speculation  ?  Although  this 

Preliminary  Discourse,  and  indeed  the  work 

3 


30          A  DISCOURSE  OF  NATURAL  THEOLOGY. 

itself  which  it  introduces,  and  all  the  illustrations 
of  it,  are  calculated  throughout  to  furnish  the 
answer  to  the  question,  we  shall  yet  add  a  few 
particulars  in  this  place,  in  order  to  show  how 
precisely  the  same  fallacy  which  we  have  been 
exposing,  in  regard  to  the  classification  of  objects 
in  ordinary  scientific  research,  gives  rise  to  the 
more  general  classification  or  separation  of  all 
science  into  two  distinct  branches,  Human  and 
Divine,  and  how  erroneous  it  is  to  suppose  that 
these  two  branches  rest  upon  different  founda- 
tions. 


SECTION  II. 


COMPARISON    OF    THE    PHYSICAL    BRANCH    OF    NATURAL    THEO- 
LOGY   WITH    PHYSICS. 


The  two  inquiries — that  into  the  nature  and 
constitution  of  the  universe,  and  that  into  the 
evidence  of  design  which  it  displays — in  a  word, 
physics  and  psychology,  philosophy  whether 
natural  or  mental,  and  the  fundamental  branch 
of  Natural  Theology, — are  not  only  closely  allied 
one  to  the  other,  but  are  to  a  very  considerable 
extent  identical.  The  two  paths  of  investigation 
for  a  great  part  of  the  way  completely  coincide. 
The  same  induction  of  facts  which  leads  us  to  a 
knowledge  of  the  structure  of  the  eye,  and  its  func 
tions  in  the  animal  economy,  leads  us  to  the  know- 
ledge of  its  adaptation  to  the  properties  of  light. 
It  is  a  truth  of  physics ,  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the 
word ,  that  vision  is  performed  by  the  eye  refract- 
ing light,  and  making  it  converge  to  a  focus  upon 
the  retina;  and  that  the  peculiar  combination  of  its 
lenses,  and  the  different  materials  they  are  com- 
posed of,  correct  the  indistinctness  which  would 


52  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

otherwise  arise  from  the  different  refrangibility 
of  light;  in  other  words,  make  the  eye  an  achro- 
matic instrument.  But  if  this  is  not  also  a  truth 
in  Natural  Theology,  it  is  a  position  from  which, 
by  the  shortest  possible  process  of  reasoning,  we 
arrive  at  a  Theological  truth— namely,  that  the 
instrument  so  successfully  performing  a  given 
service  by  means  of  this  curious  structure,  must 
have  been  formed  with  a  knowledge  of  the  pro- 
perties of  light.  The  position  from  which  so  easy 
a  step  brings  us  to  this  doctrine  of  Natural  Theo- 
logy was  gained  by  strict  induction.  Upon  the 
same  evidence  which  all  natural  science  rests 
on,  reposes  the  knowledge  that  the  eye  is  an 
optical  instrument  :  this  is  a  truth  common  to 
both  Physics  and  Theology.  Before  the  days  of 
Sir  Isaac  Newton,  men  knew  that  they  saw  by 
means  of  the  eye  ,  and  that  the  eye  was  con- 
structed upon  optical  principles;  but  the  reason  of 
its  peculiar  conformation  they  knew  not,  because 
they  were  ignorant  of  the  different  refrangibi- 
lity  of  light.  When  his  discoveries  taught  this 
truth,  it  was  found  to  have  been  acted  upon,  and 
consequently  known,  by  the  Being  who  created 
the  eye.  Still  our  knowledge  was  imperfect;  and 
it  was  reserved  for  Mr.  Dollond  to  discover  an- 
other law  of  nature — the  different  dispersive 
powers  of  different  substances — which  enabled 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  53 

him  to  compound  an  object-glass  that  more  ef- 
fectually corrected  the  various  refrangibility  of 
the  rays.  It  was  now  observed  that  this  truth  also 
must  have  been  known  to  the  maker  of  the  eye ; 
for  upon  its  basis  is  that  instrument,  far  more 
perfect  than  the  achromatic  glass  of  Dollond, 
framed.  These  things  are  truths  in  both  physics 
and  theology  ;  they  are  truths  taught  us  by  the 
self-same  process  of  investigation,  and  resting 
upon  the  self-same  kind  of  evidence. 

When  we  extend  our  inquiries,  and  observe 
the  varieties  of  this  perfect  instrument,  we  mark 
the  adaptation  of  changes  to  the  diversity  of  cir- 
cumstances ;  and  the  truths  thus  learnt  are  in 
like  manner  common  to  Physical  and  Theolo- 
gical science  ;  that  is,  to  Natural  History,  or 
Comparative  Anatomy,  and  Natural  Theology. 

That  beautiful  instrument ,  so  artistly  con- 
trived that  the  most  ingenious  workman  could  not 
imagine  an  improvement  of  it,  becomes  still  more 
interesting  and  more  wonderful,  when  we  find 
that  its  conformation  is  varied  with  the  different 
necessities  of  each  animal.  If  the  animal  prowls 
by  night,  we  see  the  opening  of  the  pupil,  and 
the  power  of  concentration  in  the  eye  increased. 
If  an  amphibious  animal  has  occasionally  to 
dive  into  the  water,  with  the  change  of  the  me- 
dium through  which  the  rays  pass,  there  is  an 

3. 


34  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

accommodation  in  the  condition  of  the  humours, 
and  the  eye  partakes  of  the  eye  both  of  the  qua- 
druped and  the  fish. 

So,  having  contemplated  the  apparatus  for 
protection  in  the  human  eye,  we  find  that  in  the 
lower  animals,  who  want  both  the  accessory 
means  of  cleaning:  the  eye  and  the  ingenuity  to 
accomplish  it  by  other  modes  than  the  eyelids  , 
an  additional  eyelid,  a  new  apparatus,  is  pro- 
vided for  this  purpose. 

Again,  in  fishes,  whose  eye  is  washed  by  the 
element  in  which  they  move,  all  the  exterior 
apparatus  is  unnecessary,  and  is  dismissed  ;  but 
in  the  crab,  and  especially  in  that  species  which 
lies  in  mud,  the  very  peculiar  and  horny  pro- 
minent eye,  which  everybody  must  have  obser- 
ved, would  be  quite  obscured  were  it  not  for  a 
particular  provision.  There  is  a  little  brush  of 
hair  above  the  eye,  against  which  the  eye  is 
occasionally  raised  to  wipe  off  what  may  adhere 
to  it.  The  form  of  the  eye,  the  particular  mode 
in  which  it  is  moved,  and,we  may  say,  the  coarse- 
ness of  the  instrument  compared  with  the  parts 
of  the  same  organ  in  the  higher  class  of  animals, 
make  the  mechanism  of  eyelids  and  of  lachry- 
mal glands  unsuitable.  The  mechanism  used  for 
this  purpose  is  discovered  by  observation  and 
reasoning  ;  that  it  is  contrived  for  this  purpose 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  55 

is  equally  a  discovery  of  observation  and  reason- 
ing. Both  propositions  are  strictly  propositions 
of  physical  science. 

The  same  remarks  apply  to  every  part  of  the 
animal  body.  The  use  to  which  each  member  is 
subservient,  and  the  manner  in  which  it  is  en- 
abled so  to  perform  its  functions  as  to  serve  that 
appointed  use,  is  learnt  by  an  induction  of  the 
strictest  kind.  But  it  is  impossible  to  deny,  that 
what  induction  thus  teaches  forms  the  great  bulk 
of  all  Natural  Theology.  The  question  which  the 
theologian  always  puts  upon  each  discovery  of 
a  purpose  manifestly  accomplished  is  this:  «  Sup- 
pose I  had  this  operation  to  perform  by  mecha- 
nical means,  and  were  acquainted  with  the  laws 
regulating  the  action  of  matter,  should  I  attempt 
it  in  any  other  way  than  I  here  see  practised  ?  » 
If  the  answer  is  in  the  negative,  the  consequence 
is  irresistible  that  somepower,  capable  of  acting, 
with  design,  and  possessing  the  supposed  know- 
ledge, employed  the  means  which  we  see  used. 
But  this  negative  answer  is  the  result  of  reason- 
ing founded  upon  induction,  and  rests  upon  the 
same  evidence  whereon  the  doctrines  of  all  phy- 
sical science  are  discovered  and  believed.  And 
the  inference  to  which  that  negative  answer  so 
inevitably  leads  is  a  truth  in  Natural  Theology  ; 
for  it  is  only  another  way  of  asserting  that  design 


36  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

and  knowledge  are  evinced  in  the  works  and 
functions  of  nature. 

It  may  further  illustrate  the  argument  to  take 
one  or  two  other  examples.  When  a  bird's  egg 
is  examined ,  it  is  found  to  consist  of  three  parts ; 
the  chick,  the  yolk  in  which  the  chick  is  placed, 
and  the  white  in  which  the  yolk  swims.  The  yolk 
is  lighter  than  the  white ;  and  it  is  attached  to  it 
at  two  points ,  joined  by  a  line ,  or  rather  plane, 
heloiv  the  centre  of  gravity  of  the  yolk.  From 
this  arrangement  it  must  follow  that  the  chick 
is  always  uppermost ,  roll  the  egg  how  you  will ; 
consequently  ,  the  chick  is  always  kept  nearest 
to  the  breast  or  belly  of  the  mother  while  she  is 
sitting.  Suppose,  then,  that  any  one  acquainted 
with  the  laws  of  motion  had  to  contrive  things 
so  as  to  secure  this  position  for  the  little  speck 
or  sac  in  question  ,  in  order  to  its  receiving  the 
necessary  heat  from  the  hen  —  could  he  proceed 
otherwise  than  by  placing  it  in  the  lighter  liquid, 
and  suspending  that  liquid  in  the  heavier,  so 
that  its  centre  of  gravity  should  be  above  the  line 
or  plane  of  suspension  ?  Assuredly  not ;  for  in  no 
other  way  could  his  purpose  be  accomplished. 
This  position  is  attained  by  a  strict  induction  ; 
it  is  supported  by  the  same  kind  of  evidence  on 
which  all  physical  truths  rest.  But  it  leads  by  a 
single  step  to  another  truth  in  Natural  Theology; 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  o7 

that  the  egg  must  have  been  formed  by  some 
hand  skilful  in  mechanism  ,  and  acting  under 
the  knowledge  of  dynamics. 

The  forms  of  the  bones  and  joints,  and  the 
tendons  or  cords  which  play  over  them  ,  afford 
a  variety  of  instances  of  the  most  perfect  mecha- 
nical adjustment.  Sometimes  the  power  is  sacri- 
ficed for  rapidity  of  motion,  and  sometimes  ra- 
pidity is  sacrificed  for  power.  Our  knee-pan  ,  or 
patella,  throws  off  the  tendon  which  is  attached 
to  it  from  the  centre  of  motion  ,  and  therefore 
adds  to  the  power  of  the  muscles  of  the  thigh, 
which  enable  us  to  rise  or  to  leap.  We  have  a 
mechanism  of  precisely  the  same  kind  in  the 
lesser  joints ,  where  the  bones,  answering  the 
purposes  of  the  patella,  are  formed  of  a  diminu- 
tive size  ' .  In  the  toes  of  the  ostrich ,  the  material 
is  different,  but  the  mechanism  is  the  same.  An 
elastic  cushion  is  placed  between  the  tendon  and 
the  joint,  which ,  whilst  it  throws  off  the  tendon 
from  the  centre  of  motion ,  and  therefore  adds 
to  the  power  of  the  flexor  muscle,  gives  elasticity 
to  the  bottom  of  the  foot.  And  we  recognise  the 
intention  of  this  when  we  remember  that  this 
bird  docs  not  fly,  but  runs  with  great  swiftness, 
and  that  the  whole  weight  rests  upon  the  foot, 

1  Hence  called  Sesamoid  from  Sesamam,  a  kind  of  grain. 


58  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

which  hasbut  little  relative  breadth;  these  elastic 
cushions  serving  in  some  degree  the  same  office 
as  the  elastic  frog  of  the  horse's  hoof,  or  the 
cushion  in  the  bottom  of  the  camel's  foot. 

The  web-foot  of  a  water-fowl  is  an  inimitable 
paddle ;  and  all  the  ingenuity  of  the  present  day 
exerted  to  improve  our  steam-boats  makes  no- 
thing to  approach  it.  The  flexor  tendon  of  the 
toes  of  the  duck  is  so  directed  over  the  heads  of 
the  bones  of  the  thigh  and  leg,  that  it  is  made 
tight  when  the  creature  bends  its  leg ,  and  is  re- 
laxed when  the  leg  is  stretched  out.  When  the 
bird  draws  its  foot  up,  the  toes  are  drawn  toge- 
ther, in  consequence  of  the  bent  position  of  the 
bones  of  the  leg  pressing  on  the  tendon.  When , 
on  the  contrary,  it  pushes  the  leg  out  straight , 
in  making  the  stroke ,  the  tendons  are  relieved 
from  the  pressure  of  the  heel-bone,  and  the  toes 
are  permitted  to  be  fully  extended  and  at  the  same 
time  expanded ,  so  that  the  web  between  them 
meets  the  resistance  of  a  large  volume  of  water. 

In  another  class  of  birds ,  those  which  roost 
upon  the  branch  of  a  tree ,  the  same  mechanism 
answers  another  purpose.  The  great  length  of 
the  toes  of  these  birds  enables  them  to  grasp  the 
branch;  yet  were  they  supported  by  voluntary 
effort  alone ,  and  were  there  no  other  provision 
made ,  their  grasp  would  relax  in  sleep.  But,  on 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  39 

the  contrary ,  we  know  that  they  roost  on  one 
foot,  and  maintain  a  firm  attitude.  Borelli  has 
taken  pains  to  explain  how  this  is.  The  muscle 
which  bends  the  toes  lies  on  the  fore  part  of  the 
thigh ,  and  runs  over  (he  joint  which  corresponds 
with  our  knee-joint;  from  the  fore  part  its  ten- 
don passes  to  the  back  part  of  the  leg ,  and  over 
the  joint  equivalent  to  our  heel-bone  ;  it  then 
splits,  and  extends  in  the  bottom  of  the  foot  to 
the  toes.  The  consequence  of  this  singular  course 
of  the  tendon  is,  that  when  the  mere  weight  of 
the  bird  causes  these  two  joints  to  bend  under 
it,  the  tendon  is  stretched,  or  would  be  stretch- 
ed ,  were  it  not  that  its  divided  extremities, 
inserted  into  the  last  bones  of  the  toes ,  draw 
these  toes ,  so  that  they  contract ,  and  grasp  the 
branch  on  which  the  bird  roosts ,  without  any 
effort  whatever  on  its  part. 

These  are  facts  learnt  by  induction  ;  the  in- 
ductive science  of  dynamics  shows  us  that  such 
mechanism  is  calculated  to  answer  the  end 
which ,  in  point  of  fact ,  is  attained .  To  conclude 
from  thence  that  the  mechanist  contrived  the 
means  with  the  intention  of  producing  this  end, 
and  with  the  knowledge  of  the  science ,  is  also 
strictly  an  inference  of  induction. 

Examine  now,  in  land  animals ,  the  structure 
of  the  larynx,  the  upper  part  of  which  is  so  con- 


40  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

Irived  as  to  keep  the  windpipe  closely  shut  by 
the  valve  thrown  over  its  orifice,  while  the  food 
is  passing  into  the  stomach  ,  as  it  were ,  over  a 
drawbridge ,  and ,  but  for  that  valve ,  would  fall 
into  the  lungs.  No  one  can  hesitate  in  ascribing 
this  curious  mechanism  to  the  intention  that  the 
same  opening  of  the  throat  and  mouth  should 
serve  for  conveying  food  to  the  stomach  and  air 
to  the  lungs,  without  any  interference  of  the 
two  operations.  But  that  structure  would  not  be 
sufficient  for  animals  which  live  in  the  water , 
and  must  therefore,  while  they  breathe  at  the 
surface ,  carry  down  their  food  to  devour  it  be- 
low. In  them  accordingly,  as  in  the  whale  and 
the  porpoise,  we  find  the  valve  is  not  flat,  but 
prominent  and  somewhat  conical,  rising  towards 
the  back  of  the  nose,  and  the  continuation  of  the 
nostril  by  means  of  a  ring  (or  sphyncter)  muscle 
embraces  the  top  of  the  windpipe  so  as  to  com- 
plete the  communication  between  the  lungs  and 
the  blow-hole,  while  it  cuts  off  all  communica- 
tion between  those  lungs  and  the  mouth. 

Again  ,  if  we  examine  the  structure  of  a  por- 
poise's head  ,  we  find  its  cavities  capable  of  great 
distention,  and  such  that  he  can  fill  them  at 
pleasure  with  air  or  with  water,  according  as 
he  would  mount,  float,  or  sink.  By  closing  the 
blow-hole,  he  shuts  out  the  water;  by  letting  in 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  41 

the  water,  he  can  sink;  by  blowing  from  the 
lungs  against  the  cavities,  he  can  force  out  the 
water  and  fill  the  hollows  with  air  ,  in  order 
to  rise.  No  one  can  doubt  that  such  facts  afford 
direct  evidence  of  an  apt  contrivance  directed 
towards  a  specific  object ,  and  adopted  by  some 
power  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  laws  of 
hydrostatics ,  as  well  as  perfectly  skilful  in  work- 
manship. 

To  draw  an  example  from  a  very  different 
source,  let  us  observe  the  structure  of  the  Plane- 
tary System.  There  is  one  particular  arrange- 
ment which  produces  a  certain  effect — namely, 
the  stability  of  the  system, — produces  it  in  a  man- 
ner peculiarly  adapted  for  perpetual  duration, 
and  produces  it  through  the  agency  of  an  in- 
fluence quite  universal,  pervading  all  space,  and 
equally  regulating  the  motions  of  the  smallest 
particles  of  matter  and  of  its  most  prodigious 
masses.  This  arrangement  consists  in  making  the 
planets  move  in  orbits  more  or  less  elliptical,  but 
none  differing  materially  from  circles  ,  with  the 
sun  near  the  centre,  revolving  almost  in  one 
plane  of  motion,  and  moving  in  the  same  direc- 
tion— those  whose  eccentricity  is  the  most  con- 
siderable having  the  smallest  masses,  and  the 
larger  ones  deviating  hardly  at  all  from  the  cir- 
cular path.  The  influence  of  gravitation,  which 

4 


42  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

is  inseparably  connected  with  all  matter  as  far  as 
we  know,  extends  over  the  whole  of  this  system ; 
so  that  all  those  bodies  which  move  round  the 
sun — twenty-three  planets  including  their  satel- 
lites, and  six  or  seven  comets — are  continually 
acted  upon  each  by  two  kinds  of  force, — the  ori- 
ginal projection  which  sends  them  forward,  and 
is  accompanied  with  a  similar  and  probably  a 
coeval  rotatory  motion  in  some  of  them  round 
their  axis,  and  the  attraction  of  each  towards 
every  other  body,  which  attraction  produces 
three  several  effects — consolidating  the  mass  of 
each,  and,  in  conjunction  with  the  rotatory  mo- 
tion, moulding  their  forms  —  retaining eachpla- 
net  in  its  orbit  round  the  sun,  and  each  satellite 
in  its  orbit  round  the  planet — altering  or  disturb- 
ing what  would  be  the  motion  of  each  round  the 
sun  if  there  were  no  other  bodies  in  the  system 
to  attract  and  disturb.  Now  it  is  demonstrated 
by  the  strictest  process  of  mathematical  reason- 
ing, that  the  result  of  the  whole  of  these  mutual 
actions,  proceeding  from  the  universal  influence 
of  gravitation,  must  necessarily,  in  consequence 
of  the  peculiar  arrangement  which  has  been  de- 
scribed of  the  orbits  and  masses,  and  in  conse- 
quence of  the  law  by  which  gravitation  acts, 
produce  a  constant  alteration  in  the  orbit  of  each 
body,  which  alteration  goes  on  for  thousands  of 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  43 

years,  very  slowly  making  that  orbit  bulge,  as 
it  were,  until  it  reaches  a  certain  shape  ,  when 
the  alteration  begins  to  take  the  opposite  direc- 
tion, and  for  an  equal  number  of  years  goes  on 
constantly,  as  it  were,  flattening  the  orbit,  till  it 
reaches  a  certain  shape,  when  it  stops,  and  then 
the  bulging  again  begins ;  and  that  this  alternate 
change  of  bulging  and  flattening  must  go  on  for 
ever  by  the  same  law,  without  ever  exceeding 
on  either  side  a  certain  point.  All  changes  in  the 
system  are  thus  periodical  and  its  perpetual  sta- 
bility is  completely  secured.  It  is  manifest  that 
such  an  arrangement,  so  conducive  to  such  a 
purpose,  and  so  certainly  accomplishing  that 
purpose,  could  only  have  been  made  with  the 
express  design  of  attaining  such  an  end — that 
some  power  exists  capable  of  thus  producing  such 
wonderful  order  ,  so  marvellous  and  wholly 
admirable  a  harmony  ,  out  of  such  numberless 
disturbances — and  that  this  power  was  actuated 
by  the  intention  of  producing  this  effect  l.  The 
reasoning  upon  this  subject,  I  have  observed  ,  is 
purely  mathematical ;  but  the  facts  respecting 
the  system  on  which  all  the  reasoning  rests  are 

1  Earumautemperenuescursus  atque  perpetui  cum  admira- 
bili  incredibilique  constantia,  declarant  in  his  vim  et  mentem 
esse  divinam,  ut  haec  ipsa  qui  non  sentiat  deorum  vim  habere, 
is  nihil  omnino sensurus esse  \ideatur. Cicero  De  Nai.DeoAl.  ai. 


44  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

known  to  us  by  induction  alone  :  consequently 
the  grand  truth  respecting  the  secular  distur- 
bance, or  the  periodicity  of  the  changes  in  the 
system — that  discovery  which  makes  the  glory 
of  Lagrange  and  Laplace,  and  constitutes  the 
triumph  of  the  Integral  Calculus,  whereof  it  is 
the  fruit,  and  of  the  most  patient  course  of  astro- 
nomical observation  whereon  the  analysis  is 
grounded — may  most  justly  be  classed  as  a  truth 
both  of  the  Mixed  Mathematics  and  of  Natural 
Theology — for  the  theologian  only  adds  a  single 
short  link  to  the  chain  of  the  physical  astrono- 
mer's demonstration,  in  order  to  reach  the  great 
Artificer  from  the  phenomena  of  his  system. 

But  let  us  examine  further  this  matter.  The 
position  which  we  reach  by  a  strict  process  of 
induction,  is  common  to  Natural  Philosophy  and 
Natural  Theology — namely,  that  a  given  organ 
performs  a  given  function,  or  a  given  arrange- 
ment possesses  a  certain  stability,  by  its  adapta- 
tion to  mechanical  laws.  We  have  said  that  the 
process  of  reasoning  is  short  and  easy,  by  which 
we  arrive  at  the  doctrine  more  peculiar  to  Na- 
tural Theology — namely,  that  some  power  ac- 
quainted with  and  acting  upon  the  knowledge 
of  those  laws,  fashioned  the  organ  with  the  in- 
tention of  having  the  function  performed,  or 
constructed  the  system  so  that  it  might  endure. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  45 

Is  not  this  last  process  as  much  one  of  strict  in- 
duction as  the  other  ?  It  is  plainly  only  a  genera- 
lization of  many  particular  facts ;  a  reasoning 
from  things  known  to  things  unknown;  an  in- 
ference of  a  new  or  unknown  relation  from  other 
relations  formerly  observed  and  known.  If,  to 
take  Dr.  Paley's  example,  we  pass  over  a  com- 
mon and  strike  the  foot  against  a  stone,  we  do 
not  stop  to  ask  who  placed  it  there ;  but  if  we 
find  that  our  foot  has  struck  on  a  watch,  we  at 
once  conclude  that  some  mechanic  made  it,  and 
that  some  one  dropt  it  on  the  ground.  Why  do 
we  draw  this  inference?  Because  all  our  former 
experience  had  told  us  that  such  machinery  is 
the  result  of  human  skill  and  labour,  and  that 
it  nowhere  grows  wild  about,  or  is  found  in  the 
earth.  When  we  see  that  a  certain  effect,  namely, 
distinct  vision,  is  performed  by  an  achromatic 
instrument,  the  eye,  why  do  we  infer  that  some 
one  must  have  made  it  ?  Because  we  nowhere 
and  at  no  time  have  had  any  experience  of  any 
one  thing  fashioning  itself ,  and  indeed  cannot 
form  to  ourselves  any  distinct  idea  of  what  such 
a  process  as  self-creation  means  ;  and  further, 
because  when  we  ourselves  would  produce  a 
similar  result,  we  have  recourse  to  like  means. 
Again,  when  we  perceive  the  adaptation  of  na- 
tural objects  and  operations  to  a  perceived  end, 

4- 


46  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

and  from  thence  infer  design  in  the  maker  of 
these  objects  and  superintender  of  these  opera- 
tions, why  do  we  draw  this  conclusion  ?  Because 
we  know  by  experience  that  if  we  ourselves  de- 
sired to  accomplish  a  similar  purpose,  we  should 
do  so  by  the  like  adaptation ;  we  know  by  expe- 
rience that  this  is  design  in  us,  and  that  our  pro- 
ceedings are  the  result  of  such  design ;  we  know 
that  if  some  of  our  works  were  seen  by  others, 
who  neither  were  aware  of  our  having  made 
them  ,  nor  of  the  intention  with  which  we  made 
them  ,  tbey  would  be  right  should  they,  from 
seeing  and  examining  them  ,  both  infer  that  we 
had  made  them  ,  and  conjecture  why  we  had 
made  them.  The  same  reasoning,  by  the  help  of 
experience ,  from  what  we  know  to  what  we 
cannot  know,  is  manifestly  the  foundation  of  the 
inference ,  that  the  members  of  the  body  were 
fashioned  for  certain  uses  by  a  maker  acquain- 
ted with  their  operations ,  and  willing  that  those 
uses  should  be  served. 

Let  us  consider  a  branch  of  science  which,  if 
not  wholly  of  modern  introduction,  has  received 
of  late  years  such  vast  additions  that  it  may 
really  be  said  to  have  its  rise  in  our  own  times 
— I  allude  to  the  sublime  speculations  in  Osteo- 
logy prosecuted  by  Guvier,Buckland,  and  others, 
in  its  connexion  with  Zoological  researches. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  47 

A  comparative  anatomist,  of  profound  learn- 
ing and  marvellous  sagacity,  has  presented  to 
him  what  to  common  eyes  would  seem  a  piece 
ofhalf-decayed  bone,  found  in  a  wild,  in  a  fo- 
rest, or  in  a  cave.  By  accurately  examining  its 
shape  particularly  the  form  of  its  extremity  or 
extremities  ( if  both  ends  happen  to  be  entire  ), 
by  close  inspection  of  the  texture  of  its  surface, 
and  by  admeasurement  of  its  proportions,  he  can 
with  certainty  discover  the  general  form  of  the 
animal  to  which  it  belonged,  its  size  as  well  as 
its  shape,  the  economy  of  its  viscera,  and  its  ge- 
neral habits.  Sometimes  the  investigation  in  such 
cases  proceeds  upon  chains  of  reasoning  where 
all  the  links  are  seen  and  understood  ;  where 
the  connexion  of  the  parts  found  with  other 
parts  and  with  habitudes  is  perceived,  and  the 
reason  understood, — as  that  the  animal  had  a 
trunk  because  the  neck  was  short  compared 
with  its  height  ;  or  that  it  ruminated  because  its 
teeth  were  imperfect  for  complete  mastication. 
But,  frequently,  the  inquiry  is  as  certain  in  its 
results,  although  some  links  of  the  chain  are  con- 
cealed from  our  view,  and  the  conclusion  wears 
a  more  empirical  aspect — as  gathering  that  the 
animal  ruminated  from  observing  the  print  of  a 
cloven  hoof,  or  that  he  had  horns  from  his 
wanting  certain  teeth,  or  that  he  wanted  the 


48  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

collarbone  from  his  having  cloven  hoofs.  Limited 
experience  having  already  shown  such  con- 
nexions as  facts,  more  extended  experience  will 
assuredly  one  day  enable  us  to  comprehend  the 
reason  of  the  connexion. 

The  discoveries  already  made  in  this  branch 
of  science  are  truly  wonderful,  and  they  proceed 
upon  the  strictest  rules  of  induction.  It  is  shown 
that  animals  formerly  existed  on  the  globe, 
being  unknown  varieties  of  species  still  known  ; 
but  it  also  appears  that  species  existed,  and  even 
genera,  wholly  unknown  for  the  last  five  thou- 
sand years.  These  peopled  the  earth,  as  it  was, 
not  before  the  general  deluge,  but  before  some 
convulsion  long  prior  to  that  event  had  over- 
whelmed the  countries  then  dry,  and  raised 
others  from  the  bottom  of  the  sea.  In  these 
curious  inquiries,  we  are  conversant  not  merely 
with  the  world  before  the  flood,  but  with  a 
world  which,  before  the  flood,  was  covered 
with  water,  and  which,  in  far  earlier  ages,  had 
been  the  habitation  of  birds,  and  beasts,  and 
reptiles.  We  are  carried,  as  it  were,  several 
worlds  back,  and  we  reach  a  period  when  all 
was  water,  and  slime,  and  mud,  and  the  waste, 
without  either  man  or  plants,  gave  resting 
place  to  enormous  beasts  like  lions  and  ele- 
phants and  river-horses,  while  the  water  was 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  49 

tenanted  by  lizards,  the  size  of  a  whale,  sixty  or 
seventy  feet  long,  and  by  others  with  huge 
eyes  having  shields  of  solid  bone  to  protect  them, 
and  glaring  from  a  neck  ten  feet  in  length,  and 
the  air  was  darkened  by  flying  reptiles  covered 
with  scales  ,  opening  the  jaws  of  the  crocodile  , 
and  expanding  wings,  armed  at  the  tips  with 
the  claws  of  the  leopard. 

No  less  strange  ,  and  yet  no  less  proceeding 
from  induction  ,  are  the  discoveries  made  re- 
specting the  former  state  of  the  earth  ;  the  man- 
ner in  which  those  animals ,  whether  of  known 
or  unknown  tribes  ,  occupied  it ;  and  the  period 
when,  or,  at  least,  the  way,  in  which  they 
ceased  to  exist.  Professor  Buckland  has  demon- 
strated the  identity  with  the  hyaena's  of  the 
animal's  habits  that  cracked  the  bones  which 
fill  some  of  the  caves  ,  in  order  to  come  at  the 
marrow  ;  but  he  has  also  satisfactorily  shown 
that  it  inhabited  the  neighbourhood  ,  and  must 
have  been  suddenly  exterminated  by  drowning. 
His  researches  have  been  conducted  by  experi- 
ments with  living  animals  ,  as  well  as  by  obser- 
vation upon  the  fossil  remains  *. 


1  The  researches  hoth  of  Cuvier  and  Buckland  ,  far  from  im- 
pugning the  testimony  to  the  great  fact  of  a  deluge  borne  by 
the  Mosaic    writings,  rather  fortify  it;  and  bring   additional 


50  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

That  this  branch  of  scientific  inquiry  is  singu- 
larly attractive  all  will  allow.  Nor  will  any  one 
dispute  that  its  cultivation  demands  great  know- 
ledge and  skill.  But  this  is  notour  chief  purpose 
in  referring  to  it.  There  can  be  as  little  doubt 
that  the  investigation  ,  in  the  strictest  sense  of 
the  term ,  forms  a  branch  of  physical  science  , 
and  that  this  branch  sprang  legitimately  from  the 
grand  root  of  the  whole,  —  induction  ;  in  a 
word  ,  that  the  process  of  reasoning  employed  to 
investigate  —  the  kind  of  evidence  used  to  de- 
monstrate its  truths ,  is  the  modern  analysis  or 
induction  taught  by  Bacon  and  practised  by 
Newton.  Now  wherein ,  with  reference  to  its 
nature  and  foundations  ,  does  it  vary  from  the 
inquiries  and  illustrations  of  Natural  Theology? 
When  from  examining  a  few  bones ,  or  it  may 


proofs  of  the  fallacy  which,  for  some  time ,  had  led  philosophers 
to  ascrihe  a  very  high  antiquity  to  the  world  we  now  live  in.  . 
The  extraordinary  sagacity  of  Cuvier  is ,  perhaps ,  in  no 
instance  more  shown  ,  nor  the  singular  nature  of  the  science 
better  illustrated,  than  in  the  correction  which  it  enabled  him 
to  give  the  speculation  of  President  Jefferson  upon  the  Mega- 
lonyx —  an  animal  which  the  President,  from  the  size  of  a  bone 
discovered,  supposed  to  have  existed,  four  times  the  size  an 
ox  ,  and  with  the  form  and  habits  of  the  lion.  Cuvier  has  irre- 
fragably  shown ,  by  an  acute  and  learned  induction  ,  that  the 
animal  was  a  sloth,  living  entirely  upon  vegetable  food,  but  of 
enormous  size,  like  a  rhinoceros  ,  and  whose  paws  could  tear 
up  huge  trees. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  51 

be  a  single  fragment  of  a  bone  ,  we  infer  that , 
in  the  wilds  where  we  found  it ,  there  lived  and 
ranged ,  some  thousands  of  years  ago ,  an  animal 
wholly  different  from  any  we  ever  saw,  and 
from  any  of  which  any  account ,  any  tradition , 
written  or  oral ,  has  reached  us  ,  nay  ,  from  any 
(hat  ever  was  seen  by  any  person  of  whose  exist- 
ence we  ever  heard ,  we  assuredly  are  led  to 
this  remote  conclusion  ,  by  a  strict  and  rigorous 
process  of  reasoning;  but,  as  certainly,  we 
come  through  that  process  to  the  knowledge  and 
belief  of  things  unseen,  both  of  us  and  of  all 
men  —  things  respecting  which  we  have  not , 
and  cannot  have  ,  a  single  particle  of  evidence, 
either  by  sense  or  by  testimony.  Yet  we  harbour 
no  doubt  of  the  fact;  we  go  farther,  and  not 
only  implicitly  believe  the  existence  of  this 
creature ,  for  which  we  are  forced  to  invent  a 
name,  but  clothe  it  with  attributes,  till ,  reason- 
ing step  by  step  ,  we  come  at  so  accurate  a  no- 
tion of  its  form  and  habits  ,  that  we  can  repre- 
sent the  one,  and  describe  the  other,  with 
unerring  accuracy  ;  picturing  to  ourselves  how 
it  looked  ,  what  it  fed  on  ,  and  how  it  continued 
its  kind. 

Now  ,  the  question  is  this  :  What  perceivable 
difference  is  there  between  the  kind  of  investi- 
gations we  have  just  been  considering,  and  those 


52  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

of  Natural  Theology*  —  except ,  indeed  ,  that 
the  latter  are  far  more  sublime  in  themselves  , 
and  incomparably  more  interesting  to  us  ?  Where 
is  the  logical  precision  of  the  arrangement, 
which  would  draw  a  broad  line  of  demarcation 
between  the  two  speculations  ,  giving  to  the 
one  the  name  and  the  rank  of  a  science,  and 
refusing  it  to  the  other ,  and  affirming  that  the 
one  rested  upon  induction  ,  but  not  the  other? 
We  have ,  it  is  true  ,  no  experience  directly  of 
that  Great  Being's  existence  in  whom  we  believe 
as  our  Creator  ;  nor  have  we  the  testimony  of 
any  man  relating  such  experience  of  his  own. 
But  so,  neither  we,  nor  any  witnesses  in  any 
age  ,  have  ever  seen  those  works  of  that  Being , 
the  lost  animals  that  once  peopled  the  earth  ;  and 
yet  the  lights  of  inductive  science  have  conducted 
us  to  a  full  knowledge  of  their  nature ,  as  well 
as  a  perfect  belief  in  their  existence.  Without 
any  evidence  from  our  senses  ,  or  from  the  testi- 
mony of  eye-witnesses,  we  believe  in  the  exist- 
ence and  qualities  of  these  animals  ,  because  we 
infer  by  the  induction  of  facts  that  they  once 
lived  ,  and  were  endowed  with  a  certain  nature. 
This  is  called  a  doctrine  of  inductive  philosophy. 
Is  it  less  a  doctrine  of  the  same  philosophy,  that 
the  eye  could  not  have  been  made  without  a 
knowledge  of  optics ,  and  as  it  could  not  make 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  b5 

itself,  and  as  no  human  artist ,  though  possessed 
of  the  knowledge  ,  has  the  skill  and  power  to 
fashion  it  by  his  handy-work  ,  that  there  must 
exist  some  being  of  knowledge  ,  skill ,  and 
power  ,  superior  to  our  own  ,  and  sufficient  to 
create  it? 


SECTION  III. 


COMPARISON    OF    THE     PSYCHOLOGICAL    BRANCH    OF    NATURAL 
THEOLOGY    WITH    PSYCHOLOGY. 


Hitherto,  our  argument  has  rested  upon  a  com- 
parison of  the  truths  of  Natural  Theology  with 
those  of  Physical  Science.  But  the  evidences  of 
design  presented  hy  the  universe  are  not  merely 
those  which  the  material  world  affords  ;  the  in- 
tellectual system  is  equally  fruitful  in  proofs  of 
an  intelligent  cause,  although  these  have  occu- 
pied little  of  the  philosopher's  attention  ,  and 
may ,  indeed ,  he  said  never  to  have  found  a 
place  among  the  speculations  of  the  Natural 
Theologian.  Nothing  is  more  remarkable  than 
the  care  with  which  all  the  writers  upon  this 
subject ,  at  least  among  the  moderns  ,  have 
confined  themselves  to  the  proofs  afforded  by 
the  visible  and  sensible  works  of  nature  ,  while 
the  evidence  furnished  by  the  mind  and  its 
operations  has  been  wholly  neglected  l.  The 

#■ 
»  Note  2. 


A  DISCOURSE  OF  NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  55 

celebrated  book  of  Ray  on  the  Wonders  of  the 
Creation  seems  to  assume  that  the  human  soul 
hasno  separate  existence  —  that  it  forms  no  part 
of  the  created  system.  Derhamhas  written  upon 
Astro-theology  and  Physico-theology  as  if  the 
heavens  alone  proclamed  the  glory  of  God  ,  and 
the  earth  only  showed  forth  is  handy-work  ;  for 
his  only  mention  of  intellectual  nature  is  in  the 
single  chapter  of  the  Physico-theology  on  the 
soul ,  in  which  he  is  content  with  two  observa- 
tions :  one,  on  the  variety  of  man's  inclinations  , 
and  another  ,  on  his  inventive  powers  —  giving 
nothing  which  precisely  proves  design.  Dr.  Pa- 
ley  ,  whose  work  is  chiefly  taken  from  the  writ- 
ings of  Derham  ,  deriving  from  them  its  whole 
plan  and  much  of  its  substance  ,  but  clothing  the 
harsher  statements  of  his  original  in  an  attractive 
and  popular  style1,  had  so  little  of  scientific  ha- 
bits ,  so  moderate  a  power  of  generalising ,  that 
he  never  once  mentions  the  mind  ,  or  any  of  the 
intellectual  phenomena  ,  nor  ever  appears  to 
consider  them  as  forming  a  portion  of  the  works 


1  This  observation  in  nowise  diminishes  peculiar  merit  of 
the  style,  and  also  of  the  homely,  but  close  and  logical  manner  in 
which  the  argument  is  put;  nor  does  it  deny  the  praise  of  bringing 
down  the  facts  of  former  writers,  and  adapting  them  to  the  im- 
proved state  of  physical  science— a  merit  the  more  remarkable, 
thatPaley  wrote  his  Natural  Theology  at  the  close  of  his  life. 


56  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

or  operations  of  nature.  Thus  ,  all  these  authors 
view  the  revolutions  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  the 
structure  of  animals  ,  the  organization  of  plants  , 
and  the  various  operations  of  the  material  world 
which  we  see  carried  on  around  us ,  as  indicating: 
the  existence  of  design  ,  and  leading  to  a  know- 
ledge of  the  Creator.  But  they  pass  over  in 
silence,  unaccountably  enough  ,  by  far  the  most 
singular  work  of  divine  wisdom  and  power  —  the 
mind  itself.  Is  there  any  reason  whatever  to  draw 
this  line ;  to  narrow  within  these  circles  the  field 
of  Natural  Theology  ;  to  draw  from  the  constitu- 
tion and  habits  of  matter  alone  the  proof  that 
one  Intelligent  Cause  formed  and  supports  the 
universe?  Ought  we  not  rather  to  consider 
the  phenomena  of  the  mind  as  more  peculiarly 
adapted  to  help  this  inquiry ,  and  as  bearing  a 
nearer  relation  to  the  Great  Intelligence  which 
created  and  which  maintains  the  system? 

There  cannot  be  a  doubt  that  this  extraordi- 
nary omission  had  its  origin  in  the  doubts  which 
men  are  prone  to  entertain  of  the  mind's  existence 
independent  of  matter.  The  eminent  persons 
above  named  *  were  not  materialist ,  that  is  to 


■  Some  have  thought,  unjustly,  that  the  language  of  Paley 
rather  savours  ofmaterialism;hut  it  may  he  douhted  whether  he 
was,  fully  impressed  with  the  evidence  of  mental  existence.    His 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  57 

say ,  if  you  had  asked  them  the  question ,  they 
would  have  answered  in  the  negative ;  they 
would  have  gone  farther,  and  asserted  their  be- 
lief in  the  separate  existence  of  the  soul  inde- 
pendent of  the  body.  But  they  never  felt  this  as 
strongly  as  they  were  persuaded  of  the  natural 
world's  existence.  Their  habits  of  thinking  led 
them  to  consider  matter  as  the  only  certain  exist- 
ence—  as  that  which  composed  the  universe  — 
as  alone  forming  the  subject  of  our  contempla- 
tions—  as  furnishing  the  only  materials  for  our 
inquiries,  whether  respecting  structure  or  habits 
and  operations.  They  had  no  firm ,  definite , 
abiding ,  precise  idea  of  any  other  existence  re- 
specting which  they  could  reason  and  speculate. 
They  saw  and  they  felt  external  objects  ;  they 
could  examine  the  lenses  of  the  eye ,  the  val- 
ves of  the  veins  and  arteries,  the  ligaments 
and  the  sockets  of  the  joints,  the  bones  and  the 
drum  of  the  ear;  but  though  they  now  and 
then  made  mention  of  the  mind,  and,  when 
forced  to  the  point ,  would  acknowledge  a  belief 
in  it,  they  never  were  fully  and  intimately  per- 


limited  and  unexercised  powers  of  abstract  discussion,  and  the 
natural  predilection  for  what  he  handled  so  well— a  practical 
argument  level  to  all  comprehensions— appear  not  to  have  given 
him  any  taste  for  metaphysical  speculations. 

5. 


58  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

suaded  of  its  separate  existence.  They  thought 
of  it  and  of  matter  very  differently  ;  they  gave 
its  structure ,  and  its  habits  ,  and  its  operations, 
no  place  in  their  inquiries ;  their  contemplations 
never  rested  upon  it  with  any  steadiness  ,  and 
indeed  scarcely  ever  even  glanced  upon  it  at  all. 
That  this  is  a  very  great  omission,  proceeding, 
if  not  upon  mere  carelessness ,  upon  a  grievous 
fallacy ,  there  can  be  no  doubt  whatever. 

The  evidence  for  the  existence  of  mind  is  to 
the  full  as  complete  as  that  upon  which  we  be- 
lieve in  the  existence  of  matter.  Indeed  it  is  more 
certain  and  more  irrefragable.  The  consciousness 
of  existence ,  the  perpetual  sense  that  we  are 
thinking,  and  that  we  are  performing  the  opera- 
tion quite  independently  of  all  material  objects, 
proves  to  us  the  existence  of  a  being  different 
from  our  bodies,  with  a  degree  of  evidence  higher 
than  any  we  can  have  for  the  existence  of  those 
bodies  themselves  ,  or  of  any  other  part  of  the 
material  world.  It  is  certain  —  proved,  indeed, 
to  demonstration  —  that  many  of  the  perceptions 
of  matter  which  we  derive  through  the  senses  are 
deceitful,  and  seem  to  indicate  that  which  has  no 
reality  at  all.  Some  inferences  which  we  draw 
respecting  it  are  confounded  with  direct  sensation 
or  perception ,  for  example ,  the  idea  of  motion  ; 
other  ideas,  as  those  of  hardness  and  solidity,  are 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  59 

equally  the  result  of  reasoning,  and  often  mislead. 
Thus  we  never  doubt ,  on  the  testimony  of  our 
senses,  that  the  parts  of  matter  touch  —  that  dif- 
ferent bodies  come  in  contact  with  one  another, 
and  with  our  organs  of  sense;  and  yet  nothing  is 
more  certain  than  that  there  still  is  some  small 
distance  between  the  bodies  which  we  think  we 
perceive  to  touch.  Indeed  it  is  barely  possible  that 
all  the  sensations  and  perceptions  which  we  have 
of  the  material  world  may  be  only  ideas  in  our 
own  minds:  it  is  barely  possible,  therefore,  that 
matter  should  have  no  existence.  But  that  mind — 
that  the  sentient  principle  —  that  the  thing  or 
the  being  which  we  call  «  I»  and  «  toe,  »  and 
which  thinks ,  feels ,  reasons  —  should  have  no 
existence ,  is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Of  the  two 
existences  ,  then,  that  of  mind  as  independent 
of  matter  is  more  certain  than  that  of  matter  apart 
from  mind.  In  a  subsequent  branch  of  this  dis- 
course %  we  shall  have  occasion  to  treat  again 
of  this  question,  when  the  constitution  of  the  soul 
with  reference  to  its  future  existence  becomes  the 
subject  of  discussion.  At  present  we  have  only 
to  keep  steadily  in  view  the  undoubted  fact ,  that 
mind  is  quite  as  much  an  integral  part  of  the 
universe  as  matter. 

1  Sect.  V  and  Note  4. 


60  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

It  follows  that  the  constitution  and  functions 
of  the  mind  are  as  much  the  subjects  of  inductive 
reasoning  and  investigation ,  as  the  structure  and 
actions  of  matter.  The  mind  equally  with  matter 
is  the  proper  subject  of  observation ,  by  means 
of  consciousness,  which  enables  us  to  arrest  and 
examine  our  own  thoughts  :  it  is  even  the  sub- 
ject of  experiment,  by  the  power  which  we  have, 
through  the  efforts  of  abstraction  and  attention  , 
of  turning  those  thoughts  into  courses  not  natural 
to  them ,  not  spontaneous ,  and  watching  the  re- 
sults1. Now  the  phenomena  of  mind,  at  the  know- 
ledge of  which  we  arrive  by  this  inductive  pro- 
cess ,  the  only  legitimate  intellectual  philosophy, 
afford  as  decisive  proofs  of  design  as  do  the  phe- 
nomena of  matter,  and  they  furnish  those  proofs 
by  the  strict  method  of  induction .  In  other  words, 
we  study  the  nature  and  operations  of  the  mind, 
and  gather  from  them  evidences  of  design ,  by 
one  and  the  same  species  of  reasoning,  the  in- 
duction of  facts.  A  few  illustrations  of  these  po- 
sitions may  be  useful ,  because  this  branch  of  the 
science  has  ,  as  we  have  seen  ,  been  unaccoun- 
tably neglected  by  philosophers  and  theologians. 


1  An  instance  will  occur  in  the  Fifth  Section  of  this  Part,  in 
which  experiments  upon  the  course  of  our  thoughts  in  sleep  are 
descrihed. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  61 

First.  The  structure  of  the  mind,  in  every  way 
in  which  we  can  regard  it,  affords  evidences  of 
the  most  skilful  contrivance.  All  that  adapts  it 
so  admirably  to  the  operations  which  it  performs, 
all  its  faculties,  are  plainly  means  working  to 
an  end.  Among  the  most  remarkable  of  these  is 
the  power  of  reasoning,  or  first  comparing  ideas 
and  drawing  conclusions  from  the  comparison , 
and  then  comparing  together  those  conclusions 
or  judgments.  In  this  process,  the  great  instru- 
ment is  attention,  as  indeed  it  is  the  most  im- 
portant of  allthe  mental  faculties.  It  is  the  power 
by  which  the  mind  fixes  itself  upon  a  subject, 
and  its  operations  are  facilitated  by  many  con- 
trivances of  nature ,  without  which  the  effort 
would  be  painful,  if  not  impossible  —  voluntary 
attention  being  the  most  difficult  of  all  acts  of 
the  understanding. 

Observe,  then,  in  the  second  place,  the  helps 
which  are  provided  for  the  exertion  of  this  fa- 
culty. Curiosity,  or  the  thirst  of  knowledge,  is 
one  of  the  chief  of  these.  This  desire  renders  any 
new  idea  the  source  of  attraction,  and  makes  the 
mind  almost  involuntarily,  and  with  gratifica- 
tion rather  than  pain  ,  bend  and  apply  itself  to 
whatever  has  the  quality  of  novelty  to  rouse  it. 
But  association  gives  additional  facilities  of  the 
same  kind ,  and  makes  us  attend  with  satisfaction 


62  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

to  ideas  which  formerly  were  present  and  fami- 
liar, and  the  revival  of  which  gives  pleasure 
oftentimes  as  sensible  as  that  of  novelty,  though 
of  an  opposite  kind.  Then,  again ,  habit,  in  this, 
as  in  all  other  operations  of  our  faculties ,  has 
the  most  powerful  influence ,  and  enables  us  to 
undergo  intellectual  labour  with  ease  and  com- 
fort. 

Thirdly.  Consider  the  phenomena  of  memory. 
This  important  faculty,  without  which  no  intel- 
lectual progress  whatever  could  be  made,  is  sin- 
gularly adapted  to  its  uses.  The  tenacity  of  our 
recollection  is  in  proportion  to  the  attention 
which  has  been  exercised  upon  the  several  ob- 
jects of  contemplation  at  the  time  they  were 
submitted  to  the  mind.  Hence  it  follows  ,  that 
by  exerting  a  more  vigorous  attention ,  by  de- 
taining ideas  for  some  time  under  our  view ,  as 
it  were ,  while  they  pass  through  the  mind  or 
before  it ,  we  cause  them  to  make  a  deeper  im- 
pression upon  the  memory,  and  are  thus  en- 
abled to  recollect  those  things  the  longest  which 
we  most  desire  to  keep  in  mind.  Hence,  too, 
whatever  facilitates  attention ,  whatever  excites 
it ,  as  we  sometimes  say,  helps  the  memory ;  so 
that  we  recollect  those  things  the  longest  which 
were  most  striking  at  the  time.  But  those  things 
are,  generally  speaking ,  most  striking,  and  most 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  63 

excite  the  attention,  which  are  in  themselves 
most  important.  In  proportion  ,  therefore,  as 
anything  is  most  useful,  or  for  any  reason  most 
desirable  to  be  remembered,  it  is  most  easily 
stored  up  in  our  memory. 

We  may  observe,  however, in  the/bwrJ/t  place, 
that  readiness  of  memory  is  almost  as  useful  as 
tenacity — quickness  of  bringing  out  as  power  of 
retention.  Habit  enables  us  to  tax  our  recollec- 
tion with  surprising  facility  and  certainty;  as  any 
one  must  be  aware  who  has  remarked  the  ex- 
traordinary feats  performed  by  boys  trained  to 
learn  things  by  heart ,  and  especially  to  recol- 
lect numbers  in  calculating.  From  the  same  force 
of  habit  we  derive  the  important  power  of  for- 
ming artificial  or  conventional  associations  be- 
tween ideas — of  tacking ,  as  it  were  ,  one  to  the 
other ,  in  order  to  have  them  more  under  our 
control ;  and  hence  the  relation  between  arbi- 
trary signs  and  the  things  signified  ,  and  the 
whole  use  of  language,  whether  ordinary  or  al- 
gebraical :  hence,  too ,  the  formation  of  what  is 
calledartificial  memory,  and  of  all  the  other  helps 
to  recollection.  But  a  help  is  provided  for  quick- 
ness of  memory  ,  independent  of  any  habit  or 
training,  in  what  may  be  termed  the  natural  as- 
sociation of  ideas  ,  whereby  one  thing  suggests 
another  from  various  relations  of  likeness,  con- 


64  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

trast ,  contiguity,  and  so  forth.  The  same  asso- 
ciation of  ideas  is  of  constant  use  in  the  exercise 
of  the  inventive  faculty,  which  mainly  depends 
upon  it,  and  which  is  the  great  instrument  not 
only  in  works  of  imagination  ,  hut  in  conducting 
all  processes  of  original  investigation  by  pure 
reasoning. 

Fifthly.  The  effect  of  habit  upon  our  whole 
intellectual  system  deserves  to  be  further  consi- 
dered, though  we  have  already  adverted. to  it. 
It  is  a  law  of  our  nature  that  any  exertion  be- 
comes more  easy  the  more  frequently  it  is  repea- 
ted. This  might  have  been  otherwise  :  it  might 
have  been  just  the  contrary,  so  that  each  suc- 
cessive operation  should  have  been  more  diffi- 
cult; and  it  is  needless  to  dwell  upon  the  slow- 
ness of  our  progress,  as  well  as  the  painfulness 
of  all  our  exertions ,  say  ,  rather  ,  the  impossibi- 
lity of  our  making  any  advances  in  learning  , 
which  must  have  been  the  result  of  such  an  in- 
tellectual conformation.  But  the  influence  of 
habit  upon  the  exercise  of  all  our  faculties 
is  valuable  beyond  expression.  It  is  indeed 
the  great  means  of  our  improvement  both  in- 
tellectual and  moral  ,  and  it  furnishes  us  with 
the  chief,  almost  the  only,  power  we  possess 
of  making  the  different  faculties  of  the  mind 
obedient  to  the  will.  Whoever  has  observed  the 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  65 

extraordinary  feats  performed  by  calculators, 
orators ,  rhymers  ,  musicians  ,  nay  ,  by  artists  of 
all  descriptions  ,  can  want  no  further  proof  of 
the  power  that  man  derives  from  the  contrivan- 
ces by  which  habits  are  formed  in  all  mental 
exertions.  The  performances  of  the  Italian  Im- 
provvisatori ,  or  makers  of  poetry  off-hand  upon 
any  presented  subject,  and  in  almost  any  kind 
of  stanza  ,  are  generally  cited  as  the  most  sur- 
prising efforts  in  this  kind.  But  the  power  of  ex- 
tempore speaking  is  not  less  singular,  though  more 
frequently  displayed ,  at  least  in  this  country. 
A  practised  orator  will  declaim  in  measured  and 
in  various  periods — will  weave  his  discourse 
into  one  texture — form  parenthesis  within  pa- 
renthesis— excite  the  passions  ,  or  move  to 
laughter — take  a  turn  in  his  discourse  from  an 
accidental  interruption  ,  making  it  the  topic  of 
his  rhetoric  for  five  minutes  to  come,  and  pur- 
suing in  like  manner  the  new  illustrations  to 
which  it  gives  rise— mould  his  diction  with  a 
view  to  attain  or  to  shun  an  epigrammatic  point, 
or  an  alliteration ,  or  a  discord  ;  and  ail  this  with 
so  much  assured  reliance  on  his  own  powers , 
and  with  such  perfect  ease  to  himself,  that  he 
shall  even  plan  the  next  sentence  while  he  is 
pronouncing  off-hand  the  one  he  is  engaged  with, 
adapting  each  to  the  other,  and  shall  look  for- 

6 


66  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

ward  to  the  topic  which  is  to  follow  and  fit  in 
the  close  of  the  one  he  is  handling  to  be  its  in- 
troducer; nor  shall  any  auditor  be  able  to  dis- 
cover the  least  difference  between  all  this  and  the 
portion  of  his  speech  which  he  has  got  by  heart , 
or  tell  the  transition  from  the  one  to  the  other. 
Sixth.  The  feelings  and  the  passions  with 
which  we  are  moved  or  agitated  are  devised  for 
purposes  apparent  enough  ,  and  to  effect  which 
their  adaptation  is  undeniable.  That  of  love,  tends 
to  the  continuance  of  the  species — the  affections, 
to  the  rearing  of  the  young ;  and  the  former  are 
fitted  to  the  difference  of  sex,  as  the  latter  are 
to  that  of  age.  Generally  ,  there  are  feelings  of 
sympathy  excited  by  distress  and  by  weakness, 
and  these  beget  attachment  towards  their  ob- 
jects, and  a  disposition  to  relieve  them  or  to  sup- 
port. Both  individuals  and  societies  at  large  gain 
by  the  effects  thence  arising  of  union  and  con- 
nexion ,  and  mutual  help.  So  hope,  of  which  the 
seeds  are  indigenous  in  all  bosoms,  and  which 
springs  up  like  certain  plants  in  the  soil  as  often 
as  it  is  allowed  to  repose ,  encourages  all  our 
labours  ,  and  sustains  us  in  every  vicissitude  of 
fortune,  as  well  as  under  all  the  toils  of  our  being. 
Fear,  again ,  is  the  teacher  of  caution,  prudence, 
circumspection,  and  preserves  us  from  danger. 
Even  anger,  generally  so  painful,  is  not  without 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  67 

its  use  :  for  it  stimulates  to  defence,  and  it  often- 
times assuages  the  pain  given  to  our  more  ten- 
der feelings  by  the  harshness  ,  or  ingratitude  , 
or  injustice,  or  treachery  of  those  upon  whom 
our  claims  were  the  strongest ,  and  whose  cruelty 
orwhose  baseness  would  enter  like  steel  into  the 
soul,  were  no  reaction  excited  to  deaden  and  to 
protect  it.  Contempt ,  or  even  pity ,  is  calculated 
to  exercise  the  same  healing  influence  l.  Then, 
to  go  no  further  ,  curiosity  is  implanted  in  all 
minds  to  a  greater  or  a  less  degree  ;  it  is  pro- 
portioned to  the  novelty  of  objects,  and  conse- 
quently to  our  ignorance ,  and  its  immediate  ef- 
fects are  to  fix  our  attention— to  stimulate  our 
apprehensive  powers — by  deepening  the  impres- 
sions of  all  ideas  on  our  minds  ,  to  give  the  me- 
mory a  bold  over  them — to  make  all  intellectual 
exertion  easy ,  and  convert  into  a  pleasure  the 
toil  that  would  otherwise  be  a  pain.  Can  any- 
thing be  more  perfectly  contrived  as  an  instru- 
ment precisely  adapted  to  the  want  of  knowledge, 
by  being  more  powerful  in  proportion  to  the 
ignorance  in  which  we  are  ?  Hence  it  is  the  great 

1  «  Atque  i!li  (Crantor  et  Pansetius)  quidem  etiam  uliliter  a 
natura  dicebant  permotiones  istas  animis  nostris  datas,  melum 
cavendi  causa  ;  misericordiam  aegritudinemque  dementia?;  ipsam 
iracundiam  fortitudinis  quasi  cotem  esse  dicebant. »  —  Acad. 
Qucest.  iv.  44- 


68  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

means  by  which  ,  above  all  in  early  infancy ,  we 
are  taught  every  thing  most  necessary  for  our 
physical  as  well  as  moral  existence.  In  riper  years 
it  smooths  the  way  for  further  acquirements  to 
most  men;  to  some  in  whom  it  is  strongest ,  it 
opens  the  paths  of  science  ;  but  in  all ,  without 
any  exception  ,  it  prevails  at  the  beginning  of  life 
so  powerfully  as  to  make  them  learn  the  facul- 
ties of  their  own  bodies  ,  and  the  general  pro- 
perties of  those  around  them — an  amount  of 
knowledge  which  ,  for  its  extent  and  its  practical 
usefulness ,  very  far  exceeds  ,  though  the  most 
ignorant  possess  it,  whatever  additions  the  great- 
est philosophers  are  enabled  to  build  upon  it  in 
the  longest  course  of  the  most  successful  investi- 
gations. 

Nor  is  it  the  curiosity  natural  to  us  all  that 
alone  tends  to  the  acquirement  of  knowledge; 
the  desire  of  communicating  it  is  a  strong  propen- 
sity of  our  nature,  and  conduces  to  the  same  im- 
portant end.  There  is  a  positive  pleasure  as  well 
in  teaching  others  what  they  knew  not  before  , 
as  in  learning  what  we  did  not  know  ourselves  ; 
and  it  is  undeniable  that  all  this  might  have  been 
differently  arranged  withouta  material  alteration 
of  our  intellectual  and  moral  constitution  in  other 
respects.  The  propensity  might  have  been,  like 
the  perverted  desires  of  the  miser ,  to  retain  what 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  G9 

we  know  without  communication  ,  as  it  might 
have  been  made  painful  instead  of  pleasurable 
to  acquire  new  ideas,  by  novelty  being  rendered 
repulsive  and  not  agreeable.  The  stagnation  of 
our  faculties  ,  the  suspension  of  mental  exertion, 
the  obscuration  of  the  intellectual  world,  would 
have  followed  as  certainly  as  universal  darkness 
would  veil  the  universe  on  the  extinction  of  the 
sun. 

Thus  far  we  have  been  considering  the  uses  to 
which  the  mental  faculties  and  feelings  are  sub- 
servient ,  and  their  admirable  adaptation  to  these 
ends.  But  view  the  intellectual  world  as  a  whole, 
and  surely  it  is  impossible  to  contemplate  with- 
out amazement  the  extraordinary  spectacle  which 
the  mind  of  man  displays ,  and  the  immense  pro- 
gress which  it  has  been  able  to  make  in  conse- 
quence of  its  structure,  its  capacity,  and  its  pro- 
pensities ,  such  as  we  have  just  been  describing 
them.  If  the  brightness  of  the  heavenly  bodies, 
the  prodigious  velocity  of  their  motions,  their 
vast  distances  and  mighty  bulk,  fill  the  imagi- 
nation with  awe  ,  there  is  the  same  wonder 
excited  by  the  brilliancy  of  the  intellectual 
powers — the  inconceivable  swiftness  of  thought 
— the  boundless  range  which  our  fancy  can  take 
— the  vast  objects  which  our  reason  can  embrace. 
That  we  should  have  been  able  to  resolve  the 

6. 


70  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

elements  into  their  more  simple  constituents — 
to  analyse  the  subtle  light  which  fills  all  space — 
to  penetrate  from  that  remote  particle  in  the  uni- 
verse ,  of  which  we  occupy  a  speck  ,  into  regions 
infinitely  remote — ascertain  the  weight  of  bodies 
at  the  surface  of  the  most  distant  worlds — in- 
vestigate the  laws  that  govern  their  motions  ,  or 
mould  their  forms — and  calculate  to  a  second  of 
time  the  periods  of  their  re-appearance  during 
the  revolution  of  centuries  , — all  this  is  in  the 
last  degree  amazing,  and  affords  much  more  food 
for  admiration  than  any  of  the  phenomena  of  the 
material  creation.  Then  what  shall  we  say  of  that 
incredible  power  of  generalization  which  has 
enabled  some  even  to  anticipate  by  ages  the  dis- 
covery of  truths  the  farthest  removed  above  or- 
dinary apprehension  ,  and  the  most  savouring  of 
improbability  and  fiction — not  merely  of  a  Clai- 
raut  conjecturing  the  existence  of  a  seventh  pla- 
net, and  the  position  of  its  orbit,  but  of  a  Newton 
learnedly  and  sagaciously  inferring,  from  the 
refraction  of  light ,  the  inflammable  quality  of 
the  diamond,  the  composition  of  apparently  the 
simplest  of  the  elements  ,  and  the  opposite  na- 
ture of  the  two  ingredients  ,  unknown  for  a  cen- 
tury after ,  of  which  it  is  composed J  ?  Yet  there 

■  Further  induction  may  add  to  the  list  of  these  wonderful 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  71 

is  something  more  marvellous  still  in  the  pro- 
cesses of  thought,  by  which  such  prodigies  have 
been  performed  ,  and  in  the  force  of  the  mind 
itself,  when  it  acts  wholly  without  external  aid, 
borrowing  nothing  whatever  from  matter,  and 
relying  on  its  own  powers  alone.  The  most  abs- 
truse investigations  of  the  mathematician  are 
conducted  without  any  regard  to  sensible  objects; 
and  the  helps  he  derives  in  his  reasonings  from 
material  things  at  all ,  are  absolutely  insignifi- 
cant, compared  with  the  portion  of  his  work 
which  is  altogether  of  an  abstract  kind — the  aid 
of  figures  and  letters  being  only  to  facilitate  and 
abridge  his  labour  ,  and  not  at  all  essential  to 
his  progress.  Nay,  strictly  speaking,  there  are 
no  truths  in  the  whole  range  of  the  pure  mathe- 
matics which  might  not,  by  possibility,  have 
been  discovered  and  systematized  by  one  depri- 
ved of  sight  and  touch,  or  immured  in  a  dark 
chamber  ,  without  the  use  of  a  single  material 
object. Theinstrumentof  Newton's  most  sublime 
speculations  ,  the  calculus  which  he  invented  , 
and  the  astonishing  systems  reared  by  its  means, 


conjectures,  the  thin  ether,  of  which  he  even  calculated  the 
density  and  the  effects  upon  planetary  motion.  Certainly  the 
acceleration  of  Encke's  comet  does  seem  to  render  this  hy  no 
means  improhahle. 


72  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

which  have  given  immortality  to  the  names  of 
Euler,  Lagrange  ,  Laplace  ,  all  are  the  creatures 
of  pure  abstract  thought,  and  all  might ,  by  pos- 
sibility ,  have  existed  in  their  present  magnifi- 
cence and  splendour,  without  owing  to  material 
agency  any  help  whatever  ,  except  such  as  might 
be  necessary  for  their  recording  and  communi- 
cation. These  are,  surely,  the  greatest  of  all  the 
wonders  of  nature,  when  justly  considered,  al- 
though they  speak  to  the  understanding  and  not 
to  the  sense.  Shall  we  ,  then ,  deny  that  the  eye 
could  be  made  without  skill  in  optics  ,  and  yet 
admit  that  the  mind  could  be  fashioned  and  en- 
dowed without  the  most  exquisite  of  all  skill  , 
or  could  proceed  from  any  but  an  intellect  of  in- 
finite power? 

At  first  sight ,  it  may  be  deemed  that  there  is 
an  essential  difference  between  the  evidence  from 
mental  and  from  physical  phenomena.  It  may  be 
thought  that  mind  is  of  a  nature  more  removed 
beyond  our  power  than  matter — that  over  the 
masses  of  matter  man  can  himself  exercise  some 
control  — that,  to  a  certain  degree,  he  has  a 
plastic  power — that  i  nto  some  forms  he  can  mould 
them  ,  and  can  combine  into  a  certain  machi- 
nery— that  he  can  begin  and  can  continue  mo- 
tion ,  and  can  produce  a  mechanism  by  which  it 
may  be  begun ,  and  maintained ,  and  regulated 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  73 

—  while  mind  ,  it  may  be  supposed ,  is  wholly 
beyond  his  reach  ;  over  it  he  has  no  grasp;  its 
existence  alone  is  known  to  him  ,  and  the  laws 
by  which  it  is  regulated  ; — and  thus  ,  it  may  be 
said ,  the  great  First  Cause ,  which  alone  can  call 
both  matter  and  mind  into  existence  ,  has  alone 
the  power  of  modulatingintellectual  nature.  But, 
when  the  subject  is  well  considered  ,  this  diffe- 
rence between  tile  two  branches  of  science  dis- 
appears with  all  the  rest.  It  is  admitted,  ofcourse, 
that  we  can  no  more  create  matter  than  we  can 
mind  ;  and  we  can  influence  mind  in  a  way  al- 
together analogous  to  our  power  of  modulating 
matter.  By  means  of  the  properties  of  matter  we 
can  form  instruments  ,  machines ,  and  figures. 
So  ,  by  availing  ourselves  of  the  properties  of 
mind  ,  we  can  effect  the  intellectual  faculties  — 
exercising  them,  training  them,  improving  them, 
producing ,  as  it  were ,  new  forms  of  the  under- 
standing. Nor  is  there  a  greater  difference  be- 
tween the  mass  of  rude  iron  from  which  we  make 
steel ,  and  the  thousands  of  watch-springs  into 
which  that  steel  is  cut,  or  the  chronometer  which 
we  form  of  this  and  other  masses  equally  inert 

—  than  there  is  between  the  untutored  indocile 
faculties  of  a  rustic  ,  who  has  grown  up  to  man- 
hood without  education ,  and  the  skill  of  the 
artist  who  invented  that  chronometer,  and  of  the 


74  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

mathematician  who  uses  it  to  trace  the  motions 
of  the  heavenly  bodies. 

Although  writers  on  Natural  Theology  have 
altogether  neglected,  at  least  in  modern  times, 
that  branch  of  the  subject  at  large  with  which 
we  have  now  been  occupied ,  there  is  one  por- 
tion of  it  which  has  always  attracted  their  atten- 
tion —  the  Instincts  of  animals.  These  are  un- 
questionably mentalfaculties,  which  we  discover 
by  observation  and  consciousness ,  but  which 
are  themselves  wholly  unconnected  with  any 
exercise  of  reason.  They  exhibit,  however,  the 
most  striking  proofs  of  design  ,  for  they  all  tend 
immediately  to  the  preservation  or  to  the  com- 
fort of  the  animals  endowed  with  them.  The 
lower  animals  are  provided  with  a  far  greater 
variety  of  instincts ,  and  of  a  more  singular  kind 
than  man,  because  they  have  only  the  most 
circumscribed  range  and  feeblest  powers  of  rea- 
son ,  while  to  reason  man  is  in  almost  every 
thing  indebted.  Yet  it  would  be  as  erroneous  to 
deny  that  we  are  endowed  with  any  instincts , 
because  so  much  is  accomplished  by  reason,  as  it 
would  be  rash  to  conclude  that  other  animals 
are  wholly  destitute  of  reasoning,  because  they 
owe  so  much  to  instinct.  Granting  that  infants 
learn  almost  all  those  animal  functions  which  are 
of  a  voluntary  nature ,  by  an  early  exercise  of 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  75 

reason,  it  is  plain  that  instinct  alone  guides  them 
in  others  which  are  necessary  to  continue  their 
life,  as  well  as  to  begin  their  instruction  :  for 
example  ,  they  suck,  and  even  swallow  by  in- 
stinct, and  by  instinct  they  grasp  what  is  presented 
to  their  hands.  So  ,  allowing  that  the  brutes 
exercise  but  very  rarely ,  and  in  a  limited  ex- 
tent ,  the  reasoning  powers  ,  it  seems  impossible 
to  distinguish  from  the  operations  of  reason 
those  instances  of  sagacity  which  some  dogs 
exhibit  in  obeying  the  directions  of  their  master, 
and  indeed  generally  the  docility  shown  by 
them  and  other  animals ;  not  to  mention  the  in- 
genuity of  birds  in  breaking  hard  substances 
by  letting  them  drop  from  a  height ,  and  in 
bringing  the  water  of  a  deep  pitcher  nearer 
their  beaks  by  throwing  in  pebbles.  These  are 
different  from  the  operations  of  instinct ,  because 
they  are  acts  which  vary  with  circumstances 
novel  and  unexpectedly  varying;  they  imply 
therefore  the  adaptation  of  means  to  an  end, 
and  the  power  of  varying  those  means  when 
obstacles  arise  :  we  can  have  no  evidence  of 
design,  that  is  of  reason,  in  other  men,  which 
is  not  similar  to  the  proof  of  reason  in  animals 
afforded  by  such  facts  as  these. 

But  the  operations  of  pure  instinct,  by  far  the 
greater  portion  of  the  exertions  of  brutes,  have 


76  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

never  been  supposed  by  any  one  to  result  from 
reasoning,  and  certainly  they  do  afford  the  most 
striking  proofs  of  an  intelligent  cause  ,  as  well 
as  of  a  unity  of  design  in  the  world.  The  work  of 
bees  is  among  the  most  remarkable  of  all  facts  in 
both  these  respects.  The  form  is  in  every  country 
the  same  —  the  proportions  accurately  alike  — 
the  size  the  very  same  to  the  fraction  of  a  line, 
go  where  you  will;  and  the  form  is  proved  to  be 
that  which  the  most  refined  analysis  has  enabled 
mathematicians  to  discover  as  of  all  others  the 
best  adapted  for  the  purposes  of  saving  room  , 
and  work  ,  and  materials.  This  discovery  was 
only  made  about  a  century  ago ;  nay ,  the  in- 
strument that  enabled  us  to  find  it  out  —  the 
fluxional  Galculus  —  was  unknown  half  a  cen- 
tury before  that  application  of  its  powers.  And 
yet  the  bee  had  been  for  thousands  of  years ,  in 
all  countries  ,  unerringly  working  according  to 
this  fixed  rule ,  choosing  the  same  exact  angle 
of  120  degrees  for  the  inclination  of  the  sides  of 
its  little  room  ,  which  every  one  had  for  ages 
known  to  be  the  best  possible  angle ,  but  also 
choosing  the  same  exact  angles  of  110  and  70 
degrees,  for  the  parallelograms  of  the  roof, 
which  no  one  had  ever  discovered  till  the  18th 
century  ,  when  Maclaurin  solved  that  most 
curious  problem  of  maxima  and   minima  ,   the 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  77 

means  of  investigating  which  had  not  existed  till 
the  century  before  ,  when  Newton  invented  the 
calculus  whereby  such  problems  can  now  be 
easily  worked.  It  is  impossible  to  conceive  any 
thing  more  striking  as  a  proof  of  refined  skill  than 
the  creation  of  such  instincts  ,  and  it  is  a  skill  al- 
together applied  to  the  formation  of  intellectual 
existence. 

Now, all  the  inferences  drawn  from  the  exami- 
nation which  we  have  just  gone  through  of  psy- 
chological phenomena  are  drawn  according  to 
the  strict  rules  of  inductive  science.  The  facts 
relating  to  the  velocity  of  mental  operations  —  to 
the  exercise  of  attention  —  to  its  connexion 
with  memory  —  to  the  helps  derived  from  curio- 
sity and  from  habit  —  to  the  association  of  ideas 

—  to  the  desires  ,  feelings  ,  and  passions  —  and 
to  the  adjoining  provinces  of  reason  and  instinct 

—  are  all  discovered  by  consciousness  or  by 
observation  ;  and  we  even  can  make  experiments 
upon  the  subject  by  varying  the  circumstances 
in  which  the  mental  powers  are  exercised  by 
ourselves  and  others,  and  marking  the  results. 
The  facts  thus  collected  and  compared  together 
we  are  enabled  to  generalize ,  and  thus  to  shew 
that  certain  effects  are  produced  by  an  agency 
calculated  to  produce  them.  Aware  that  if  we 
desired  to  produce  them  ,  and  had  the  power  to 

7 


78  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

employ  this  agency,  we  should  resort  to  it  for 
accomplishing  our  purpose  ,  we  infer  both  that 
some  being  exists  capable  of  creating  this  agency , 
and  that  he  employs  it  for  this  end.  The  process 
of  reasoning  is  not  like ,  but  identical  with  , 
that  by  which  we  infer  the  existence  of  design 
in  others  ( than  ourselves)  with  whom  we  have 
daily  intercourse.  The  kind  of  evidence  is  not 
like  ,  but  identical  with ,  that  by  which  we  con- 
duct all  the  investigations  of  intellectual  and  of 
natural  science. 

Such  is  the  process  of  reasoning  by  which  we 
infer  the  existence  of  design  in  the  natural  and 
moral  world.  To  this  abstract  argument  an  ad- 
dition of  great  importance  remains  to  be  made. 
The  whole  reasoning  proceeds  necessarily  upon 
the  assumption  that  there  exists  a  being  or  thing 
separate  from  ,  and  independent  of,  matter ,  and 
conscious  of  its  own  existence,  which  we  call 
mind.  For  the  argument  is  —  «  Had  I  to  ac- 
complish this  purpose  ,  I  should  have  used 
some  such  means  ;  »  or ,  «  Had  1  used  these 
means,  I  should  have  thought  I  was  accomplish- 
ing some  such  purpose.  »  Perceiving  the  ad- 
aptation of  the  means  to  the  end  ,  the  inference 
is,  that  some  being  has  acted  as  we  should 
ourselves  act;  and  with  the  same  views.  But 
when  we  so  speak ,  and  so  reason  ,  we  are  all 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  79 

the  while  referring  to  an  intelligent  principle 
or  existence ;  we  are  referring  to  our  mind , 
and  not  to  our  bodily  frame.  The  agency 
which  we  infer  from  this  reasoning  is  ,  there- 
fore .  a  spiritual  and  immaterial  agency  —  the 
working  of  something  like  our  own  mind  —  an 
intelligence  like  our  own  ,  though  incomparably 
more  powerful  and  more  skilful.  The  being  of 
whom  we  thus  acquire  a  knowledge  ,  and  whose 
operations  as  well  as  existence  we  thus  deduce 
from  a  process  a  inductive  reasoning  ,  must  be  a 
spirit ,  and  wholly  immaterial.  But  his  being 
such  is  only  inferred  because  we  set  out  with 
assuming  the  separate  existence  of  our  own 
mind,  independently  of  matter.  Without  that 
we  never  could  conclude  that  superior  intelli- 
gence existed  or  acted.  The  belief  that  mind 
exists  is  essential  to  the  whole  argument  by  which 
we  infer  that  the  Deity  exists.  This  belief  we 
have  shown  to  be  perfectly  well  grounded,  and 
further  occasions  of  confirming  the  truth  of  it 
will  occur  under  another  head  of  discourse. l 
But  at  any  rate  it  is  the  foundation  of  Natural 
Theology  in  all  its  branches  ;  and  upon  the 
scheme  of  materialism  no  rational,  indeed  no  in- 
telligible, account  can  be  given  of  a  first  cause  , 

'  Sect.  V,  and  Note  4. 


80  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

or  of  the  creation  or  government  of  the  uni- 
verse ». 

The  preceding  observations  have  been  direct- 
ed to  the  inquiries  respecting  the  design  exhi- 
bited in  the  universe.  But  the  other  parts  of  the 
first  great  branch  of  natural  theology  come 
srietly  within  the  scope  of  the  same  reasoning. 
Thus,  all  the  proofs  of  the  Deity's  'personality, 
that  is  ,  his  individuality,  his  unity  ;  all  the  evi- 
dence which  we  have  of  his  works ,  showing 
throughout  not  only  that  they  proceeded  from 
design,  but  that  the  design  is  of  one  distinctive 
kind — that  they  come  from  the  hand  not  only 
of  an  intelligent  being,  but  of  a  being  whose  in- 


1  It  is  worthy  of  observation,  that  not  the  least  allusion  is  made 
in  Dr.  Paley's  work  to  the  argument  here  stated,  although  it  is 
the  foundation  of  the  whole  of  Natural  Theology.  Not  only  does 
this  author  leave  entirely  untouched  the  argument  a  priori  (  as 
it  is  called),  and  also  all  the  inductive  arguments  derived  from 
the  phenomena  of  mind,  but  he  does  not  even  advert  to  the  ar- 
gument upon  which  the  inference  of  design  must  of  necessity 
rest— thatdesign  which  is  the  whole  subject  of  his  book.  Nothing 
can  more  evince  his  distaste  or  incapacity  for  metaphysical  re- 
searches. He  assumes  the  very  position  which  alone  sceptics 
dispute.  In  combating  him  they  would  assert  that  he  begged 
the  whole  question  ;  for  certainly  they  do  not  deny,  at  least  in 
modern  times,  the  fact  of  adaptation.  As  to  the  fundamental 
doctrine  of  causation,  not  the  least  allusion  is  ever  made  to  it  in 
any  of  his  writings,  even  in  his  Moral  Philosophy.  This  doc- 
trine is  discussed  in  Note  3. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  81 

tellect  is  specifically  peculiar,  and  always  of  the 
same  character ;  all  these  proofs  are  in  the  most 
rigorous  sense  inductive . 


SECTION  IV. 


OF    THE    ARGUMENT    A    PRIORI, 


Hitherto  we  have  confined  our  attention  to  the 
evidences  of  Natural  Religion  afforded  by  the 
phenomena  of  the  universe  —  what  is  commonly 
termed  the  argument  a  posteriori.  But  some  in- 
genious men  conceiving  that  the  existence  and 
attributes  of  a  Deity  are  discoverable  by  reason- 
ing merely,  and  without  reference  to  facts, 
have  devised  what  they  term  the  argument  a 
priori,  of  which  it  is  necessary  now  to  speak. 

The  first  thing  that  strikes  us  on  this  subject 
is  the  consequence  which  must  inevitably  follow 
from  admitting  the  possibility  of  discerning  the 
existence  of  the  Deity  and  his  attributes  a  priori, 
or  wholly  independent  of  facts.  It  would  follow 
that  this  is  a  necessary,  not  a  contingent  truth, 
and  that  it  is  not  only  as  impossible  for  the  Deity 
not  to  exist ,  as  for  the  whole  to  be  greater  than 
the  sum  of  its  parts ,  but  that  it  is  equally  impos- 
sible for  his  attributes  to  be  other  than  the  ar- 
gument is  supposed  to  prove  they  are.  Thus  the 
reasoners  in  question  show,  by  the  argument  a 


A  DISCOURSE  OF  NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  80 

priori,  that  he  is  a  being  of  perfect  wisdom ,  and 
perfect  benevolence.  Dr.  Clarke  is  as  clear  of 
this  as  he  is  clear  that  his  existence  is  proved  by 
the  same  argument.  Now,  first,  it  is  impossible 
that  any  such  truths  can  be  necessary ;  for  their 
contraries  are  not  things  wholly  inconceivable, 
inasmuch  as  there  is  nothing  at  all  inconceivable 
in  the  Maker  of  the  universe  existing  as  a  being 
of  limited  power  and  of  mixed  goodness  ,  nay  of 
malevolence.  We  never,  before  all  experience, 
could  pronounce  it  mathematically  impossible 
that  such  a  being  should  exist,  and  should  have 
created  the  universe.  But  next,  the  facts  ,  when 
we  came  to  examine  them ,  might  disprove  the 
conclusions  drawn  a  priori.  The  universe  might 
by  possibility  be  so  constructed  that  every  con- 
trivance might  fail  to  produce  the  desired  effect — 
the  eye  might  be  chromatic  and  give  indistinct 
images —  the  joints  might  be  so  unhinged  as  to 
impede  motion  —  every  smell,  as  Paley  has  it, 
might  be  a  stink,  and  every  touch  a  sting.  In- 
deed, we  "know  that,  perfect  as  the  frame  of 
things  actually  is,  a  few  apparent  exceptions  to 
the  general  beauty  of  the  system  have  made  many 
disbelieve  theperfect  power  and  perfect  goodness 
of  the  Deity,  and  invent  Manichean  theories  to 
accouut  for  the  existence  of  evil.  Nothing  can 
more  clearly  show  the  absurdity  of  those  argu- 


84  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

raents  by  which  it  is  attempted  to  demonstrate 
the  truths  of  this  science  as  mathematical  or  ne- 
cessary., and  congnizable  a  priori. 

But,  secondly,  let  us  see  whether  the  argu- 
ment in  question  be  really  one  a  priori ,  or  only 
a  very  imperfect  process  of  induction  —  an  in- 
duction from  a  limited  number  of  facts. 

Dr.  Clarke  is  the  chief  patron  of  this  kind  of 
demonstration ,  as  he  terms  it ;  and  though  his 
book  contains  it  more  at  large,  the  statement  of 
his  fundamental  argument  is  perhaps  to  be  found 
most  distinctly  given  in  the  letters  subjoined  to 
that  celebrated  work.  The  fundamental  propo- 
sitions in  the  discourse  itself  are,  That  something 
must  have  existed  from  all  eternity,  and  that  this 
something  must  have  been  a  being  independent 
and  self-existent.  In  the  letters  he  condenses  , 
perhaps  explains,  certainly  illustrates ,  these  po- 
sitions (see  Answers  to  Letters  3 ,  A ,  and  5) ,  by 
arguing  that  the  existence  of  space  and  time  (or, 
as  he  terms  it ,  duration)  proves  the  existence  of 
something  whereof  these  are  qualities,  for  they 
are  not  themselves  substances ;  he  cites  the  ce- 
lebrated Scholium  Generale  of  the  Principia; 
and  he  concludes  that  the  Deity  must  be  the  in- 
finite being  of  whom  they  are  qualities. 

But  to  argue  from  the  existence  of  space  and 
time  to  the  existence  of  any  thing  else,  is  as- 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  85 

suraing  that  those  two  things  have  a  real  being 
independent  of  our  conceptions  of  them  :  for  the 
existence  of  certain  ideas  in  our  minds  cannot 
be  the  foundation  on  which  to  build  a  conclusion 
that  any  thing  external  to  our  minds  exists.  To 
infer  that  space  and  time  are  qualities  of  an  in- 
finite and  eternal  being  is  surely  assuming  the  very 
thing  to  be  proved  ,  if  a  proposition  can  be  said  to 
have  a  distinct  meaning  at  all  which  predicates 
space  and  time  as  qualities  of  any  thing.  What, 
for  example,  is  time  but  the  succession  of  ideas, 
and  the  consciousness  and  the  recollection  which 
we  have  of  that  succession?  To  call  it  a  quality  is 
absurd;  as  well  might  we  call  motion  a  quality,  or 
our  ideas  of  absent  things  and  persons  a  quality. 
Again,  if  space  is  to  be  deemed  a  quality,  and 
if  infinite  space  be  the  quality  of  an  infinite  being, 
finite  space  must  also  be  a  quality,  and  must,  by 
parity  of  reason  ,  be  the  quality  of  a  finite  being. 
Of  what  being?  Here  is  a  cube  of  one  foot  within 
an  exhausted  receiver,  or  a  cylinder  of  half  an 
inch  diameter  and  three  inches  high  in  the 
Torricellian  vacuum.  What  is  the  being  of  whom 
that  square  and  that  cylindrical  square  are  to  be 
deemed  as  qualities?  Is  distance,  that  is,  the 
supposed  movement  of  a  point  in  a  straight  line 
ad  infinitum,  a  quality  ?  It  must  be  so  if  infinite 
space  is.  Then  of  what  is  it  a  quality?  If  infinite 


86  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

space  is  the  quality  of  an  infinite  being,  infinite 
distance  must  be  the  quality  of  an  infinite  being 
also.  But  can  it  be  said  to  be  the  quality  of  the 
same  infinite  being?  Observe  that  the  mind  can 
form  just  as  correct  an  idea  of  infinite  distance 
as  of  infinite  space,  or,  rather,  it  can  form  a 
somewhat  more  distinct  idea.  But  the  being  to 
be  inferred  from  this  infinite  distance  cannot 
be  exactly  the  same  in  kind  with  that  to  be  in- 
ferred from  space  infinite  in  all  directions.  Again, 
if  infinite  distance  shows  an  infinite  being  of 
whom  it  is  the  quality,  finite  distance  must  be 
Inequality  of  a  finitebeing.  What  being?  Of  what 
kind  of  being  is  the  distance  between  two  trees 
or  two  points  a  quality?  Therecan  be  no  doubt  that 
this  argument  rests  either  upon  of  the  use  of 
words  without  meaning,  or  it  is  a  disguised  form 
of  the  old  doctrine  of  the  anima  mundi,  or  of  the 
hypothesis  that  the  whole  universe  is  a  mere 
emanation  of  the  Deity. 

But  it  deserves  to  be  remarked  that  this  argu- 
ment, which  professes  to  be  a  priori,  and  wholly 
independent  of  all  experience,  is,  strictly  speak- 
ing, inductive,  and  nothing  more.  We  can  have 
no  idea  whatever  of  space  apart  from  experience. 
The  experience  of  space  filled  with  matter  enables 
us,  by  means  of  abstraction ,  to  conceive  space 
without  the  matter ;  and  a  further  abstraction  and 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  87 

generalization  enable  us  te  conceive  infinite  space 
by  imagining  the  limits  indefinitely  removed  of  a 
particular  portion  of  space.  But  the  foundation 
of  the  whole  reasoning  is  the  experience  of  cer- 
tain finite  portions  of  space  first  observed  in  con- 
nexion with  matter.  Therefore  our  ideas  of  space 
are  the  result  of  our  experience  as  to  external 
objects.  Even  if  we  could  fancy  figure  (which  is 
possible)  without  having  seen  or  touched  any 
objects  external  to  ourselves,  still  it  would  be 
the  experience  of  our  own  ideas  that  had  given 
us  this  idea.  So  of  time  ;  it  is  the  succession  of 
our  ideas ,  and  we  have  the  notion  of  it  from 
consciousness  and  memory.  From  hence  we  form 
an  idea  of  indefinite  time  or  eternal  duration. 
But  the  basis  of  the  whole  is  the  observation 
which  we  have  made  upon  the  actual  succession 
of  our  ideas  ;  and  this  is  inductive,  though  the 
process  of  reasoning  be  very  short.  It  is  as  much 
a  process  of  inductive  reasoning  as  that  by  which 
we  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  the  mind's  exist- 
ence. There  is,  therefore,  great  inaccuracy  in 
denominating  the  argument  in  question ,  were  it 
ever  so  sound,  an  argument  a  priori,  for  it  is  a 
reasoning  founded  on  experience,  and  it  is  to  be 
classed  with  the  arguments  derived  from  the  ob- 
servation of  external  objects,  the  ground  of  our 
reasoning  a  posteriori  as  to  matter,  or,   at  the 


88  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

utmost  ,  with  the  information  given  by  con- 
seiousness  ,  the  whole  ground  of  our  reasoning  a 
posteriori  as  to  mind. 

When  ,  however ,  Dr.  Clarke  has  once  fixed 
the  propositions  to  which  we  have  been  advert- 
ing ,  he  deduces  from  them  the  whole  qualities 
of  the  Deity — those  which  we  learn  from  expe- 
rience— and  thinks  he  can  derive  them  all  from 
the  simple  propositions  that  lie  at  the  foundation 
of  his  argument.  It  is  truly  astonishing  to  find 
so  profound  a  thinker  ,  and,  generally  speaking, 
so  accurate  a  reasoner,  actually  supposing  that 
he  can  deduce  from  the  proposition  ,  that  a  self- 
existent  being  must  have  existed  from  all  time, 
this  other  proposition  ,  that  therefore  this  being 
must  be  infinitely  wise  (Prop.  XI)  ,  and  that 
he  «  must  of  necessity  be  a  being  of  infinite  good- 
ness ,  justice ,  and  truth  ,  and  all  other  moral 
perfections  ,  such  as  become  the  supreme  gover- 
nor and  judge  of  the  world.))  (Prop.  XII.)  With 
the  general  texture  of  this  argument  we  have  at 
present  nothing  to  do  ,  further  than  to  show  how 
little  it  can  by  possibility  deserve  the  name  either 
of  an  argument  a  priori ,  or  be  regarded  as  the 
demonstration  of  a  necessary  truth.  For  surely , 
prior  to  all  experience ,  no  one  could  ever  know 
that  there  were  such  things  as  either  judges  or 
governors;  and  without  the  previous  idea  of  a 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  89 

finite  or  worldly  ruler  and  judge,  we  could  ne- 
ver gain  any  ideaofan  eternal  and  infinitely  just 
ruler  or  judge  ;  and  equally  certain  it  is  that 
this  demonstration  ,  if  it  proves  the  existence  of 
an  infinite  and  eternal  ruler  or  judge  to  be  a 
necessary  and  not  a  contingent  truth  (which  is 
Dr.  Clarke's  whole  argument)  ,  would  just  as 
strictly  prove  the  existence  of  finite  rulers  and 
judges  to  be  a  necessary  and  not  a  contingent 
truth  ;  or  ,  in  other  words  ,  it  would  follow,  that 
the  existence  of  governors  and  judges  in  the 
world  is  a  necessary  truth  ,  like  the  equality  of 
the  three  angles  in  a  triangle  to  two  right  an- 
gles, and  that  it  would  be  a  contradiction  in  terms, 
and  so  an  impossibility,  to  conceive  the  world 
existing  without  governors  and  judges. 

I  believe  it  may  safely  be  said  ,  that  very  few 
men  have  ever  formed  a  distinct  apprehension 
of  the  nature  of  Dr.  Clarke's  celebrated  argu- 
ment ,  and  that  hardly  any  person  has  ever  been 
at  all  satisfied  with  it.  The  opinion  of  Dr.  E.eid 
is  well  known  upon  this  subject ,  and  it  has  re- 
ceived the  full  acquiescence  of  no  less  an  autho- 
rity than  that  of  Mr.  Stewart. 

«  These  ,  »  says  Dr.  Reid  ,  «  are  the  specula- 
tions of  men  of  superior  genius,  but  whether  they 
be  as  solid  as  they  are  sublime ,  or  whether  they 
be  the  wanderings  of  imagination  in  a  region 


90  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

beyond  the  limits  of  human  understanding,  I  am 
unable  to  determine.  » 

To  this  Mr.  Stewart  adds —  «  After  this  candid 
acknowledgment  from  Dr.  Reid  ,  I  need  not  be 
ashamed  to  confess  my  own  doubts  and  difficul- 
ties on  the  same  subject  «  » 

That  the  argument  a  priori  has  been  most 
explicitly  handled  by  Dr.  Clarke  ,  and  that  its 
acceptation  restsprincipallyuponhishigh  autho- 
rity, cannot  be  denied.  Nevertheless,  other  great 
men  preceded  him  in  this  field ;  and  besides  Sir 
Isaac  Newton  ,  whole  Scholium  Generate  is 
thought  to  have  suggested  it,  the  same  reasoning 
isto  be  found  in  the  writings  of  others  of  Dr.  Clar- 
ke's predecessors. 

The  tenth  chapter  of  Mr.  Locke's  fourth  book 
does  not  materially  differ  ,  in  its  fundamental 
position  ,  from  the  «  Demonstration  of  the  Being 
and  Attributes.))  The  argument  is  all  drawn  from 
the  truth ,  assumed  as  self-evident ,  «  Nothing 
can  no  more  produce  any  real  being  than  it  can 
be  equal  to  two  right  angles.  »  From  this  ,  and 
the  knowledge  we  have  of  our  own  existence , 
it  is  shown  to  follow  ,  that  «  from  eternity  there 
has  been  something ;  »  and  again  ,  «  that  this 
eternal  being  must  have  been  most  powerful  and 
most  knowing  ,  «  and  «  therefore  God.  »  The 

■  Philosophy  of  the  Active  Powers,  i.  334- 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  91 

only  difference  between  this  argument  and 
Dr.  Clarke's  is ,  that  Mr.  Locke  states ,  as  one  of 
his  propositions  ,  our  knowledge  of  our  own 
existence.  But  this  difference  is  only  in  appear- 
ance ;  for  Dr.  Clarke  really  has  assumed  what 
Mr.  Locke  has  more  logically  made  a  distinct 
proposition.  Dr.  Clarke's  first  proposition  ,  that 
something  must  have  existed  from  all  eternity  , 
is  demonstrated  by  showing  the  absurdity  of  the 
supposition  that  «  the  things  which  now  are 
were  produced  out  of  nothing.  »  He  therefore 
assumes  the  existence  of  those  things  ,  while 
Mr.  Locke  more  strictly  assumes  the  existence  of 
ourselves  only  ,  and  indeed  states  it  as  a  propo- 
sition. The  other  arguments  of  Mr.  Locke  are 
more  ingenious  than  Dr.  Clarke's,  and  the  whole 
reasoning  is  more  rigorous  ,  although  he  does 
not  give  it  the  name  of  a  demonstration  ,  and 
scarcely  can  be  said  to  treat  it  as  proving  the 
Deity's  existence  to  be  a  necessary  truth.  Were 
it  to  be  so  considered  ,  the  objections  formerly 
stated  would  apply  to  it.  Indeed ,  if  Dr.  Clarke 
had  stated  the  different  steps  of  his  reasoning  as 
distinctly  as  Mr.  Locke,  he  would  haveperceived 
it  to  be  inconclusive  beyond  a  very  limited  ex- 
tent, and  to  that  extent  inductive  '. 

1  See  particularly  Mr.  Locke's  proofs  of  his  first    position  , 
(Hum.  Unilerstandig,  IV.  x.  sec.  2.) 


92  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

Dr.  Cudworth  ,  in  the  fifth  chapter  of  his 
great  work  ■ ,  has ,  in  answering  theDemocritick 
arguments,  so  plainly  anticipated  Dr.  Clarke, 
that  it  is  hardly  possible  to  conceive  how  the 
latter  should  have  avoided  referring  to  it  2.  «  If 
space  be  indeed  a  nature  distinct  from  body , 
and  a  thing  really  incorporeal ,  then  will  it  un- 
deniably follow,  from  this  very  principle  of 
theirs  ( the  Democritists ) ,  that  there  must  be 
incorporeal  space;  and  (this  space  being  sup- 
posed by  them  also  to  be  infinite )  an  infinite 
incorporeal  Deity.  Because  if  space  be  not  the 
extension  of  body ,  nor  an  affection  thereof,  then 
must  it  of  necessity  be,  either  an  accident  existing 
alone  by  itself,  without  a  substance,  which  is 
impossible  ;  or  else  the  extension  or  affection  of 
some  other  incorporeal  substance  that  is  infi- 
nite. »  He  then  supposes  a  reply  ( founded  on 
the  doctrines  of  Gassendi ) ,  that  space  is  of  a 
middle  nature  and  essence ,  and  proceeds  to 
observe  upon  it  :  —  «  Whatsoever  is  ,  or  hath 
any  kind  of  entity  ,  doth  either  subsist  by  itself, 


1  Intellectual  System,  Book  I,  c.  v,  s.  3,  par  4-  The  profound 
learning  of  this  unfinished  work,  and  its  satisfactory  exposition 
of  the  ancient  philosophers,  are  above  all  praise.  Why  are  the 
manuscripts  of  the  author  still  buried  in  the  British  Museum  ? 

■  Cudvvortlvs  bookwas  published  in  1678.  The  «  Demonstra- 
tion »  was  delivered  in  1704-5  at  the  Boyle  Lecture. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  93 

or  else  is  an  attribute ,  affection ,  or  mode  of 
something  that  doth  subsist  by  itself.  For  it  is 
certain  that  there  can  be  no  mode  ,  accident,  or 
affection  of  nothing  ;  and  ,  consequently  ,  that 
nothing  cannot  be  extended  nor  mensurable. 
But  if  space  be  neither  the  extension  of  body, 
nor  yet  of  substance  incorporeal ,  then  must  it  of 
necessity  be  the  extension  of  nothing ,  and  the 
affection  of  nothing ,  and  nothing  must  be 
measurable  by  yards  and  poles.  We  conclude  , 
therefore,  that  from  this  very  hypothesis  of  the 
Democritick  and  Epicurean  atheists,  that  space 
is  a  nature  distinct  from  body,  and  positively 
infinite ,  it  follows  undeniably  that  there  must 
be  some  incorporeal  substance  whose  affection 
its  extension  is  ;  and  because  there  can  be  no- 
thing infinite  but  only  the  Deity  ,  that  it  is  the 
infinite  extension  of  our  incorporeal  Deity.  » 
The  statement  of  Dr.  Clarke's  argument ,  given  in 
his  correspondence  ,  is  manifestly ,  if  not  taken 
from  this ,  at  least  coincident  with  it  in  every 
important  respect.  Dr.  Cudworth ,  indeed  ,  con- 
fines his  reasoning  to  the  consideration  of  space 
and  immensity  ,  and  Dr.  Clarke  extends  his  to 
time  and  eternity  also.  But  of  the  two  portions 
of  the  argument  this  has  been  shown  to  be  the 
most  fallacious. 

The  arguments  of  the  ancient  theisls  were  in 


94  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

great  partdrawn  from  metaphysical  speculations, 
some  of  which  resembled  the  argument  a  priori*. 
But  they  were  pressed  by  the  difficulty  of  con- 
ceiving the  possibility  of  creation  ,  whether  of 
matter  or  spirit ;  and  their  inaccurate  views  of 
physical  science  made  them  consider  this  diffi- 
culty as  peculiar  to  the  creative  act.  They  were 
thus  driven  to  the  hypothesis  that  matter  and 
mind  are  eternal ,  and  that  the  creative  power  of 
the  Deity  is  only  plastic.  They  supposed  it  easy 
to  comprehend  how  the  divine  mind  should  be 
eternal  and  self-existing ,  and  matter  also  eter- 
nal and  self-existing.  They  found  no  difficulty 
in  comprehending  how  that  mind  could ,  by  a 
wish  or  a  word ,  reduce  chaos  to  order  ,  and 
mould  all  the  elements  of  things  into  their  pre- 
sent form  ;  but  how  every  thing  could  be  made 
out  of  nothing  they  could  not  understand.  When 
rightly  considered  ,  however  ,  there  is  no  more 
difficulty  in  comprehending  the  one  than  the 
other  operation  —  the  existence  of  the  plastic  , 
than  of  the  creative  power ,  or  rather  ,  the  one  is 
as  incomprehensible  as  the  other.  How  the 
Supreme  Being  made  matter  out  of  the  void  is 
not  easily  comprehended.  This  must  be  ad- 
mitted ;  but  is  it  more  easy  to  conceive  how 

'  Notes  6  ami  7. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  95 

the  same  Being  ,  by  his  mere  will  ,  moved  and 
fashioned  the  primordial  atoms  of  an  eternally 
existing  chaos  into  the  beauty  of  the  natural 
world  ,  or  the  regularity  of  the  solar  system  ?  In 
truth  ,  these  difficulties  meet  us  at  every  step  of 
the  argument  of  Natural  Theology ,  when  we 
would  penetrate  beyond  those  things ,  those 
facts  which  our  faculties  can  easily  comprehend  ; 
but  they  meet  us  just  as  frequently ,  and  are  just 
as  hard  to  surmount ,  in  our  steps  over  the 
field  of  Natural  Philosophy.  How  matter  acts  on 
matter  —  how  motion  is  begun,  or,  when  be- 
gun ,  ceases  —  how  impact  takes  place  —  what 
are  the  conditions  and  limitations  of  contact  — 
whether  or  not  matter  consists  of  ultimate  parti- 
cles ,  endowed  with  opposite  powers  of  attrac- 
tion and  repulsion  ,  and  how  these  act  —  how 
one  planet  acts  upon  another  at  the  distance  of  a 
hundred  million  of  miles  —  or  how  one  piece 
of  iron  attracts  and  repels  another  at  a  distance 
less  than  any  visible  space  —  all  these  ,  and  a 
thousand  others  of  the  like  sort ,  are  questions 
just  as  easily  put  ,  and  as  hard  to  answer,  as 
how  the  universe  could  be  made  out  of  nothing  , 
or  how  ,  out  of  chaos ,  order  could  be  made  to 
spring. 

In  concludiug   these  observations  upon  the 
argument  a  priori  }  I  may  remark  ,  that  although 


96  A  DISCOURSE  OF  NATURAL     HEOLOGY. 

it  carries  us  but  a  very  little  way ,  and  would 
be  unsafe  to  build  upon  alone,  it  is  yet  of  emi- 
nent use  in  two  particulars.  First ,  it  illustrates  , 
if  it  does  not  indeed  prove ,  the  possibility  of 
an  Infinite  Being  existing  beyond  and  inde- 
pendent of  us  and  of  all  visible  things  ;  and , 
secondly,  the  fact  of  those  ideas  of  immensity  and 
eternity ,  forcing  themselves  ,  as  Mr.  Stewart 
expresses  it,  upon  one  belief,  seems  to  furnish 
an  additionnal  argument  for  the  existence  of 
an  Immense  and  Eternal  Being.  At  least  we 
must  admit  that  excellent  person's  remark  to 
be  well-founded ,  that  after  we  have ,  by  the 
argument  a  posteriori  ( I  should  rather  say  the 
other  parts  of  the  argument  a  posteriori) ,  sa- 
tisfied ourselves  of  the  existence  of  an  intelli- 
gent cause ,  we  naturally  connect  with  this 
cause  those  impressions  which  we  have  derived 
from  the  contemplation  of  infinite  space  and 
endless  duration  ,  and  hence  we  clothe  with  the 
attributes  of  immensity  and  eternity  the  awful 
Being  whose  existence  has  been  proved  by  a 
more  rigorous  process  of  investigation  l. 


1  Lord  Spencer ,  who  has  deeply  studied  these  abstruse  sub- 
jects, communicated  to  me,  before  he  was  aware  of  my  opinion, 
that  he  had  arrived  at  nearly  the  same  conclusion  upon  the  me- 
rits of  the  argument  a  prio ri. 


SECTION  V. 

MORAL  OF  ETHICAL  BRANCH  OF  NATURAL  THEOLOGY. 

If  we  now  direct  our  attention  to  the  other 
great  branch  of  Natural  Theology  ,  that  which 
we  have  termed  the  moral  or  ethical  portion  , 
which  treats  of  the  probable  designs  of  the  Deity 
with  respect  to  the  future  destiny  of  his  creatures, 
we  shall  find  that  the  same  argument  applies  to 
the  nature  of  its  truths ,  which  we  have  been 
illustrating  in  its  application  to  the  first  or  on- 
tological  branch  of  the  science,  or  that  relating 
to  the  existence  and  attributes  of  the  Creator , 
whether  proved  by  physical  or  by  psychological 
reasoning.  The  second  branch,  like  the  first, 
rests  upon  the  same  foundation  with  all  the  other 
inductive  sciences,  the  only  difference  being 
that  the  one  belongs  to  the  inductive  science  of 
Natural  and  Mental,  and  the  other  to  the  in- 
ductive science  of  Moral  Philosophy. 

The  means  which  we  have  of  investigating  the 
probable  designs  of  the  Deity  are  derived  from 


98  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

two  sources —  the  nature  of  the  human  mind, 
and  the  attributes  of  the  Creator. 

To  the  consideration  of  these  we  now  proceed; 
but  in  discussing  them,  and  especially  the  first, 
there  is  this  difference  to  be  marked  as  distin- 
guishing them  from  the  former  branch  of  Natural 
Theology.  They  are  far  less  abundant  in  doc- 
trine ;  they  have  been  much  less  cultivated  by 
scientific  inquirers  ;  and  the  truths  ascertained 
in  relation  to  them  are  fewer  in  number:  in  a 
word ,  our  knowledge  of  the  Creator's  designs 
in  the  order  of  nature  is  much  more  limited  than 
our  acquaintance  with  his  existence  and  attri- 
butes. But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  identity  of 
the  evidence  with  that  on  which  the  other  induc- 
tive sciences  rest  is  far  more  conspicuous  in  what 
may  be  termed  the  psychological  part  of  the  se- 
cond branch  of  Natural  Theology  than  in  any 
portion  of  the  first  branch,  it  being  much  less 
apparent  that  the  inferences  drawn  from  facts 
in  favour  of  the  Deity's  existence  and  attributes 
are  of  the  same  nature  with  the  ordinary  deduc- 
tions of  physical  science —  in  other  words,  that 
this  part  of  Natural  Theology  is  a  branch  of  Na- 
tural Philosophy —  than  it  is  that  the  deductions 
from  the  nature  of  the  mind  in  favour  of  its 
separate  and  future  existence  are  a  branch  of 
Metaphysical  science. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  99 

From  this  diversity  it  follows,  that,  in  treating 
this  second  hranch  of  the  subject ,  there  will  be 
more  necessity  for  entering  at  large  into  the  sub- 
ject of  the  Deity's  probable  designs  in  regard  to 
the  soul,  especially  those  to  be  inferred  from 
its  constitution ,  than  we  found  for  entering  into 
the  evidences  of  his  existence  and  attributes, 
although  there  will  not  be  so  much  labour  re- 
quired for  proving  that  this  is  a  branch  of  in- 
ductive science. 

1.  PSYCHOLOGICAL    ARGUMENT,  OR    EVIDENCE  OF  THE   DEITY'S 
DESIGNS    DRAWN    FROM    THE    NATURE    OF    THE    MIND. 

The  Immaterality  of  the  Soul  is  the  foundation 
of  all  the  doctrines  relating  to  its  Future  State. 
If  it  consists  of  material  parts ,  or  if  it  consists  of 
any  modification  of  matter,  or  if  it  is  inseparably 
connected  with  any  combination  of  material  ele- 
ments, we  have  no  reason  whatever  for  believing 
that  it  can  survive  the  existence  of  the  physical 
part  of  our  frame ;  on  the  contrary,  its  destruction 
seems  to  follow  as  a  necessary  consequenceofthe 
dissolution  of  the  body.  It  is  true  that  the  body 
is  not  destroyed  in  the  sense  of  beingannihilated; 
but  it  is  equally  true  that  the  particular  con- 
formation, the  particular  arrangement  of  material 
particles  with  which  the  soul  is  supposed  to  have 
been  inseparably  connected,  or  in  which  it  is 


100  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

supposed  to  consist,  is  gone  and  destroyed  even 
in  the  sense  of  annihilation ;  for  that  arrangement 
or  conformation  has  no  longer  an  existence,  any 
more  than  a  marble  statue  can  be  said  to  have 
an  existence  when  it  is  burned  into  a  mass  of 
quicklime.  Now  it  is  to  the  particular  confor- 
mation and  arrangement ,  and  not  to  the  matter 
itself,  that  the  soul  is  considered  as  belonging  by 
any  theory  of  materialism ,  there  being  none  of 
the  theories  of  materialists  so  absurd  as  to  make 
the  total  mass  of  the  particles  themselves ,  in- 
dependent of  their  arrangement,  the  seat  of  the 
soul.  Therefore ,  the  destruction  of  that  form 
and  organization  as  effectually  destroys  the  soul 
which  consists  in  it ,  as  the  beauty  or  the  intel- 
lectual expression  of  the  statue  is  gone  when  the 
marble  is  reduced  to  lime-dust. 

Happily,  however,  the  doctrines  of  materialism 
rest  upon  no  solid  foundation ,  either  of  reason 
or  experience.  The  vague  and  indistinct  form  of 
the  proportions  in  which  they  are  conveyed  af- 
fords one  strong  argument  against  their  truth. 
It  is  not  easy  to  annex  a  definite  meaning  to  the 
proposition  that  mind  is  inseparably  connected 
with  a  particular  arrangement  of  the  particles  of 
matter;  it  is  more  difficult  to  say  what  they  mean 
who  call  it  a  modification  of  matter ;  but  to  con- 
sider it  as  consisting  in  a  combination  of  matter, 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  101 

as  coming  into  existence  the  instant  that  the 
particles  of  matter  assume  a  given  arrangement, 
appears  to  be  a  wholly  unintelligible  collocation 
of  words. 

Let  us,  however,  resort  to  experience,  and 
inquire  what  results  may  be  derived  from  that 
safe  guide  whom  modern  philosophers  most  will- 
ingly trust,  though  despised  as  too  humble  a 
helpmate  by  most  of  the  ancient  sages. 

We  may  first  of  all  observe  that  if  a  particular 
combination  of  matter  gives  birth  to  what  we 
call  mind,  this  is  an  operation  altogether  peculiar 
and  unexampled.  We  have  no  other  instance  of 
it;  we  know  of  no  case  in  which  the  combination 
of  certain  elementsproduces  something  quite  dif- 
ferent, not  only  from  each  of  the  simple  ingre- 
dients ,  but  also  different  from  the  whole  com- 
pound. We  can ,  by  mixing  a  acid  and  an  alkali- 
form  a  thirdbody,  having  the  qualities  of  neither, 
and  possessing  qualities  of  its  own  different  from 
the  properties  of  each;  but  here  the  third  body 
consists  of  the  other  two  in  combination.  There 
are  not  two  things —  two  different  existences  — 
the  neutral  salt  composed  of  the  acid  and  the 
alkali ,  and  another  thing  different  from  that  neu- 
tral salt,  and  engendered  for  the  first  time  by 
that  salt  coming  into  existence.  So  when  ,  by  chi- 
selling,   u  the  marble  softened  into  life  grows 


102  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

warm ,  »  we  have  the  marble  new  moulded,  and 
endowed  with  the  power  of  agreeably  affecting 
our  senses,  our  memory,  and  our  fancy ;  but  it  is 
all  the  while  the  marble  :  there  is  the  beautiful 
and  expressive  marble  instead  of  the  amorphous 
mass,  and  we  have  not,  besides  the  marble,  a 
new  existence  created  by  the  form  which  has 
been  given  to  that  stone.  But  the  materialists  have 
to  maintain  that,  by  matter  being  arranged  in  a 
particular  way,  there  is  produced  both  the  or- 
ganized body  and  something  different  from  it, 
and  having  not  one  of  its  properties —  neither 
dimensions,  nor  weight ,  nor  colour  ,  nor  form. 
They  have  to  maintain  that  the  chemist  who 
mixed  the  aqua  fortis  and  potash  produced  both 
nitre  and  something  quite  different  from  all  the 
three,  and  which  began  to  exist  the  instant  that 
the  nitre  crystallized  ;  and  that  the  sculptor  who 
fashioned  the  Apollo ,  not  only  made  the  marble 
into  a  human  figure,  but  called  into  being  some- 
thing different  from  the  marble  and  the  statue, 
and  which  exists  at  the  same  time  with  both  and 
without  one  property  of  either.  If,  therefore, 
their  theory  is  true ,  it  must  be  admitted  to  rest 
upon  nothing  which  experience  has  ever  taught 
us :  it  supposes  operations  to  be  performed  and 
relations  to  exist  of  which  we  see  nothing  that 
bears  thelenst  resemblance  in  anything  we  know. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  105 

But  secondly ,  the  doctrine  of  the  materialists 
in  every  form  which  it  assumes  is  contradicted 
by  the  most  plain  and  certain  deductions  of  ex- 
perience. The  evidence  which  we  have  of  the 
existence  of  the  mind  is  complete  in  itself,  and 
wholly  independent  of  the  qualities  or  the  exist- 
ence of  matter.  It  is  not  only  as  strong  and 
conclusive  as  the  evidence  which  makes  us  be- 
lieve in  the  existence  of  matter ,  but  more  strong 
and  more  conclusive  ;  the  steps  of  the  demon- 
stration are  fewer  ;  the  truth  to  which  they  con- 
duct the  reason  is  less  remote  from  the  axiom — 
the  intuitive  or  self-evident  position  whence  the 
demonstration  springs.  We  believe  that  matter 
exists  because  it  makes  a  certain  impression  upon 
our  senses,  that  is,  because  it  produces  a  cer- 
tain change  or  a  certain  effect;  and  we  argue , 
and  argue  justly,  that  this  effect  must  have  a 
cause,  though  the  proof  is  by  no  means  so  clear 
that  this  cause  is  something  external  to  ourselves. 
But  we  know  the  existence  of  mind  by  our  con- 
sciousness of  or  reflection  on  what  passes  within 
us,  and  our  own  existence  as  sentient  and  think- 
ing beings  implies  the  existence  of  the  mind 
which  has  sense  and  thought.  To  know,  there- 
fore ,  that  we  are  ,  and  that  we  think,  implies  a 
knowledge  of  the  soul's  existence.  But  this  know- 
ledge is  altogether  independent  of  matter  ,  and 


104  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

the  subject  of  it  bears  no  resemblance  whatever 
to  matter  in  any  one  of  its  qualities,  or  habits  , 
or  modes  of  action.  Nay  ,  we  only  know  the 
existence  of  matter  through  the  operations  of  the 
mind;  and  were  we  to  doubt  of  the  existence 
of  either  ,  it  would  be  far  more  reasonable  to 
doubt  that  matter  exists  than  that  mind  exists. 
The  existence  and  the  operations  of  mind,  sup- 
posing it  to  exist,  will  account  for  all  the  phe- 
nomena which  matter  is  supposed  to  exhibit.  But 
the  existence  and  action  of  matter  ,  vary  it  how 
we  may  ,  will  never  account  for  one  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  mind.  We  do  not  believe  more  firmly 
in  the  existence  of  the  sensible  objects  around 
us  when  we  are  well  and  awake,  than  we  do  in 
the  reality  of  those  phantoms  which  the  imagi- 
nation conjures  up  in  the  hours  of  sleep  ,  or  the 
reason  of  derangement.  But  no  effect  produced 
by  material  agency  ever  produced  a  spiritual 
existence  ,  or  engendered  the  belief  of  such  an 
existence;  indeed,  the  thing  is  almost  a  contra- 
diction in  terms.  That  all  around  us  should  only 
be  the  creatures  of  our  fancy  ,  no  one  can  affirm 
to  be  impossible.  But  that  our  mind — that  which 
remembers — compares — imagines — in  a  word, 
that  which  thinks — that  of  the  existence  of  which 
we  are  perpetually  consc'ous — that  which  can- 
not but  exist  if  we  exist — that  which  can  make 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  105 

its  own  operations  the  subject  of  its  own  thought 
— that  this  should  have  no  existence  is  both  im- 
possible and  indeed  a  contradiction  in  terms. 
We  have  ,  therefore  ,  evidence  of  the  strictest 
kind — induction  of  facts  the  most  precise  and 
unerring — to  justify  the  conclusion  that  the  mind 
exists ,  and  is  different  from  and  independent  of 
matter  altogether  l. 

Now  this  proposition  not  only  destroys  the 
doctrine  of  the  materialists  ,  but  leads  to  the 
strongest  inferences  in  favour  of  the  mind  survi- 
ving the  body  with  which  it  is  connected  through 
life.  All  our  experience  shows  us  no  one  instance 
of  annihilation.  Matter  is  perpetually  changing 
—  never  destroyed;  the  form  and  manner  of  its 
existence  is  endlessly  and  ceaselessly  varying — 
its  existence  never  terminates.  The  body  decays, 
and  is  said  to  perish  ;  that  is ,  it  is  resolved  into 
its  elements  ,  and  becomes  the  material  of  new 
combinations,  animate  and  inanimate  ,  but  not  a 
single  particle  of  it  is  annihilated  ;  nothing  of  us 
or  around  us  ever  ceases  to  exist.  If  the  mind 
perishes  ,  or  ceases  to  exist  at  death  ,  it  is  the 
only  example  of  annihilation  which  we  know. 

But ,  it  may  be  said  ,  why  should  it  not ,  like 
the  body  ,  be  changed,  or  dissipated ,  or  resolved 


See  on  the  Hypothesis  of  Materialism.     Note  4- 

9- 


106  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

into  its  elements?  The  answer  is  plain :  it  differs 
from  the  body  in  this  ,  that  it  has  no  parts  ;  it 
is  absolutely  one  and  simple;  therefore  it  is  in- 
capable of  resolution  or  dissolution .  These  words, 
and  the  operations  or  events  they  refer  to ,  have 
no  explication  to  a  simple  and  immaterial  exist- 
ence. 

Indeed  ,  our  idea  of  annihilation  is  wholly  de- 
rived from  matter  ,  and  what  we  are  wont  to  call 
destruction  means  only  change  of  form  and  re- 
solution into  parts  ,  or  combination  into  new 
forms.  But  for  the  example  of  the  changes  un- 
dergone by  matter,  we  should  not  even  have 
any  notion  of  destruction  or  annihilation.  When 
we  come  to  consider  the  thing  itself ,  we  cannot 
conceive  it  to  be  possible ;  we  can  well  imagine 
a  parcel  of  gunpowder  or  any  other  combustible 
substance  ceasing  to  exist  as  such  by  burning  or 
exploding  ;  but  that  its  whole  elements  should 
not  continue  to  exist  in  a  different  state  ,  and  in 
new  combinations,  appears  inconceivable.  We 
cannot  follow  the  process  so  far;  we  can  form 
no  conception  of  any  one  particle  that  once  is  , 
ceasing  wholly  to  be.  How  then  can  we  form  any 
conception  of  the  mind  which  we  now  know  to 
exist  ceasingto be?  It  is  an  idea  altogether  above 
our  comprehension.  True,  we  no  longer ,  after 
the  body  is  dissolved,  perceive  the  mind,  because 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  107 

we  never  knew  it  by  the  senses  ;  we  only  were 
aware  of  its  existence  in  others  by  its  effects  upon 
matter,  and  had  no  experience  of  it  unconnected 
with  the  body.  But  it  by  no  means  follows  that 
it  should  not  exist  ,  merely  because  we  have 
ceased  to  perceive  its  effects  upon  any  portion 
of  matter.  It  had  connexion  with  the  matter 
which  it  used  to  act  upon ,  and  by  which  it  used 
to  be  acted  on  ;  when  its  entire  severance  took 
place  thatmatter  underwent  a  great  change,  but 
a  change  arising  from  its  being  of  a  composite 
nature.  The  same  separation  cannot  have  af- 
fected the  mind  in  the  like  manner,  because  its 
nature  is  simple  and  not  composite.  Our  ceasing 
to  perceive  any  affects  produced  by  it  on  any 
portion  of  matter  ,  the  only  means  we  can  have 
of  ascertaining  its  existence,  is  therefore  no  proof 
that  it  does  not  still  exist ;  and  even  if  we  admit 
that  it  no  longer  does  produce  any  effect  upon 
any  portion  of  matter ,  still  this  will  offer  no 
proof  that  it  has  ceased  to  exist.  Indeed  ,  when 
we  speak  of  its  being  annihilated  we  may  be  said 
to  use  a  word  to  which  no  precise  meaning  can 
be  attached  by  our  imaginations.  At  any  rate  ,  it 
is  much  more  difficult  to  suppose  that  this  anni- 
hilation has  taken  place,  and  to  conceive  in  what 
way  it  is  effected  ,  than  to  suppose  that  the  mind 
continues  in  some  state  of  separate  existence , 


108  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

disencumbered  of  the  body ,  and  to  conceive  in 
what  manner  this  separate  existence  is  main- 
tained. 

It  may  be  further  observed  that  the  material 
world  affords  no  example  of  creation,  any  more 
than  of  annihilation.  Such  as  it  was  in  point  of 
quantity  since  its  existence  began ,  such  it  still 
is,  not  a  single  particle  of  matter  having  been 
either  added  to  it  or  taken  from  it.  Change — 
unceasing  change — in  all  its  parts  ,  at  every 
instant  of  time  ,  it  is  for  ever  undergoing  ;  but 
though  the  combinations  or  relations  of  these 
parts  are  unremittingly  varying  ,  there  has  not 
been  a  single  one  of  ihem  created  ,  or  a  single 
one  destroyed.  Of  mind  ,  this  cannot  be  said  ;  it 
is  called  into  existence  perpetually  ,  before  our 
eyes.  In  one  respect  this  may  weaken  the  argu- 
ment for  the  continued  existence  of  the  soul , 
because  it  may  lead  to  the  conclusion  ,  that  as 
we  see  mind  created  ,  so  may  it  be  destroyed  ; 
while  matter ,  which  suffers  no  addition,  is  liable 
to  no  loss.  Yet  the  argument  seems  to  gain  in 
another  direction  more  force  than  it  loses  in 
this  ;  for  nothing  can  more  strongly  illustrate  the 
diversity  between  mind  and  matter  ,  or  more 
strikingly  show  that  the  one  is  independent  of 
the  other. 

Again ,  the  mind's  independence  of  matter 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  109 

and  capacity  of  existence  without  it ,  appears  to 
be  strongly  illustrated  by  whatever  shows  the 
entire  dissimilarity  of  its  constitution.  The  in- 
conceivable rapidity  of  its  operations  is,  perhaps, 
the  most  striking  feature  of  the  diversity,  and 
there  is  no  doubt  that  this  rapidity  increases  in 
proportion  as  the  interference  of  the  senses  — 
that  is  ,  the  influence  of  the  body — is  withdrawn. 
A  multitude  of  facts ,  chiefly  drawn  from  and 
connected  with  the  Phenomena  of  Dreams, 
throw  a  strong  light  upon  this  subject ,  and 
seem  to  demonstrate  the  possible  disconnexion 
of  mind  and  matter. 

The  bodily  functions  are  in  part  suspended 
during  sleep  ,  that  is  ,  all  those  which  depend 
upon  volition.  The  senses,  however,  retain  a 
portion  of  their  acuteness  ;  and  those  of  touch l 
and  hearing,  especially,  may  be  affected  with- 
out awakening  the  sleeper.  The  consequence 
of  the  cessation  which  takes  place  of  all  commu- 
nication of  ideas  through  the  senses  ,  is  that  the 
action  of  the  mind ,  and ,  above  all ,  of  those 
powers  connected  with  the  imagination,  becomes 


1  The  common  classification  of  the  senses  which  makes  the 
touch  comprehend  the  sense  of  heat  and  cold,  is  here  adopted ; 
though  certainly,  there  seems  almost  as  little  reason  for  ranging 
(his  under  touch,  as  for  ranging  sight,  smell,  hearing,  and  taste 
under  the  same  head. 


110  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

much  more  vigorous  and  uninterrupted.  This  is 
shown  in  two  ways  —  first ,  by  the  celerity 
with  which  any  impression  upon  the  senses, 
strong  enough  to  be  felt  without  awaking  ,  is 
caught  up  and  made  the  groundwork  of  a  new 
train  of  ideas  ,  the  mind  instantly  accommoda- 
ting itself  to  the  suggestions  of  the  impression, 
and  making  all  its  thoughts  chime  in  with  that ; 
and ,  secondly  ,  by  the  prodigiously  long  suc- 
cession of  images  that  pass  through  the  mind  , 
with  perfect  distinctness  and  liveliness  ,  in  an 
instant  of  time. 

The  facts  upon  this  subject  are  numerous ,  and 
of  undeniable  certainty  ,  because  of  daily  occur- 
rence. Every  one  knows  the  effect  of  a  bottle  of 
hot  water  applied  during  sleep  to  the  soles  of  the 
feet :  you  instantly  dream  of  walking  over  hot 
mould,  or  ashes  ,  or  a  stream  of  lava  ,  or  having 
your  feet  burnt  by  coming  too  near  the  fire.  But 
the  effect  of  falling  asleep  in  a  stream  of  cold 
air  ,  as  in  open  carriage  ,  varies  this  experiment 
in  a  very  interesting  ,  and  ,  indeed ,  instructive 
manner.  You  will ,  instantly  that  the  wind  be- 
gins to  blow  ,  dream  of  being  upon  some  exposed 
point,  and  anxious  for  shelter,  but  unable  to 
reach  it ;  then  you  are  on  the  deck  of  a  ship  ,  suf- 
fering from  the  gale  —  you  run  behind  a  sail  for 
shelter  ,  and  the  wind  changes,  so  that  it  still 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  ill 

blows  upon  you  —  you  are  driven  to  the  cabin  , 
but  the  ladder  is  removed  ,  or  the  door  locked. 
Presently  you  are  on  shore  ,  in  a  house  with  all 
the  windows  open  ,  and  endeavour  to  shut  them 
in  vain  ;  or ,  seeing  a  smith's  forge ,  you  are 
attracted  by  the  fire  ,  and  suddenly  a  hundred 
bellows  play  upon  it ,  and  extinguish  it  in  an 
instant ,  but  fill  the  whole  smithy  with  their 
blast ,  till  you  are  as  cold  as  on  the  road.  If  you 
from  time  to  time  awake,  the  moment  you  fall 
asleep  again  ,  the  same  course  of  dreaming  suc- 
ceeds in  the  greatest  variety  of  changes  that  can 
be  rung  on  our  thoughts. 

But  the  rapidity  of  these  changes ,  and  of  the 
succession  of  ideas  ,  cannot  be  ascertained  by 
this  experiment:  it  is  most  satisfactorily  proved 
by  another.  Let  any  one  who  is  extremely  over- 
powered with  drowsiness — as  after  sitting  up  all 
night,  and  sleeping  none  the  next  day — lie  down, 
and  begin  to  dictate  :  he  will  find  himself  fall- 
ing asleep  after  uttering  a  few  words ,  and  he 
will  be  awakened  by  the  person  who  writes  re- 
peating the  last  word,  to  show  he  has  written 
the  whole  ;  not  above  five  or  six  seconds  may 
elapse  ,  and  the  sleeper  will  find  it  at  first  quite 
impossible  to  believe  that  he  has  not  been  asleep 
for  hours  ,  and  will  chide  the  amanuensis  for 
having  fallen  asleep  over  his  work — so  great 


112  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

apparently  will  be  the  length  of  the  dream  which 
he  has  dreamt ,  extending  through  half  a  life- 
time. This  experiment  is  easily  tried  :  again  and 
again  the  sleeper  will  find  his  endless  dream 
renewed  ;  and  he  will  always  be  able  to  tell  in 
how  short  a  time  he  must  have  performed  it.  For 
suppose  eight  or  ten  seconds  required  to  write 
the  four  or  five  words  dictated  ,  sleep  could 
hardly  begin  in  less  than  four  or  five  seconds 
after  the  effort  of  pronouncing  the  sentence  ;  so 
that ,  at  the  utmost ,  not  more  than  four  or  five 
seconds  can  have  been  spent  in  sleep.  But,  in- 
deed, the  greater  probability  is  ,  that  not  above 
a  single  second  can  have  been  so  passed ;  for  a 
writer  will  easily  finish  two  words  in  a  second; 
and  suppose  he  has  to  write  four  ,  and  half  the 
time  is  consumed  in  falling  asleep  ,  one  second 
only  is  the  duration  of  the  dream ,  which  yet 
seems  to  last  for  years ,  so  numerous  are  the 
images  that  compose  it. 

Another  experiment  is  still  more  striking,  and 
affords  a  more  remarkable  proof  both  of  the 
velocity  of  thought,  and  of  the  quickness  with 
which  its  course  is  moulded  to  suit  any  external 
impression  made  on  the  senses.  But  this  experi- 
ment is  not  so  easily  tried.  A  puncture  made 
will  immediately  produce  a  long  dream  ,  which 
seems  to  terminate  in  some  such  accident  as  that 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  113 

the  sleeper  has  been  wandering  through  a  wood, 
and  received  a  severe  wound  from  a  spear ,  or 
the  tooth  of  a  wild  animal ,  which  at  the  same 
instant  awakens  him.  Agun  fired  in  oneinstance, 
during  the  alarm  of  invasion,  made  a  military- 
man  at  once  dream  the  enemy  had  landed,  so 
that  he  ran  to  his  post ,  and  repairing  to  the  scene 
of  action  ,  was  present  when  the  first  discharge 
took  place  ,  which  also  the  same  moment  awa- 
kened him  *. 

Now  these  facts  show  the  infinite  rapidity  of 
thought ;  for  the  puncture  and  the  discharge  of 
the  gun  took  place  in  an  instant,  and  their  im- 
pression on  the  senses  was  as  instantaneous ;  and 
yet ,  during  that  instant,  the  mind  went  through 
a  long  operation  of  fancy,  suggested  by  the  first 
part  of  the  impression  ,  and  terminated  ,  as  the 
sleep  itself  was,  by  the  continuation  —  the  last 
portion  of  the  same  impression.  Mark  what  was 
done  in  an  instant  —  in  a  mere  point  of  time. 
The  sensation  of  the  pain  or  noise  beginning 
is  conveyed  to  the  mind  ,  and  sets  it  a  thinking 
of  many  things  connected  with  such  sensations. 
But  that  sensation  is  lost  or  forgotten  for  a  portion 


1  The  ingenious  Eastern  tale,  in  the  Spectator,  of  the  magi- 
cian who  made  the  prince  plunge  his  head  into  a  pail  of  water, 
is  founded  on  facts  like  those  to  which  we  have  been  referring. 

lo 


114  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

of  the  short  instant  during  which  the  impression 
lasts ;  for  the  conclusion  of  the  same  impression 
gives  rise  to  a  new  set  of  ideas.  The  walk  in  the 
wood,  and  the  hurrying  to  the  post,  are  sug- 
gested by  the  sensation  beginning.  Then  follow 
many  things  unconnected  with  that  sensation  , 
except  that  they  grew  out  of  it;  and,  lastly, 
comes  the  wound ,  and  the  broadside ,  suggested 
by  the  continuance  of  the  sensation  ,  while  ,  all 
the  time ,  this  continuance  has  been  producing 
an  effet  on  the  mind  wholly  different  from  the 
train  of  ideas  the  dream  consists  of,  nay,  destruc- 
tive of  that  train  —  namely,  the  effect  of  rousing 
it  from  the  state  of  sleep  ,  and  restoring  its  domi- 
nion over  the  body.  Nay,  there  may  be  said  to 
be  a  third  operation  of  the  mind  going  on  at  the 
same  time  with  these  two —  a  looking  forward 
to  the  denouement  of  the  plot,  —  for  the  fancy  is 
all  along  so  contriving  as  to  fit  that,  by  termi- 
nating in  some  event,  some  result  consistent  with 
the  impression  made  on  the  senses,  and  which 
has  given  rise  to  the  whole  train  of  ideas. 

There  seems  every  reason  to  conclude  ,  from 
these  facts  ,  that  we  only  dream  during  the  in- 
stant of  transition  into  and  out  of  sleep.  That 
instant  is  quite  enough  to  account  for  the  whole 
of  what  appears  a  night's  dream.  It  is  quite  cer- 
tain we  remember  no  more  than  ought ,  accor- 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  115 

ding  to  these  experiments ,  to  fill  an  instant  of 
time ;  and  there  can  be  no  reason  why  we 
should  only  recollect  this  one  portion  if  we  had 
dreamt  much  more.  The  fact  that  we  never 
dream  so  much  as  when  our  rest  is  frequently 
broken  proves  the  same  proposition  almost  to 
demonstration.  An  uneasy  and  restless  night 
passed  in  bed  is  always  a  night  studded  full  with 
dreams.  So  ,  too ,  a  night  passed  on  the  road  in 
travelling ,  by  such  as  sleep  well  in  a  carriage  , 
is  a  night  of  constant  dreams.  Every  jolt  that 
awakens  or  half-awakens  us  seems  to  be  the 
cause  of  a  dream.  If  it  be  said  that  we  always 
or  generally  dream  when  asleep  ,  but  only  re- 
collect a  portion  of  our  dream,  then  the  ques- 
tion arises ,  why  we  recollect  a  dream  each 
time  we  fall  asleep ,  or  are  awakened ,  and  no 
more?  If  we  can  recall  twenty  dreams  in  a 
night  of  interrupted  sleep  ,  how  is  it  that  we  can 
only  recall  one  or  two  when  our  sleep  is  conti- 
nued? The  length  of  time  occupied  by  the  dream 
we  recollect  is  the  only  reason  that  can  be  given 
for  our  forgetting  the  rest;  but  this  reason  fails 
if,  each  time  we  are  roused,  we  remember 
separate  dreams. 

Nothing  can  be  conceived  better  calculated 
than  these  facts  to  demonstrate  the  extreme  agi- 
lity of  the  mental  powers ,  their  total  diversity 


116  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

from  any  materia  I  substances  or  actions  ;  nothing 
better  adapted  to  satisfy  us  that  the  nature  of  the 
mind  is  consistent  with  its  existence  apart  from 
the  body. 

The  changes  which  the  mind  undergoes  in  its 
activity,  its  capacity,  its  mode  of  operation, 
are  matter  of  constant  observation,  indeed  of 
every  man's  experience.  Its  essence  is  the  same  ; 
its  fundamental  nature  is  unalterable;  it  never 
loses  the  distinguishing  peculiarities  which  se- 
parate it  from  matter  ;  never  acquires  any  of  the 
properties  of  the  latter ;  but  it  undergoes  impor- 
tant changes  ,  both  in  the  progress  of  time  ,  and 
by  means  of  exercise  and  culture.  The  develop- 
ment of  the  bodily  powers  appears  to  affect  it , 
and  so  does  their  decay;  but  we  rather  ought  to 
say ,  that  ,  in  ordinary  cases  ,  its  improvement 
is  contemporaneous  with  the  growth  of  the 
body ,  and  its  decline  generally  is  contempora- 
neous with  that  of  the  body,  after  an  advanced 
period  of  life.  For  it  is  an  undoubted  fact ,  and 
almost  universally  true  ,  that  the  mind  ,  before 
extreme  old  age  ,  becomes  more  sound  ,  and  is 
capable  of  greater  things  ,  during  nearly  thirty 
years  of  diminished  bodily  powers  ;  that ,  in 
most  cases ,  it  suffers  no  abatement  of  strength 
during  the  ten  years  more  of  bodily  decline ;  that, 
in  many  cases ,  a  few  years  more  of  bodily  de- 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  117 

crepitude  produce  no  effect  upon  the  mind ;  and 
that ,  in  some  instances ,  its  faculties  remain 
bright  to  the  last ,  surviving  the  almost  total  ex- 
tinction of  the  corporeal  endowment.  It  is  certain 
that  the  strength  of  the  body  ,  its  agility  ,  its 
patience  of  fatigue  ,  indeed  all  its  qualities  ,  de- 
cline from  thirty  at  the  latest ,  and  yet  the  mind 
is  improving  rapidly  from  thirty  to  fifty ;  suffers 
little  or  no  decline  before  sixty;  and  therefore 
is  better  when  the  body  is  enfeebled  ,  at  the  age 
of  fifty-eight  or  fifty-nine  ,  than  it  was  in  the 
acme  of  the  corporeal  faculties  thirty  years  be- 
fore. It  is  equally  certain  ,  that  while  the  body  is 
rapidly  decaying  ,  between  sixty  or  sixty-three 
and  seventy,  the  mind  suffers  hardly  any  loss 
of  strength  in  the  generality  of  men  ;  that  men 
continue  to  seventy-five  or  seventy-six  in  the 
possession  of  all  their  mental  powers  ,  while  few 
can  then  boast  of  more  than  the  remains  of 
physical  strength  ;  and  instances  are  not  wanting 
of  persons  who  between  eighty  and  ninety,  or 
even  older ,  when  the  body  can  hardly  be  said 
to  live  ,  possess  every  faculty  of  the  mind  unim- 
paired. We  are  authorised  to  conclude,  from 
these  facts  ,  that  unless  some  unusual  and  violent 
accident  interferes,  such  as  a  serious  illness  or 
a  fatal  contusion  ,  the  ordinary  course  of  life 
presents  the  mind  and  the  body  running  courses 


118  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

widely  different,  and  in  great  part  of  the  time 
in  opposite  directions  ;  and  this  affords  strong 
proof  ,  both  that  the  mind  is  independent  of  the 
body  ,  and  that  its  destruction  in  the  period  of 
its  entire  vigour  is  contrary  to  the  analogy  of 
nature. 

The  strongest  of  all  the  arguments  both  for 
the  separate  existence  of  mind  ,  and  for  its  sur- 
viving the  body  remains,  and  it  is  drawn  from 
the  strictest  induction  of  facts.  The  body  is  con- 
stantly undergoing  change  in  all  its  parts.  Pro- 
bably no  person  at  the  age  of  twenty  has  one  single 
particle  in  any  part  of  his  body  which  he  had 
at  ten ;  and  still  less  does  any  portion  of  the 
body  he  was  born  with  continue  to  exist  in  or 
with  him.  All  that  he  before  had  has  nowentered 
into  new  combinations  ,  forming  parts  of  other 
men ,  or  of  animals ,  or  of  vegetable  or  mineral 
substances  ,  exactly  as  the  body  he  now  has  will 
afterwards  he  resolved  into  new  combinations 
after  his  death.  Yet  the  mind  continues  one  and 
the  same  ,  «  without  change  or  shadow  of  turn- 
ing. »  None  of  its  parts  can  be  resolved ;  for  it 
is  one  and  single  ,  and  it  remains  unchanged  by 
the  changes  of  the  body.  The  argument  would 
be  quite  as  strong  though  the  change  undergone 
by  the  body  were  admitted  not  to  be  so  com- 
plete, and  though   some  small  portion  of  its 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  119 

harder  parts  were  supposed  to  continue  with  us 
through  life. 

But  observe  how  strong  the  inferences  arising 
from  these  facts  are ,  both  to  prove  that  the  exist- 
ence of  the  mind  is  entirely  independent  of  the 
existence  of  the  body,  and  to  show  the  proba- 
bility of  its  surviving  !  If  the  mind  continues  the 
same  while  all  or  nearly  all  the  body  is  chan- 
ged ,  it  follows  that  the  existence  of  the  mind 
depends  not  in  the  least  degree  upon  the  exist- 
ence of  the  body;  for  it  has  already  survived  a 
total  change  of,  or,  in  the  common  use  of  the 
words,  an  entire  destruction  of  that  body.  But 
again ,  if  the  strongest  argument  to  show  that 
the  mind  perishes  with  the  body,  nay,  the  only 
argument  be,  as  it  indubitably  is,  derived  from 
the  phenomena  of  death ,  the  fact  to  which  we 
have  been  referring  affords  an  answer  to  this. 
For  the  argument  is  that  we  know  of  no  instance 
in  which  the  mind  has  ever  been  known  to  exist 
after  the  death  of  the  body.  Now  here  is  exactly 
the  instance  desiderated ,  it  being  manifest  that 
the  same  process  which  takes  place  on  the  body 
more  suddenly  at  death  is  taking  place  more 
gradually,  but  as  effectually  in  the  result ,  during 
the  whole  of  life,  and  that  death  itself  does  not 
more  completely  resolve  the  body  into  its  ele- 
ments and  form  it  into  new  combinations  than 


120  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

living  fifteen  or  twenty  years  does  destroy,  by 
like  resolution  and  combination  ,  the  self-same 
body.  And  yet  after  those  years  have  elapsed , 
and  the  former  body  has  been  dissipated  and 
formed  into  new  combinations,  the  mind  remains 
the  same  as  before ,  exercising  the  same  memory 
and  conciousness ,  and  so  preserving  the  same 
personal  identity  as  if  the  body  had  suffered  no 
change  at  all.  In  short ,  it  is  not  more  correct  to 
say  that  all  of  us  who  are  now  living  have  bodies 
formed  of  what  were  once  the  bodies  of  those 
who  went  before  us ,  than  it  is  to  say  that  some 
of  us  who  are  now  living  at  the  age  of  fifty  have 
bodies  which  in  part  belonged  to  others  now 
living  at  that  and  other  ages.  The  phenomena 
are  precisely  the  same ,  and  the  operations  are 
performed  in  like  manner  though  with  different 
degrees  of  expedition.  Now  all  would  believe  in 
the  separate  existence  of  the  soul  if  they  had 
experience  of  its  existing  apart  from  the  body. 
But  the  facts  referred  to  prove  that  it  does  exist 
apart  from  one  body  with  which  it  once  was 
united,  and  though  it  is  in  union  with  another, 
yet  as  it  is  not  adherent  to  the  same,  it  is  shown 
to  have  an  existence  separate  from ,  and  inde- 
pendent of,  that  body.  So  all  would  believe  in 
the  soul  surviving  the  body  ,  if  after  the  body's 
death  its  existence  were  made  manifest.  But  the 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  121 

facts  referred  to  prove  that  after  the  body's  death, 
that  is,  after  the  chronic  dissolution  which  the 
body  undergoes  during  life  ,  the  mind  continues 
to  exist  as  before.  Here ,  then ,  we  have  that 
proof  so  much  desiderated — the  existence  of  the 
soul  after  the  dissolution  of  the  bodily  frame 
with  which  it  was  connected.  The  two  cases 
cannot,  in  any  soundness  of  reasoning,  be  dis- 
tinguished ;  and  this  argument,  therefore,  one 
of  pure  induction,  derived  partly  from  physical 
science, through  the  evidence  of  our  senses,  partly 
from  psychological  science  by  the  testimony  of 
our  consciousness ,  appears  to  prove  the  possible 
Immortality  of  the  Soul  almost  as  rigorously  as 
« if  one  were  to  rise  from  the  dead.  » 

Now  we  have  gone  through  the  first  division 
of  this  second  branch  of  the  subject ,  and  have 
considered  the  proofs  of  the  separate  and  future 
existence  of  the  soul  afforded  by  the  nature  of 
mind.  It  is  quite  clear  that  all  of  them  are  de- 
rived from  a  strict  induction  of  facts ,  and  that 
the  doctrines  rest  upon  precisely  the  same  kind 
of  evidence  with  that  upon  which  the  doctrines 
respecting  the  constitution  and  habits  of  the  mind 
are  founded.  In  truth  ,  the  subjects  are  not  to  be 
distinguished  as  regards  the  species  of  demon- 
stration applicable  to  t  hem  —  the  process  by  which 
the  investigation  of  them  is  to  be  conducted.  That 


122  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

mind  has  an  existence  perceivable  and  demon- 
strable as  well  as  matter  ,  and  that  it  is  wholly 
different  from  matter  in  its  qualities ,  is  a  truth 
proved  by  induction  of  facts.  That  mind  can  exist 
independent  of  matter  and  survive  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  body ,  is  a  truth  proved  exactly  in  the 
same  manner,  by  induction  of  facts.  The  pheno- 
mena of  dreams  which  lead  to  important  con- 
clusions touching  the  nature  of  the  mind  ,  lead, 
and  by  the  self-same  kind  of  reasoning ,  to  im- 
portant conclusions  of  a  similar  description  , 
touching  the  mind's  existence  independent  of 
the  body.  The  facts,  partly  physical,  partly  psy- 
chological ,  which  show  the  mind  to  be  unaffected 
by  the  decay  and  by  even  the  total  though  gra- 
dual change  of  the  body  during  life,  likewise 
show  that  it  can  exist  after  the  more  sudden 
change  of  a  similar  kind  ,  which  we  term  the 
dissolution  of  the  body  by  death.  There  is  no 
means  of  separating  the  two  classes  of  truths , 
those  of  Psychology  and  those  of  Natural  Theo- 
logy ;  they  are  parts  of  one  and  the  same  science ; 
they  are  ascertained  by  one  and  the  same  pro- 
cess of  investigation  ;  they  repose  upon  one  and 
the  same  kind  of  evidence;  nor  can  any  person, 
without  giving  way  to  a  most  groundless  and 
unphilosophical  prejudice,  profess  his  belief  in 
the  former  doctrines,  and  reject  the  latter.  The 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  123 

only  difference  between  the  two  is  that  the  Theo- 
logical propositions  are  of  much  greater  impor- 
tance to  human  happiness  than  the  Metaphysical. 

II.  MORAL  ARGUMENT,  OR  EVIDENCE  OF  THE  DEITY'S  DESIGNS 
DRAWN  FROM  HIS  ATTRIBUTES  IN  CONNEXION  WITH  THE 
CONDITION    OF    THE    SPECIES. 

The  probable  designs  of  Divine  Providence 
with  respect  to  the  future  lot  of  man  are  to  be 
gathered  in  part  from  the  nature  of  the  mind 
itself,  the  work  of  the  Deity,  and  in  part  from 
the  attributes  of  the  Deity ,  ascertained  by  an 
examination  of  his  whole  works.  Itthus  happens 
that  a  portion  of  this  head  of  the  argument  has 
been  anticipated  in  treating  the  other  head,  the 
nature  of  the  mind.  Whatever  qualities  of  the 
soul  show  it  to  differ  from  matter,  both  make  it 
improbable  that  it  should  perish  with  the  body, 
and  make  it  improbable  that  the  Deity  should 
destine  it  to  such  a  catastrophe  ;  and  whatever 
facts  show  that  it  can  survive  a  total  change  of 
the  body  during  life,  show  likewise  the  proba- 
bility that  the  same  being  who  endowed  it  with 
that  capacity  will  suffer  it ,  in  like  manner,  to 
continue  in  being  after  the  more  sudden  change 
which  the  body  undergoes  at  death. 

The  argument  built  upon  the  supposed  designs 
of  the  Creator  requires  to  be  handled  in  a  humble 


124  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

andsdhmissive  spirit  ;b  lit,  if  so  undertaken,  there 
is  nothing  in  it  which  can  be  charged  with  pre- 
sumption, or  deemed  inconsistent  which  perfect 
though  rational  devotion.  In  truth,  all  the  in- 
vestigations of  Natural  Theology  are  equally 
liable  to  such  a  charge ;  for  to  trace  the  evidences 
of  design  in  the  works  of  nature  ,  and  inquire 
how  far  benevolence  presides  over  their  forma- 
tion and  maintenance — in  other  words  ,  to  de- 
duce from  what  we  see  ,  the  existence  of  the 
Deity ,  and  speculate  upon  His  wisdom  and  good- 
ness in  the  creation  and  government  of  the  uni- 
verse— is  just  as  daring  a  thing,  and  exactly  of 
the  same  kind  of  audacity  ,  as  to  speculate  upon 
His  probable  intentions  with  respect  to  the  fu- 
ture destiny  of  man. 

The  contemplation  of  the  Deity's  goodness  , 
as  deducible  from  the  great  preponderance  of 
instances  in  which  benevolent  design  is  exhibited, 
when  accompanied  with  a  consideration  of  the 
feelings  and  wishes  of  the  human  mind  ,  gives 
rise  to  the  first  argument  which  is  usually  ad- 
duced in  favour  of  the  Immortality  of  the  Soul. 
There  is  nothing  more  universal  or  more  con- 
stant than  the  strong  desire  of  immortality  which 
possesses  the  mind,  and  compared  with  which 
its  other  wishes  and  solicitudes  are  but  faint  and 
occasional.  That  a  benevolent  being  should  have 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  125 

implanted  this  propensity  without  the  intention 
of  gratifying  it,  and  to  serve  no  very  apparent 
purpose  unless  it  be  the  proving  that  it  is  with- 
out an  object ,  appears  difficult  to  believe  :  for 
certainly  the  instinctive  fear  of  death  would  have 
served  all  the  purposes  of  self-preservation  with- 
out any  desire  of  immortality  being  connected 
with  it,  although  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  this 
desire  ,  or  at  least  the  anxiety  about  our  future 
destiny,  is  intimately  related  to  our  dread  of  dis- 
solution. But  the  inference  acquires  additional 
strength  from  the  consideration  that  the  faculties 
of  the  mind  ripen  and  improve  almost  to  the  time 
of  the  body's  extinction ,  and  that  the  destruction 
of  the  soul  at  the  moment  of  its  being  fitter  than 
ever  for  worthy  things  seems  quite  inconceivable. 
The  tender  affections  so  strongly  and  so  uni- 
versally operating  in  our  nature  afford  another 
argument  of  a  like  kind.  No  doubt  the  purpose 
to  which  they  are  subservient  in  this  life  is  much 
more  distinctly  perceivable  ;  yet  still  it  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  provisions  of  a  benovelent  Power 
to  suppose  that  we  should  be  made  susceptible 
of  such  vehement  feelings  ,  and  be  suffered  to 
indulge  in  them  ,  so  as  to  make  our  happiness 
chiefly   consist  in  their  gratification ,  and  that 
then  we  should  suddenly  be  made  to  undergo  the 
bitter  pangs  of  separation  ,  while  ,  by  our  sur- 


126  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

viving,  those  pains  are  lengthened  out  without 
any  useful  effect  resulting  from  our  sufferings. 
That  such  separations  should  he  eternal  appears 
irreconcilable  with  the  strength  of  the  affections 
wounded  ,  arid  with  the  goodness  so  generally 
perceived  in  the  order  of  the  universe.  The  sup- 
position of  a  re-union  hereafter  overcomes  the 
difficulty,  and  reconciles  the  apparent  inconsist- 
ency. 

The  unequal  distribution  of  rewards  and  pu- 
nishments in  this  world  ,  that  is,  the  misery  in 
which  virtue  often  exists  ,  and  the  prosperity  not 
seldom  attendant  upon  vice  ,  can  in  no  way  be 
so  well  accounted  for  ,  consistently  with  the 
scheme  of  a  benevolent  Providence  ,  as  by  the 
supposition  of  a  Future  State. 

But  perhaps  there  is  nothing  more  strongly 
indicative  of  such  a  design  in  the  Creator  than 
the  universal  prevalence  of  religion  amongst 
men.  There  can  hardly  be  found  a  tribe  so  dark 
and  barbarous  as  to  be  without  some  kind  of 
worship  ,  and  some  belief  in  a  future  state  of  ex- 
istence. Now  all  religions  are  so  far  of  God  that 
he  permits  them  ;  he  made  and  preserves  the 
faculties  which  have  invented  the  false  ones  ,  as 
well  as  those  which  comprehend  and  treasure 
up  the  true  faith.  Religious  belief ,  religious  ob- 
servance ,    the    looking   forward   to   a   future 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  127 

existence  ,  and  pointing  to  a  condition  in  which 
the  deeds  done  on  earth  shall  be  visited  with 
just  recompense  ,  are  all  facts  of  universal  occur- 
rence in  the  history  and  intellectual  habits  of  the 
species.  Are  they  all  a  mere  fiction  ?  Do  they 
indeed  signify  nothing?  Is  thatameregroundless 
fancy  ,  which  in  all  places,  in  all  ages  ,  occu- 
pies and  has  occupied  the  thoughts  ,  and  mingled 
itself  with  the  actions  of  all  mankind  ,  whether 
barbarous  or  refined  «  ? 

But  if  it  be  said  that  the  belief  of  such  a  state 
is  subservient  to  animportantuse  ,  the  restrain- 
ing the  passions  and  elevating  the  feelings,  it  is 
obvious  to  reply  ,  that  so  great  a  mechanism  to 
produce  this  effect  very  imperfectly  and  preca- 
riously ,  appears  little  consistent  with  the  ordi- 
nary efficacy  and  simplicity  of  the  works  of  Pro- 
vidence, and  that  the  disposition  to  shun  vice 
and  debasement  could  have  been  more  easiiy 
and  more  certainly  implanted  by  making  them 
disgusting.  True,  there  would  then  have  been 
little  merit  in  the  restraint ;  but  of  what  value 
is  the  production  of  such  merit,  if  the  mind  which 
attains  it  and  becomes  adorned  by  it  has  no  sooner 
approached  perfection  than  it  ceases  to  exist 
at  all?  The  supposition  of  a  Future  State  at  once 

'  Notes  8  and  9. 


128  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

reconciles  all  inconsistencies  here  as  before  ,  and 
enables  us  to  comprehend  why  virtue  is  taught 
by  the  hopes  of  another  life ,  as  well  as  why  those 
hopes  ,  and  the  grounds  they  rest  on  ,  form  so 
large  a  portion  of  human  contemplation. 

That  the  existence  of  the  soul  in  a  new  state 
after  the  entire  dissolution  of  the  body  — nay  , 
thattheexistenceofthebodyitselfina  new  state, 
after  passing  through  death  ,  is  nothing  contrary 
to  the  analogies  which  nature  presents  ,  has  been 
oftentimes  observed,  and  is  a  topic  much  dwelt 
upon  ,  especially  by  the  ancient  philosophers. 
The  extraordinary  transformations  which  insects 
undergo  have  struck  men's  imaginations  so 
powerfully  in  contemplating  this  subject ,  that 
the  soul  itself  was  deemed  of  old  to  be  aptly  de- 
signated under  the  emblematical  form  of  a  but- 
terfly, which  havingemerged  from  the  chrysalis 
state,  flutters  in  the  air,  instead  of  continuing 
to  crawl  on  the  earth  ,  as  it  did  before  the  worm 
it  once  was  ceased  to  exist.  The  instance  of  the 
foetus  of  animals  ,  and  especially  of  the  human 
embryo  ,  has  occupied  the  attention  of  modern 
inquirers  into  this  interesting  subject.  Marking 
the  entire  difference  in  one  state  of  existence  be- 
fore and  after  birth,  and  the  diversity  of  every 
one  animal  function  at  those  two  periods,  phi- 
losophers have  inferred  ,  that  as  on  passing  from 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  129 

the  one  to  the  other  state  of  existence  so  mighty 
a  change  is  wrought ,  without  any  destruction 
either  of  soul  or  hody ,  a  like  transition  may  take 
place  at  death,  and  the  event  which  appears  to 
close  our  being  may  only  open  the  portals  of  a 
new,  and  higher,  and  more  lasting  condition. 
As  far  as  such  considerations  suggest  analogies, 
they  furnish  matter  of  pleasing  contemplation  , 
perhaps  lend  even  some  illustration  to  the  argu- 
ment. Nevertheless ,  they  must  be  regarded  as 
exceedingly  feeble  helps  in  this  latter  respect , 
if  indeed  their  aid  be  not  of  a  doubtful,  and  even 
dangerous  kind.  They  are  all  drawn  from  ma- 
terial objects, — all  restupon  the  properties  and 
the  fortunes  of  corporeal  existences.  Now  the 
stronghold  of  those  who  maintain  the  Immorta- 
lity of  the  Soul ,  and ,  indeed,  all  the  doctrines  of 
Natural  Theology ,  is  the  entire  difference  bet- 
ween mind  and  matter ,  and  the  proofs  we  have 
constantly  around  us,  and  within  us,  of  existences 
as  real  as  the  bodies  which  affect  our  outward 
senses,  but  resembling  those  perishable  things  in 
no  one  quality,  no  one  habit  of  action  ,  no  one 
mode  of  being. 

Upon  the  particulars  of  a  future  state  —  the 
kind  of  existence  reserved  for  the  soul — the  spe- 
cies of  its  occupations  and  enjoyments — Natural 
Theology  is,  of  course,  profoundly  silent;  but 


130  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

not  more  silent  than  Revelation.  We  are  left 
wholly  to  conjecture,  and  in  a  field  on  which  our 
hopelessness  of  attaining  any  certain  result  is 
quite  equal  to  our  interest  in  the  success  of  the 
search.  Indeed  ,  all  our  ideas  of  happiness  in  this 
world  are  such  as  rather  to  disqualify  us  for  the 
investigation  ,  or  what  may  more  fitly  be  termed 
the  imagination.  Those  ideas  are,  for  the  most 
part ,  either  directly  connected  with  the  senses , 
or  derived  from  our  condition  of  weakness  here 
which  occasions  the  formation  of  connexions  for 
mutual  comfort  and  support ,  and  gives  to  the 
feebler  party  the  feeling  of  allegiance  ,  to  the 
stronger  the  pleasure  of  protection.  Yet  may  we 
conceive  that,  hereafter,  such  of  our  affections 
as  have  been  the  most  cherished  in  life  shall 
survive  and  form  again  the  delight  of  meeting 
those  from  whom  death  has  severed  us— that  the 
soul  may  enjoy  the  purest  delights  in  the  exer- 
cise of  its  powers,  above  all ,  for  the  investigation 
of  truth — that  it  may  expatiate  in  the  full  disco- 
very of  whatever  has  hitherto  been  most  sparingly 
revealed  ,  or  most  carefully  hidden  from  its  view 
— that  it  may  be  gratified  with  the  sight  of  the 
useful  harvest  reaped  by  the  world  from  the  good 
seed  which  it  helped  to  sow.  We  can  only  con- 
jecture or  fancy.  But  these  ,  and  such  as  these  , 
are  pleasures  in  which  the  gross  indulgences  of 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  131 

sense  have  no  part ,  and  which  are  even  remo- 
ved above  the  less  refined  or  our  moral  gra- 
tifications :  they  may,  therefore,  be  supposed 
consistent  with  a  pure  and  faultless  state  of 
spiritual  being. 

Perhaps  the  greatest  ofall  the  difficulties  which 
we  feel  in  forming  such  conjectures,  regards  the 
endless  duration  of  an  immortal  existence.  All 
our  ideas  in  this  world  are  so  adapted  to  a  limited 
continuance  of  life — not  only  so  moulded  upon 
the  scheme  of  a  being  incapable  of  lasting  beyond 
a  few  years  ,  but  so  inseparably  connected  with 
a  constant  change  even  here — a  perpetual  ter- 
mination of  one  stage  of  existence  and  beginning 
of  another — that  we  cannot  easily  ,  if  at  all  , 
fancy  an  eternal ,  or  even  a  long-continued  ,  en- 
durance of  the  same  faculties,  the  samepursuits, 
and  the  same  enjoyments.  All  here  is  in  perpe- 
tual movement  —  ceaseless  change.  There  is 
nothing  in  us  or  about  us  that  abides  an  hour — 
nay,  an  instant.  Resting-place  there  is  none  for 
the  foot — no  haven  is  provided  where  the  mind 
may  be  still.  How  then  shall  a  creature ,  thus 
wholly  ignorant  of  repose — unacquainted  with 
any  continuation  at  all  in  any  portion  of  his 
existence — so  far  abstract  his  thoughts  from  his 
whole  experience  as  to  conceive  a  long ,  much 
more  a  perpetual ,  duration  of  the  same  powers, 


132  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

pursuits  ,  feelings,  pleasures?  Here  it  is  that  we 
are  the  most  lost  in  our  endeavours  to  reach  the 
seats  of  the  blessed  with  our  imperfect  organs 
of  perception  ,  and  our  inveterate  and  only  ha- 
bits of  thinking  '. 

It  remains  to  observe,  that  all  the  speculations 
upon  which  we  have  touched  under  this  second 
subdivision  of  the  subject,  the  moral  argument, 

1  The  part  of  Dean  Swift's  satire  which  relates  to  the  Stulbrugs 
may  possibly  occur  to  some  readers  as  bearing  upon  this- topic. 
That  the  staunch  admirers  of  that  singularly-gifted  person  should 
havebeen  flung  into  ecstacies  on  the  perusal  of  this  extraordinary 
part  of  his  writings,  needs  not  surprise  us.  Their  raptures 
were  full  easily  excited  ;  but  I  am  quite  clear  they  have  given 
a  wrong  gloss  to  it,  and  heaped  upon  its  merits  a  very  undeserved 
praise.  They  think  that  the  picture  of  the  Stulbrugs  was  inten- 
ded to  wean  us  from  a  love  of  life,  and  that  it  has  well  accom- 
plished its  purpose.  I  am  very  certain  that  the  Dean  never  had 
any  such  thing  in  view,  because  his  sagacity  was  far  too  great 
not  to  perceive  that  he  only  could  make  out  this  position  by  a 
most  undisguised  begging  of  the  question .  How  could  any  man 
of  the  most  ordinary  reflection  expect  to  wean  his  fellow-crea- 
tures from  love  of  life  by  describing  a  sort  of  persons  who  at  a 
given  age  lost  their  faculties,  and  became  doting,  drivelling 
idiots?  Did  any  man  breathing  ever  pretend  that  he  wished 
to  live,  not  only  for  centuries,  but  even  for  threescore  years 
and  ten,  bereaved  of  his  understanding,  and  treated  by  the  law 
and  by  his  fellow  men  as  in  hopeless,  incurable  dotage  ?  The 
passage  in  question  is  much  more  likely  to  have  proceeded  from 
Swift's  exaggerated  misanthropy,  and  to  have  been  designed  as 
an  antidote  to  human  pride,  by  showing  that  our  duration  is 
necessarily  limited  if,  indeed,  it  is  not  rather  to  be  regarded 
as  the  work  of  mere  whim  and  caprice. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  133 

are  similar  to  the  doctrines  of  inductive  science — 
at  least  to  such  of  those  doctrines  as  are  less 
perfectly  ascertained;  but  the  investigation  is 
conducted  upon  the  same  principles.  The  most 
satisfactory  proofs  of  the  soul's  immortality  are 
those  of  the  first,  or  psychological  class,  derived 
from  studying  the  nature  of  mind  ;  those  of  the 
second  class  which  we  have  last  been  surveying, 
derived  from  the  condition  of  man  in  connexion 
with  the  attributes  of  the  Deity,  are  less  distinct 
and  cogent  ;  nor  would  they  be  sufficient  of 
themselves  ;  but  they  add  important  confirmation 
to  the  others ;  and  both  are  as  truly  parts  of 
legitimate  inductive  science  as  any  branch — we 
may  rather  say,  any  other  branch  —  of  moral  phi- 
losophy. 


SECTION  VI. 

LORD   BACOIN'S    DOCTRINE    OF    FINAL    CAUSES  '. 

It  now  appears,  that  when  we  said  that  Natural 
Theology  can  no  more  be  distinguished  from 
the  physical,  psychological,  and  ethical  sciences, 
in  respect  of  the  evidence  it  rests  upon  and 
the  manner  in  which  its  investigations  are  to 
be  conducted,  than  the  different  departments 
of  those  sciences  can  be  distinguished  from  each 
other  in  the  like  respect,  we  were  only  making 
an  assertion  borne  out  by  a  close  and  rigorous 
examination  of  the  subject.  How,  then ,  comes 
it  to  pass,  it  may  be  asked,  that  the  father  of 
Inductive  Philosophy  has  banished  the  specula- 
tion of  Final  Causes  from  his  system,  as  if  it  were 
no  branch  of  inductive  science?  A  more  atten- 
tive consideration  of  the  question  will  show,  first 
that  the  sentence  which  he  pronounced  has  been 

1  Note  10. 


A  DISCOURSE  OF  NATURAL  THEOLOGY.        155 

not  a  little  misunderstood  by  persons  who  looked 
only  at  particular  aphorisms ,  without  duly  re- 
garding the  context  and  the  occasion  ;  and  ,  se- 
condly, that  Lord  Bacon  may  very  probably  have 
conceived  a  prejudice  against  the  subject  alto- 
gether, from  the  abuses,  or  indeed  perversions, 
to  which  a  misplaced  affection  for  it  had  given 
rise  in  some  of  the  ancient  schools  of  philosophy. 
That  Lord  Bacon  speaks  disparagingly  of  the 
inquiry  concerning  final  causes,  both  when  he 
handles  it  didactically,  and  when  he  mentions  it 
incidentally,  is  admitted .  He  enumerates  it  among 
the  errors  that  spring  from  the  restlessness  of  mind 
(impotentia  mentis),  which  forms  the  fourth  class 
of  the  idols  of  the  species  (idola  tribus)  or  causes 
offalse  philosophy  connected  with  the  peculiari- 
ties of  the  human  constitution  ».  In  other  parts  of 
the  same  work  he  descants  upon  the  mischiefs 
which  have  arisen  in  the  schools  from  mixing  the 
doctrines  of  natural  religion  with  those  of  natural 
philosophy 2 ;  and  he  more  than  once  treats  of  the 
inquiry  concerning  final  causes  as  a  barren  spe- 
culation ,  comparing  it  to  a  nun  or  a  vestal  con- 
secrated to  heaven  3.  But  a  nearer  examination 


1  Nov.  Org.  lib.  i.Aph.48. 
a  lb.  Aph.  96  ;  and  De  Dig.  et  Aug.  lib.  i. 
3  «  Sterilis  et  tanquam  virgo  deo  sacra  non  parit .  »  c.  5.    De 
Dig.  lib.  iii. 


136  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

of  this  great  authority  will  show  that  it  is  not 
adverse  to  our  doctrine. 

1.  First  of  all  it  is  to  he  remarked  ,  that  Lord 
Bacon  does  not  disapprove  of  the  speculation  con- 
cerning final  causes  absolutely,  and  does  not  un- 
dervalue the  doctrines  of  Natural  Religion  ,  so 
long  as  that  speculation  and  those  doctrines  are 
kept  in  their  proper  place.  His  whole  writings 
bear  testimony  to  the  truth  of  this  proposition. 
In  the  Parasceve  to  natural  and  experimental 
history,  which  closes  the  Novum  Organum,  he 
calls  the  history  of  the  phenomena  of  nature  a 
volume  of  the  work  of  God ,  and  as  it  were  an- 
other Bible —  uvolumenoperumDei,  ettanquam 
altera  scriptura  l.  »  In  the  first  book  of  the  De 
Dignitate,  he  says  there  are  two  books  of  religion 
to  be  consulted  —  thescriptures,  to  tellthe  will  of 
God,  and  the  book  of  creation,  to  show  is  power2. 
Accordingly  he  maintains  elsewhere  3 ,  that  a 
miracle  was  never  yet  performed  to  convert 
atheists,  because  these  mightalways  arrive  at  the 
knowledge  of  a  Deity  by  the  light  of  nature.  Nor 
ought  we  to  pass  over  the  remarkable  passage  of 
the  Cogitata  et  Visa ,  in  which  he  propounds 


1  Parasceve,  c.  9. 

»  Lib.  i. 

Mb.  lib.  iii.  c.  1 3. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  137 

the  use  of  Natural  Philosophy  as  the  cure  for 
superstition  and  the  support  of  true  religion. 
«  Naturalem  Philosophiam,  post  verbum  Dei, 
certissimam  superstitionis  medicinam,  eandem 
probatissimain  fidei  alimentum  esse.  Itaque  me- 
rito  religioni  tanquam  fidatissimam  et  acceptissi- 
mam  ancillam  attribui,  cum  altera  voluntatem 
Dei,  altera  potestatem  manifestet '.  »  If  the  ear- 
lier part  of  the  passage  left  any  doubt  of  the  kind 
of  service  which  religion  was  to  derive  from  in- 
ductive science,  the  last  words  clearly  show  that 
it  could  only  be  by  the  doctrine  of  final  causes. 
2.  But  further,  he  distinctly  classes  natural  re- 
ligion among  the  branches  of  legitimate  science ; 
and  it  is  of  great  and  decisive  importance  to  our 
present  inquiry  that  we  should  mark  the  particu- 
lar place  which  he  assigns  to  it.  He  first  devides 
science  into  two  great  branches,  Theology  and 
Philosophy —  comprehending  under  the  former 
description  only  the  doctrines  of  revelation,  and 
under  the  latter  all  human  science.  Now,  after 
expressly  excluding  Natural  Pteligion  a  from  the 
first  class,  he  treats  it  as  a  part  of  the  second, 
The  second,  or  philosophy,  is  divided  into  three 
parts,  according  as  its  object  is  the  Deity,  Nature, 


1  Francisci  Baconi,  Cogitata  et  visa. 
a  De  Dirt.  lib.  iii.  c.  1. 


138  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

or  Man.  The  first  of  these  subdivisions  constitutes 
Natural  Religion ,  which  he  says  may  be  termed 
Divine  knowledge,  if  you  regard  its  object,  but 
Natural  knowledge,  if  you  consider  its  nature  and 
evidence  (u  ratione  informationis  scientia  natu- 
ralis  censeri  potest '  »).  That  he  places  it  in  a 
different  subdivision  from  Natural  Philosophy 
proves  nothing ;  for  he  classes  anatomy,  medicine, 
and  intellectual  philosophy  also  in  a  different 
subdivision:  they  come  under  the  head  of  Human 
Philosophy,  or  the  science  of  man  ,  as  contradis- 
tinguished from  Natural  Theology  and  Natural 
Philosophy,  or  the  science  of  God  and  of  external 
objects.  Many  objections  may  undoubtedly  be 
made  to  this  classification,  of  which  it  is  perhaps 
enough  to  say,  that  it  leads  to  separating  optics 
as  well  as  anatomy  and  medicine2  from  natural 
philosophy.  But,  at  all  events,  it  shows  both  that 
Lord  Bacon  deemed  Natural  Theology  a  fit  object 
of  philosophical  inquiry,  and  that  he  regarded 
the  inductive  method  as  furnishing  the  means  by 
which  the  enquiry  was  to  be  conducted. 

3.  The  general  censure  upon  the  doctrine  of 
final  causes  to  which  we  have  in  the  outset  ad- 


'  De  Dig.  lib.  iii.  c.  2. 

2  lb.  lib.  iv.  c.  3.     He  treats  of  the  desiderata  in  optics,  under 
the  head  of  the  human  mind  — the  senses. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  139 

verted  ,  as  conveyed  by  certain  incidental  re- 
marks ,  is  manifestly  directed  against  the  abuse 
of  such  speculations  ,  and  more  especially  in  the 
ancient  schools  of  philosophy.  Lord  Bacon  justly 
objects  to  the  confounding  of  final  with  efficient 
or  physical  causes ;  he  marks  the  loose  and  figu- 
rative language  to  which  this  confusion  has  given 
rise ;  he  asks  if  it  is  philosophical  to  describe  the 
eye  as  Aristotle  ,  Galen ,  and  others  do  ,  with 
the  eyelids  and  eyelashes  as  a  wall  and  a  hedge 
to  protect  it ;  or  the  bones  as  so  many  beams  and 
pillars  to  support  the  body  » ;  and  he  is  naturally 
apprehensive  of  the  danger  which  may  result 
from  men  introducing  fancies  of  their  own  into 
science ,  and ,  above  all ,  from  their  setting  out 
with  such  fancies  ,  and  then  making  the  facts 
bend  to  humour  them.  This  is  indeed  the  great 
abuse  of  the  doctrine  of  final  causes  ;  and  the 
more  to  be  dreaded  in  its  consequences  ,  because 
of  the  religious  feelings  which  are  apt  to  mix 
themselves  with  such  speculations  ,  and  to  con- 
secrate error  2. 

1  De  Dig.  lib.  iii.  c.  4. 

a  This  idea  is  expressed  by  Bacon,  with  his  wonted  felicity , 
in  the  ;5th  Aphorism.  «  Pessima  enim  res  est  errorum  apo- 
theosis ;  et  pro  peste  intellectus  habenda  est,  si  vanis  accedat 
veneratio.  »  (Nov.  Org.  lib.  i.)  He  gives  an  instance  of  this  folly 
in  the  perverted  use  made  of  some  portions  of  the  Bible  history 
— «  Hinc  vanitatnonnulli  ex  modernis  summa  levitate  ita  indul- 


140  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

4.  The  objections  of  Lord  Bacon  are  the  more 
clearly  shown  to  be  levelled  against  the  abuse 
only,  that  we  find  him  speaking  in  nearly  simi- 
lar terms  of  logic  and  the  mathematics  as  having 
impeded  the  progress  of  natural  science.  In  the 
passage  already  referred  to,  and  which  occurs 
twice  in  his  hooks  ,  where  the  Platonists  are  ac- 
cused of  mixing  Natural  Religion  with  philoso- 
phy, the  latter  Platonists  (or  Eclectics)  are  in 
the  same  words  charged  with  corrupting  it  by 
the  mathematics,  and  the  Peripatetics  by  logic  *« 
Not  certainly  that  the  greatest  logician  of  modern 
times  could  undervalue  either  his  own  art  or  the 
skilof  the  analyst,  but  because  Aristotle  through 
dialectic,  and  Proclus  through  geometrical  pe- 
dantry ,  neglected  that  humbler  but  more  use- 
ful province  of  watchingantl  interpreting  nature, 
and  used  the  instruments  furnished  by  logic  and 
the  mathematics,  not  to  assist  them  in  classifying 
facts,  orin  reasoningfrom  them,  but  to  construct 
phantastic  theories,  to  which  they  made  the  facts 
bend. 

When  rightly  examined,  then,  theauthoritv 
of  Lord  Bacon  appears  not  to  oppose  the  doctrine 

serunt,ut  in  primo  capitulo  Geneseos  et  in  libro  Job  et  aliis 
scripturis  sacris,  Philosophiam  Naturalem  fundare  conati  sint  j 
inter  viva  qucerentes  mortua.  » 

1  Nov.  Org.  lib.  i.  Aph.  96  j  De  Dig.  lib.  i. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  141 

which  we  are  seeking  to  illustrate.  Yet  it  is  pos- 
sible that  a  strong  impression  of  the  evils  occa- 
sioned by  the  abuse  of  these  speculations  may 
have  given  him  a  less  favourable  opinion  of  them 
than  they  deserved.  It  appears  that  he  had  even 
conceived  some  prejudice  against  logic  and  the 
mathematics  from  a  similar  cause;  and  he  mani- 
fests it ,  not  only  in  the  passages  already  referred 
to ,  but  in  that  portion  of  his  treatise  De  Dig. 
etAug. ,  in  which  he  treats  of  mathematical  as 
an  appendix  to  physical  science,  expressing  much 
hesitation  whether  to  rank  it  as  a  science  ,  and 
delivering  himself  with  some  asperity  against 
both  logicians  and  mathematicians  l.  High  as  is 
the  authority  of  this  great  man — and  upon  the 
subject  of  the  present  inquiry  the  highest  of  all 
— yet  ,  if  it  clearly  appears  that  the  argument 
from  Final  Causes  comes  within  the  scope  of  in- 
ductive science ,  we  are  bound  to  admit  it  within 
the  circle  of  legitimate  human  knowledge,  even 
if  we  found  the  father  of  that  science  had  other- 
wise judged.  It  is  clear  that ,  had  he  now  lived  , 


1  De  Dig.  lib.  iii.  c.  6. — Delicias  et  fastum  mathematicorum , 
qui  hanc  scientiam  physicse  fieri  imperare  cupiunt.  Nescio 
enim  quo  fato  fiat  ut  mathematica  et  logicaquae  ancillarum  loca 
erga  physicam  se  gerere  debebant,  nibilominus,  certitudineui 
prae  se  jactantes,  dominationem  exerccre  petunt.  » 

12. 


142  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

he  would  himself  have  rejected  some  specula- 
tions as  wholly  beyond  the  reach  of  the  human 
faculties ,  which  he  unhesitatingly  ranges  among 
the  objects  of  sound  philosophy  ".  It  is  equally 
undeniable  that  he  would  have  treated  others 
with  greater  respect  than  he  has  shewn  them  3. 
Above  all ,  it  is  certain  that  he  would  never  have 
suffered  that  the  veneration  due  to  his  own  name 
should  enshrine  an  idol 3  to  obstruct  the  progress 
of  truth ,  and  alienate  her  votaries  from  the  true 
worship  which  he  himself  had  founded. 

That  Lord  Bacon  has  not  himself  indulged  in 
any  speculations  akin  to  those  of  Natural  Theo- 
logy is,  beyond  all  dispute ,  true.  There  is  hardly 


1  He  distinctly  considers  the  «  doctrine  of  angels  and  spirits  » 
as  an  «  appendix  to  Natural  Theology,  »  and  holds  that  their 
nature  may  he  investigated  by  science,  including  that  of  unclean 
spirits  or  daemons,  which  he  says  hold  in  this  inquiry  the  same 
place  as  poisons  do  in  physics,  or  vices  in  ethics.  —  (De  Dig. 
lib.  iii.  c.  2.)  Natural  magic,  the  doctrine  of  fascination,  the 
discovery  of  futurity  from  dreams  and  ecstacies,  especially  in  bad 
health  from  deathbed  glimpses— in  a  word,  divination— he  holds 
to  be  branches  of  science  deserving  of  cultivation  ;  though  he 
warns  against  sorcery,  or  the  practice  of  witchcraft.  —  (lb.  lib.  iv- 
c.  3,  and  lib.  ii.  c.  2.) 

2  He  complains  of  treatises  of  Natural  History  being  «  swelled 
with  figures  of  animals  and  plants,  and  other  superfluous  matter, 
instead  of  being  enriched  with  solid  observations. «— (  De  Dig. 
lib.  ii.  c.  3.) 

3  Idolum  theatri. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  143 

any  writer  upon  moral  or  natural  science  ,  in 
whose  works  fewer  references  can  be  found  to 
the  power  or  wisdom  of  a  superintending  Pro- 
vidence. It  would  be  difficult  to  find  in  any  other 
author  ,  ancient  or  modern  ,  as  much  of  very 
miscellaneous  matter  upon  almost  all  physical 
subjects  as  he  has  brought  together  in  the  Sylva 
Syharum,  without  one  allusion  to  Final  Causes. 
But  it  must  also  be  admitted,  that  it  would  not 
be  easy  to  find  in  any  other  writer  of  the  least 
name  upon  physical  subjects  so  little  of  value, 
and  so  much  that  is  wholly  unworthy  of  respect. 
That  work  is  ,  indeed ,  a  striking  instance  of  the 
inequalities  of  the  human  faculties.  Among  the 
one  thousand  observations  of  which  it  consists  , 
hardly  one — of  the  two  hundred  and  eighteen 
pages  certainly  not  one — can  be  found  in  which 
there  is  not  some  instance  of  credulity  ,  super- 
stition ,  groundless  hypothesis ,  manifest  error 
of  some  kind  or  other ;  and  nothing  at  any  time 
given  to  the  world  ever  exhibited  a  more  entire 
disregard  of  all  his  own  rules  of  philosophizing  : 
for  a  superficial  examination  of  facts  ,  a  hasty 
induction  ,  and  a  proneness  to  fanciful  theory  , 
form  the  distinguishing  characters  of  the  whole 
book.  Assuredly  it  is  a  proof  that  the  doctrine 
of  Final  Causes  is  not  the  only  parent  of  a  uphan- 
tastic  philosophy  ,  »  though  the  other  base  un- 


144  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

dergrowth  of  m  heretical  religion  l»  may  not  be 
found  in  the  recesses  of  the  Sylva. 

Descartes ,  whose  original  genius  for  the  ab- 
stract sciences  fixed  an  aera  in  the  history  of  pure 
mathematics ,  as  remarkable  as  Bacon's  genius 
did  in  that  of  logic,  like  him  failed  egregiously 
as  a  cultivator  of  natural  philosophy;  and  he  ex- 
cluded Final  Causes  altogether  from  his  system 
as  a  preposterous  speculation  —  an  irreverent 
attempt  to  penetrate  mysteries  hidden  from  hu- 
man eyes  by  the  imperfection  of  our  nature. 
But  it  is  to  be  observed ,  that  all  the  successful 
cultivators  of  physical  science  have  ,  as  if  under 
the  influence  of  an  irresistible  impulsion  ,  in- 
dulged in  the  sublime  contemplations  of  Natu- 
ral Beligion.  Nor  have  they  fallen  into  this  track 
from  feeling  and  sentiment;  they  have  pursued 
it  as  one  of  the  paths  which  inductive  philoso- 
phy opens  to  the  student  of  nature.  To  say  no- 
thing of  Mr.  Boyle,  one  of  the  earliest  cultivators 


1  This  striking  and  epigrammatic  antithesis  occurs  more  than 
once  in  his  writings.  Thus,  in  the  Nov.  Org.  lib.  i.  aph.  65 — 
«  Exdivinorum  et  humanorummalesana  adoiixtione,  non  solum 
educitur  philosophiaphantastica,  sed  etiam  Religio  haeretica;  » 
and  again,  in  De  Dig.  and  Aug.,  lib.  iii.  c.  2,  speaking  of  the 
abuse  of  speculations  touching  natural  religion,  he  remarks  on 
the  «  incommoda  et  pericula  quae  ex  eo  (abusu)  turn  religioni, 
turn  philosophise  impendent ,  utpote  qui  religionem  haereticam 
procuditet  philosophiam  phantasticam  et  superstltiosam.  » 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  145 

of  experimental  philosophy ,  whose  works  are 
throughout  imbued  with  this  spirit,  and  who  has 
left  a  treatise  expressly  on  the  subject  of  Final 
Causes  ,  let  us  listen  to  the  words  of  Sir  Isaac 
Newton  himself.  The  greatest  work  of  man,  the 
Principia  ,  closes  with  a  swift  transition  from  its 
most  difficult  investigation  ,  the  determination 
and  correction  of  a  comet's  trajectory  upon  the 
parabolic  hypothesis1,  to  that  celebrated  scho- 
lium ,  upon  which  Dr.  Clarke's  argument  a  priori 
for  the  existence  of  a  Deity  is  built.  But  whatever 
may  be  deemed  the  soundness  of  that  argument, 
or  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  eloquent  and  sublime 
passages  which  lay  its  foundation,  its  illustrious 
author  at  the  same  time  points  our  attention  to 
the  demonstration  from  induction  ,  and  in  the 
most  distinct  and  positive  terms  sanctions  the 
doctrine,  that  this  is  a  legitimate  branch  of  na- 
tural knowledge.  «  Hunc  (Deum)  cognoscimus 
per  proprietates  ejus  et  attributa  et  per  sapien- 
tissimas  et  optimas  rerum  structuras  et  causas 
finales ,  et  adrniramur  ob  prospectiones.  »  — 
«<Deus  sine  dominio ,  providentia ,  etcausis  fina- 
libus ,  nihil  aliud  est  quam  fa  turn  et  natura.  »  — 
«  Et  haec  de  Deo — de  quo  utique  ex  phoenome- 


Principia,  lib.  iii.  Prop.  xli.  and  xlii. 


146         A  DISCOURSE  OF  NATURAL  THEOLOGY. 

nis  disserere  ad  philosophiam  naturalem  per- 
tinet.  »  —  (Scholium  Generate.) 

And  if  he  could  not  rest  from  his  immortal 
labours  in  setting  forth  the  system  of  the  Uni- 
verse ,  without  raising  his  mind  to* the  contem- 
plation of  Him  who  «  weighed  the  mountains  in 
scales  and  the  hills  in  a  balance, »  so  neither  could 
he  pursue  the  more  minute  operations  of  the 
most  subtile  material  agent,  without  again  rising 
towards  Him  who  said  «  Let  there  be  light. » 
The  most  exquisite  investigation  ever  conducted 
by  man  of  the  laws  of  nature  by  the  means  of 
experiment  abounds  in  its  latter  portion,  with 
explicit  references  to  the  doctrines  of  Natural 
Theology,  and  with  admissions  that  the  business 
of  physical  science  is  <t  to  deduce  causes  from 
effects  till  we  come  to  the  very  First  Cause ,  >» 
and  that  «  every  true  step  made  in  inductive  phi- 
losophy is  to  be  highly  valued ,  because  it  brings 
us  nearer  to  the  First  Cause  *.  » 


'Optics,  Book  iii.  Query  28. — «  How  came  the  bodies  of  ani- 
mals to  be  contrived  with  so  much  art,  and  for  what  ends  the 
several  parts  ?  Was  the  eye  contrived  without  skill  in  optics, 
and  the  ear   without  knowledge  'of  sound?  » 

(See,  too,  Query  3i. ) 


SECTION  VII. 


OF    SCIENTIFIC    ARRANGEMENT,    AND    THE    METHODS    OF    ANA- 
LYSIS   AND   SYNTHESIS. 


Having  shown  that  Natural  Theology  is  a 
branch  of  inductive  science  —  partly  physical, 
partly  intellectual  and  moral —  it  is  of  compara- 
tively little  importance  to  inquire  whether  or  not 
it  can  be  kept  apart  from  the  other  branches  of 
those  sciences.  In  one  view  of  this  question  we 
may  say,  that  there  is  no  more  ground  for  the 
separation  than  there  would  be  for  making  a 
distinct  science  of  all  the  proportions  in  Natural 
Philosophy  which  immediately  relate  to  the  hu- 
man body —  whereby  we  should  have  portions 
of  dynamics,  pneumatics,  optics,  chemistry, 
electricity,  and  all  human  anatomy  and  patho 
logy  as  contradistinguished  from  comparative, 
reduced  under  one  and  the  same  head  —  a  clas- 
sification, indeed,  resembling  Lord  Bacon's.  But 
in  another,  and ,  as  it  seems ,  the  more  just  view, 
there  is  a  sufficient  number  of  resemblances  and 
differences ,  and  the  importance  of  the  subject 


148  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

is  sufficient,  to  justify  the  making  a  separate  head 
of  Natural  Theology.  The  question  is  entirely  one 
of  convenience  ;  nothing  of  essential  moment 
turns  upon  the  classification;  and  there  is  ob- 
viously an  advantage  in  having  the  truths  col- 
lected in  one  body,  though  they  are  culled  from 
the  various  parts  of  Physical  and  Metaphysical 
science  to  which  they  naturally  belong.  All  that  is 
needful  is,  constantly  to  keep  in  mind  the  identity 
of  the  evidence  on  which  these  truths  rest,  with 
that  which  is  the  groundwork  of  those  other 
parts  of  philosophy. 

Although,  however,  convenience  and  the 
paramount  importance  of  the  subject  seem  to 
require  such  a  separation ,  it  is  manifest  that 
much  of  theology  must  still  be  found  intermingled 
with  physics  and  psychology,  and  there  only;  for 
the  truths  of  Natural  Theology  being  sufficiently 
demonstrated  by  a  certain  induction  of  facts — a 
certain  number  of  experiments  and  observations 
—  no  further  proof  is  required ;  and  to  assemble 
all  the  evidence,  if  it  were  possible,  would  be  only 
incumbering  the  subject  with  superfluous  proofs, 
while  the  collection  would  still  remain  incom- 
plete ,  as  every  day  is  adding  to  the  instances 
discovered  of  design  appearing  in  the  phenomena 
of  the  natural  and  moral  world.  It  has  been  said, 
indeed,  that  a  single  well-established  proof  of 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  149 

design  is  enough ,  and  that  no  additional  strength 
is  gained  to  the  argument  by  multiplying  the 
instances.  We  shall  afterwards  show  with  what 
limitations  this  proposition  is  to  be  received  5  but 
for  our  present  purpose  it  is  sufficient,  that,  at 
all  events,  a  certain  definite  number  of  instances 
are  of  force  enough  to  work  out  the  demonstra- 
tion ;  and  yet  in  every  branch  of  physics  and  psy- 
chology new  instances  are  presented  at  each  step 
we  make.  These  instances  are  of  great  impor- 
tance ;  they  are  to  be  carefully  noted  and  trea- 
sured up;  they  form  most  valuable  parts  of  those 
scientific  inquiries,  conveying,  in  its  purest  form 
and  in  its  highest  degree,  the  gratification  of  con- 
templating abstract  truths ,  in  which  consists  the 
whole  of  the  pleasure  derived  from  science ,  pro- 
perly so  called —  that  is,  from  science  as  such, 
and  as  independent  of  its  application  to  uses  or 
enjoyments  of  a  corporeal  kind. 

An  apprehension  has  frequently  been  enter- 
tained by  learned  and  pious  men — men  of  a  truly 
philosophical  spirit  —  lest  the  natural  desire  of 
tracing  design  in  the  works  of  nature  should 
carry  inquirers  too  far,  and  lead  them  to  give 
scope  to  their  imagination  rather  than  contain 
their  speculations  within  the  bounds  of  strict 
reasoning.  They  have  dreaded  the  introduction  of 
what  Lord  Bacon  calls  a  «  phantastic  philosophy, » 


150  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

and  have  also  felt  alarm  at  the  injuries  which  re- 
ligion may  receive  from  being  exposed  to  ridicule, 
in  the  event  of  the  speculations  proving  ground- 
less upon  a  closer  examination.  But  it  does  not 
appear  reasonable  thatphilosophers  should  be  de- 
terred by  such  considerations  from  anxiously  in- 
vestigating the  subject  of  FinalCauses,  and  giving 
it  the  place  which  belongs  to  it  in  all  their  inqui- 
ries ;  provided  that  they  do  not  suffer  fancy  to 
intermix  with  and  disturb  their  speculations.  If 
they  do ,  they  commit  the  greatest  error  of  which 
reasoners  can  be  guilty  —  an  error  against  which 
it  is  the  very  object  of  inductive  philosophy  to 
guard ;  but  it  is  no  more  an  error  in  this,  than  in 
the  other  investigations  of  science.  He  who  ima- 
gines design  where  there  is  none ;  he  who  either 
assumes  facts  in  order  to  build  upon  them  an 
inference  favourable  to  Natural  Religion,  orfrom 
admitted  facts  draws  such  an  inference  fancifull y , 
and  not  logically,  comes  within  the  description 
of  a  false  philosopher :  he  prefers  the  hypothetical 
to  the  inductive  method ;  he  cannot  say  with  his 
master ,  «  hypotheses  non  fingo  l  ;  »  he  renounces 
the  modern ,  and  recurs  to  the  exploded  modes 
of  philosophising.  But  he  is  not  the  more  a  false 
philosopher ,  and  does  not  the  more  sin  against 

1  Principia,  lib.  iii,  Sch.  Gen. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  151 

the  light  of  improved  science,  for  committing  the 
offence  in  the  pursuit  of  theological  truth.  He 
would  have  been  liable  to  the  same  charge  if  he 
had  resorted  to  his  fancy  instead  of  observation 
and  experiment  while  in  search  of  any  other 
scientific  truth ,  or  had  hypothetically  assumed 
a  principle  of  classifying  admitted  phenomena, 
instead  of  rigorously  deducing  it  from  exami- 
ning their  circumstances  of  resemblance  and  of 
diversity. 

That  any  serious  discredit  can  be  brought  upon 
the  science  of  Natural  Theology  itself,  from  the 
failures  to  which  such  hypothetical  reasonings 
may  lead,  seems  not  very  easy  to  conceive.  Vain 
and  superficial  minds  may  take  any  subject  for 
their  ridicule,  and  may  laugh  at  the  mechanician 
and  the  chemist  as  well  as  the  theologian,  when 
they  chance  to  go  astray  in  their  searches  after 
truth.  Yet  no  one  ever  thought  of  being  discou- 
raged from  experimental  inquiries,  because  even 
the  strictest  prosecution  of  the  inductive  method 
cannot  always  guard  against  error.  It  is  of  the 
essence  of  all  investigations  of  merely  contingent 
truth,  that  they  are  exposed  to  casualties  which 
do  not  beset  the  paths  of  the  geometrician  and  the 
analyst.  A  conclusion  from  one  induction  of  facts 
may  be  well  warranted  until  a  larger  induction 
obliges  us  to  abandon  it ,  and  adopt  another. 


152  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

Yet  no  one  deems  chemistry  discredited  because 
a  body  considered  in  one  state  of  our  knowledge 
to  be  a  compound  acid  has  since  appeared  rather 
to  be  a  simple  substance ,  bearing  to  the  acids 
no  resemblance  in  its  composition;  nor  would 
the  optical  discoveries  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton  be 
discredited ,  much  less  the  science  he  cultivated 
be  degraded, if  the  undulatory  hypothesis  should, 
on  a  fuller  inquiry,  become  established  by  strict 
proof.  Yet  such  errors,  or  rather  such  imperfect 
and  partial  views,  were  the  result  of  a  strict  obe- 
dience to  the  inductive  rules  of  philosophising. 
How  much  less  ground  for  cavil  against  either 
those  rules,  or  the  sciences  to  which  they  are  ap- 
plicable ,  would  be  afforded  by  the  observations 
of  those  who  had  mistaken  their  way  through  a 
neglect  of  inductive  principle ,  and  by  following 
blindly  false  guides ! 

While  then,  on  the  one  hand,  we  allow  Natural 
Theology  to  form  a  distinct  head  or  branch,  the 
other  sciences  must  of  necessity  continue  to  class 
its  truths  among  their  own  ;  and  thus  every 
science  may  be  stated  to  consist  of  three  divisions — 
1 .  The  truths  which  it  teaches  relative  to  the  con- 
stitution and  action  of  matter  or  of  mind ; — 2.  The 
truths  which  it  teaches  relative  to  theology; 
and  $.  The  application  of  both  classes  of  truths 
to  practical  uses,  physical  or  moral.  Thus ,  the 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  153 

science  of  pneumatics  teaches ,  under  the  first 
head,  the  doctrine  of  the  pressure  of  the  atmo- 
sphere ,  and  its  connexion  with  respiration  ,  and 
with  the  suspension  of  weights  by  the  formation 
of  a  vacuum.  Under  the  second  head,  it  shows 
the  adaptation  of  the  lungs  of  certain  animals  to 
breathe  the  air,  and  the  feet  of  others  to  support 
their  bodies  ,  in  consequence  of  both  being 
framed  in  accordance  with  the  former  doctrine 
— that  is,  with  the  law  of  pressure — and  thus  de- 
monstrates a  wise  and  beneficent  design.  Under 
the  third  head,  it  teaches  the  construction  of 
barometers,  steam-engines,  etc. ,  while  the  con- 
templation of  the  Divine  wisdom  and  goodness 
inculcates  piety,  patience,  and  hope. 

But  it  maybe  said,  that  in  this  classification 
of  the  objects  of  science,  we  omit  one  ordinarily 
reckoned  essential  —  the  explanation  of  pheno- 
mena. The  answer  is  ,  that  such  a  classification 
is  not  strictly  accurate  ,  as  no  definite  line  can 
be  drawn  between  the  explanation  of  phenomena 
and  the  analytical  process  by  which  the  truths 
themselves  are  established  :  in  a  word ,  between 
analysis  and  synthesis  in  the  sciences  of  contin- 
gent truth.  For  the  same  phenomena  which  form 
the  materials  of  the  analytical  investigation— the 
steps  that  lead  us  to  the  proposition  or  discovery 
— would  ,  in  a  reversed  order ,  become  the  sub 

i3. 


154  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

jects  of  the  synthetical  operation  ;  that  is  ,  the 
things  to  be  explained  by  means  of  the  proposi- 
tion or  discovery ,  if  we  had  been  led  to  it  by 
another  route,  in  other  words,  if  we  had  reached 
it  by  means  of  other  phenomena  of  the  like  kind, 
referrible  to  the  same  class ,  and  falling  within 
the  same  principle  or  rule.  Thus  the  experiments 
upon  the  prismatic  spectrum  prove  the  sun's 
light  to  be  composed  of  rays  of  different  refran- 
gibility.  This  being  demonstrated  ,  we  may  ex- 
plain by  means  of  it  the  phenomena  which  form 
the  proofs  of  the  first  proposition  of  the  «  Optics,  » 
that  lights  which  differ  in  colour  differ  in  refran- 
gibility — as  that  a  parallelogram  of  two  colours 
refracted  through  a  prism  has  its  sides  no  longer 
parallel ;  or  ,  having  shown  the  different  refran- 
gibility  by  the  prismatic  phenomena  ,  we  may 
explain  why  a  lens  has  the  focus  of  violet  rays 
nearer  than  the  focus  of  red  ,  while  this  experi- 
ment is  of  itself  one  of  the  most  cogent  proofs  of 
the  different  refrangibility.  It  is  plain  that ,  in 
these  cases ,  the  same  phenomenon  may  be  made 
indiscriminately  the  subject  matter  either  of 
analysis  or  synthesis.  So  ,  one  of  the  proofs  given 
of  latent  heat  is,  that  after  you  heat  a  bar  of  iron 
once  or  twice  by  hammering  it ,  the  power  of 
being  thus  heated  is  exhausted,  until  by  exposing 
it  to  the  fire  that  power  is  restored.  Yet,  suppose 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  155 

we  had  proved  the  doctrine  of  the  absorption 
of  heat  by  other  experiments — as  by  the  effects 
on  the  thermometer  of  liquids  of  different  tem- 
peratures mixed  together — the  phenomenon  of 
the  iron  bar  would  be  explicable  by  that  doctrine 
thus  learnt.  Again, another  proof  of  the  same  truth 
is  the  production  of  heat  by  the  sudden  conden- 
sation of  gaseous  fluids,  and  of  cold  by  evapora- 
tion ,  the  evolution  of  heat  being  inferred  from 
the  former  ,  and  its  absorption  from  the  latter 
operation.  But  if  the  experiments  upon  the  mix- 
ture of  fluids  of  different  temperatures,  and  other 
facts ,  had  sufficiently  proved  the  disappearance 
of  heat  in  its  sensible  form ,  and  its  being  held 
in  a  state  in  which  it  did  not  affect  the  thermo- 
meter, we  should  by  means  of  that  doctrine  have 
been  able  to  account  for  the  refrigerating  effect 
of  evaporation,  and  the  heating  power  of  con- 
densation. 

It  cannot ,  then  ,  be  a  real  and  an  accurate 
distinction  ,  or  one  founded  on  the  nature  of  the 
thing  ,  which  depends  on  the  accident  of  the 
one  set  of  facts  having  been  chosen  for  the  instru- 
ments of  the  analytical,  and  the  other  set  for  the 
subjects  of  the  synthetical  operation  ,  each  set 
being  alike  applicable  to  either  use.  For,  in  order 
that  the  synthesis  may  be  correct,  nay,  in  order 
thay  it  may  be  strict  and  not  hypothetical ,  it  is 


156  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

obviously  necessary  that  the  phenomena  should 
be  of  such  a  description  as  might  have  made  them 
subservient  to  the  analysis.  In  truth ,  both  the 
operations  are  essentially  the  same — the  gene- 
ralization of  particulars — the  arranging  or  clas- 
sifying facts  so  as  to  obtain  a  more  general  or 
comprehensive  fact  ;  and  the  explanation  of 
phenomena  is  just  as  much  a  process  of  gene- 
ralization or  classification  as  the  investigation  of 
the  proposition  itself ,  by  means  of  which  you 
are  to  give  the  explanation.  We  do  not  perform 
two  operations ,  but  one ,  in  these  investigations. 
We  do  not  in  reality  first  find  by  the  prism  that 
light  is  differently  refrangible  ,  and  then  explain 
the  rainbow — or  show  by  the  air-pump  that  the 
atmosphere  presses  with  the  weight  of  so  many 
pounds  upon  a  square  foot ,  and  then  explain  the 
steam-engine  and  the  fly's  foot — or  prove,  by 
burning  the  two  weighed  gases  together  and 
burning  iron  in  one  of  them ,  that  water  is  com- 
posed of  them  both  and  that  rust  is  the  metal 
combined  with  one,  and  then  explain  why  iron 
rusts  in  water.  But  we  observe  all  these  several 
facts,  and  find  that  they  are  related  to  each  other , 
and  resolvable  into  three  classes—  that  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  prism  and  of  the  shower  are  the 
same ,  the  spectrum  and  the  rainbow  being  va- 
rieties of  the  same  fact,  more  general  than  either. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  157 

and  comprehending  many  others  ,  all  reducible 
within  its  compass  —  that  the  air-pump,  the  steam- 
engine  ,  the  fly's  foot ,  are  all  the  same  fact,  and 
come  within  a  description  still  more  general  and 
compendious — that  the  rusting  of  iron, the  burn- 
ing of  inflammable  air,  and  the  partial  consump- 
tion of  the  blood  in  the  lungs,  are  likewise  the 
same  fact  in  different  shapes ,  and  resolvable  into 
a  fact  much  more  comprehensive. 

If  ,  then  ,  the  distinction  of  investigation  and 
explanation ,  or  the  analytical  and  synthetical 
process  ,  is  to  be  retained ,  it  can  only  be  no- 
minal ;  and  it  is  productive  of  but  little  if  any 
convenience.  On  the  contrary  ,  it  is  calculated  to 
introduce  inaccuratehabits  of  philosophising,  and 
holds  out  a  temptation  to  hypothetical  reasoning, 
Having  obtained  a  general  law ,  or  theory,  we 
are  prone  to  apply  it  where  no  induction  shows 
that  it  is  applicable;  and  perceiving  that  it 
would  account  for  the  observed  phenomena ,  if 
certain  things  existed ,  we  are  apt  to  assume 
their  existence  ,  that  we  may  apply  our  expla- 
nation. Thus  we  know  that  if  the  walrus's  foot , 
or  the  fly's ,  make  a  vacuum ,  the  pressure  of 
the  air  will  support  the  animal's  weight ,  and 
hence  we  assume  that  the  vacuum  is  made.  Yet 
it  is  clear  that  we  have  no  right  whatever  to  do 
so  ;  and  that  the  strict  rules  of  induction  require 


158  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

us  to  prove  the  vacuum  before  we  can  arrange 
this  fact  in  the  same  class  with  the  other  instances 
of  atmospheric  pressure.  But  when  we  have 
proved  it  by  observation  ,  it  will  be  said  we  have 
gained  nothing  by  our  general  doctrine.  True ; 
but  all  that  the  science  entitles  us  to  do  is ,  not 
to  draw  facts  we  are  half  acquainted  with  under 
the  arbitrary  sway  of  our  rule  ,  but  to  examine 
each  fact  in  all  its  parts ,  and  bring  it  legitimately 
within  the  rule  by  means  of  its  ascertained  re- 
semblances —  that  is,  classify  it  with  those 
others  to  which  it  bears  the  common  relation. 
Induction  gives  us  the  right  to  expect  that  the 
same  result  will  always  happen  from  the  same 
action  operating  in  like  circumstances  ;  but  it  is 
of  the  essence  of  this  inference  that  the  simila- 
rity be  first  shown. 

It  may  be  worth  while  to  illustrate  this  further, 
as  it  is  an  error  very  generally  prevailing  ,  and 
leads  to  an  exceedingly  careless  kind  of  inquiry. 
The  fundamental  rule  of  inductive  science  is , 
that  no  hypothesis  shall  be  admitted  —  that 
nothing  shall  be  assumed  merely  because ,  if 
true  ,  it  would  explain  the  facts.  Thus  the  ma- 
gnetic theory  of  iEpinus  is  admitted  by  all  to  be 
admirably  consistent  with  itself  ,  and  to  explain 
all  the  phenomena  —  that  is ,  to  tally  exactly 
with  the  facts  observed.  But  there  is  no  procf 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  159 

at  all  of  the  accumulation  of  electrical  or  ma- 
gnetic fluid  at  the  one  pole  ,  and  other  funda- 
mental positions  ;  on  the  contrary  the  facts 
are  rather  against  them  :  therefore  ,  the  theory 
is  purely  gratuitous  ;  and  although  it  would 
be  difficult  to  find  any  other,  on  any  subject, 
more  beautiful  in  itself ,  or  more  consistent  with 
all  the  phenomena  ,  it  is  universally  rejected  as 
a  mere  hypothesis ,  of  no  use  or  value  in  scien- 
tific research.  The  inductive  method  consists  in 
only  admitting  those  things  which  the  facts 
prove  to  be  true,  and  excludes  the  supposing 
things  merely  because  they  square  with  the  facts. 
Whoever  makes  such  suppositions  upon  obser- 
ving a  certain  number  of  facts  ,  and  then  varies 
those  suppositions  when  new  facts  come  to  his 
knowledge  ,  so  as  to  make  the  theory  tally  with 
the  observation  —  whoever  thus  goes  on  touch- 
ing and  retouching  his  theory  each  time  a  new 
fact  is  observed  which  does  not  fall  within  the 
original  proposition  ,  is  a  mere  framer  of  hypo- 
theses ,  not  an  inductive  inquirer  —  a  fancier  , 
and  not  a  philosopher. 

Now  ,  this  being  the  undoubted  rule,  does  not 
the  course  of  those  fall  exactly  within  it ,  who  , 
having  upon  a  certain  class  of  phenomena  ,  built 
a  conclusion  legitimately  and  by  strict  induc- 
tion, employ  that  conclusion  to  explain  other 


1G0  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

phenomena  ,  which  they  have  not  previously 
shown  to  fall  within  the  same  description?  Take 
the  example  of  the  Torricellian  vacuum.  Having 
by  that  experiment  proved  the  weight  of  the  at- 
mosphere ,  we  have  a  right  to  conclude  that  a 
tube    filled   with  water  forty  feet  high  would 
have  a  vacuum  in  the  uppermost  seven  feet  —  be- 
cause we  know  the  relative  specific  gravities  of 
water  and  mercury ,   and  might  predict  from 
thence  that  the  lighter  fluid  would  stand  at  the 
height  of  thirty-three  feet ;  and  this  conclusion 
we  have  a  right  to  draw  ,  without  any  experi- 
ments to  ascertain  the  existence  of  a  vacuum  in 
the  upper  part  of  the  tube.  But  we  should  have 
no  right  whatever  to  draw  this  conclusion  ,  with- 
out ascertaining  the  specific  gravities  of  the  two 
fluids  :  for  if  we  did  ,  it  would  be  assuming  that 
the  two  factsbelonged  to  the  same  class.  So  res- 
pecting the  power  of  the  walrus  or  the  fly  to 
walk  up  a  vertical  plane.  We  know  the  effects 
of  exhausting  the  air  between  any  two  bodies  , 
and  leaving  the  external   atmosphere  to  press 
against  them  :  they  will  cohere.  But  if  from 
thence  we  explain  the  support  given  to  the  wal- 
rus or  the  fly  without  examining  their  feet,  and 
ascertaining  that  they  do  exhaust  or  press  out 
the  air  —  if ,  in  short  ,  we  assume  the  existence 
of  a  vacuum  under  their  feet ,  merely  because 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  161 

were  there  a  vacuum  the  pressure  of  the  air 
would  produce  the  cohesion ,  and  thus  account 
for  the  phenomena  —  we  really  only  propound 
a  hypothesis.  We  suppose  certain  circumstances 
to  exist ,  in  order  to  classify  the  fact  with  other 
facts  actually  observed  ,  and  the  existence  of 
which  circumstances  is  necessary  ,  in  order  that 
the  phenomena  may  be  reducible  under  the  same 
head. 

There  is  no  reason  whatever  fort  asserting 
that  this  view  of  the  subject  restricts  the  use  of 
induction  by  requiring  too  close  and  constant  a 
reference  to  actual  observation.  The  inductive 
principle  is  this — that  from  observing  a  number 
of  particular  facts  ,  we  reason  to  others  of  the 
same  kind  —  that  from  observing  a  certain 
thing  to  happen  in  certain  circumstances,  we 
expect  the  same  thing  to  happen  in  the  like  cir- 
cumstances. This  is  to  generalize  ;  but  then  this 
assumes  that  we  first  show  the  identity  of  the 
facts  ,  by  proving  the  similarity  of  the  circum- 
stances. If  not ,  we  suppose  or  fancy ,  and  do 
not  reason  or  generalize.  The  tendency  of  the 
doctrine  that  a  proposition  being  demonstrated 
by  one  set  of  facts ,  may  be  used  to  explain 
another  set,  has  the  effect  of  making  us  suppose 
or  assume  the  identity  or  resemblance  which 
ought  to  be  proved.  The  true  principle  is  ,  that 

»4 


162  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

induction  is  the  generalizing  or  classifying  of 
facts  by  observed  resemblances  and  diversities. 
Nothing  here  stated  has  any  tendency  to 
shackle  our  experimental  inquiries  by  too  rigidly 
narrowing  the  proof.  Thus ,  although  we  are 
notallowed  to  suppose  any  thing  merely  because, 
if  it  existed  ,  other  things  would  be  explained  ; 
yet,  when  no  other  supposition  will  account  for 
the  appearances,  the  hypothesis  is  no  longer 
gratuitous ;  and  it  constantly  happens  ,  that  an 
inference  drawn  from  an  imperfect  induction  , 
and  which  would  be,  on  that  state  of  the  facts  , 
unauthorized  because  equivocal  and  not  the  only 
supposition  on  which  the  facts  could  be  ex- 
plained ,  becomes  legitimate  on  a  further  induc- 
tion, whereby  we  show  that,  though  the  facts  first 
observed  might  be  explained  by  some  othersup- 
position  ,  yet  those  facts  newly  observed  could 
to  no  other  supposition  be  reconciled.  Thus, 
the  analytical  experiment  on  the  constitution  of 
water ,  by  passing  steam  over  red  hot  iron  ,  is 
not  conclusive  ,  because  ,  although  it  tallies  well 
with  the  position  that  water  consists  of  oxygen 
and  hydrogen  ,  yet  it  would  also  tally  with 
another  supposition ,  that  those  gases  were  pro- 
duced in  the  process  and  not  merely  separated 
from  each  other  ;  so  that  neither  oxygen  nor  hy- 
drogen existed  in  the  water  any  more  than  acid 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  163 

and  water  exist  in  coal  and  wood ,  bnt  only 
their  elements  ,  and  that ,  like  the  acid  and  wa- 
ter, the  products  of  the  destructive  distillation 
of  those  vegetable  substances  ,  the  oxygen  and 
hydrogen  ,  were  compounded  ,  and  in  fact  pro- 
duced by  the  process.  But  when,  besides  the 
analytical ,  we  have  the  synthetical  experiments 
of  Mr.  Cavendish  and  Dr.  Priestley  *  —  when 
we  find  that  by  burning  the  two  gases  in  a  close 
vessel ,  they  disappear  ,  and  leave  a  weight  of 
water  equal  to  their  united  weights  —  we  have 
a  fact  not  reconcilable  to  any  other  supposition , 
except  that  of  the  composition  of  this  fluid.  It  is 
as  when  ,  in  solving  a  problem,  we  fix  upon  a 
point  in  one  line  ,  curved  or  straight ,  because  it 
answers  one  of  the  conditions  —  it  may  be  the 
right  point ,  orit  may  not ,  forall  the  otherpoints 
of  the  line  equally  answer  that  condition  ;  but 
when  we  also  show  that  the  remaining  condi- 


1  Dr.  Priestley  drew  no  conclusion  of  the  least  value  from  his 
experiments.  But  Mr.  Watt,  after  thoroughly  weighing  them, 
by  careful  comparison  with  other  facts,  arrived  at  the  opinion 
that  they  proved  the  composition  of  water.  This  may  justly  be 
said  to  have  been  the  discovery  of  that  great  truth  in  chemical 
science.  I  have  examined  the  evidence,  and  am  convinced  that 
he  was  the  first  discoverer,  in  point  of  time,  although  it  is  very 
possible  that  Mr.  Cavendish  may  have  arrived  at  the  same 
truth  from  his  own  experiments,  without  any  knowledge  of 
Mr.  Watt's  earlier  process  of  reasoning. 


104  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

tions  require  the  point  to  be  in  another  line  , 
and  that  this  other  intersects  the  former  in  the 
very  point  we  had  assumed  ,  then  no  doubt  can 
exist ,  and  the  point  is  evidently  the  one  required, 
none  other  fulfilling  all  the  conditions. 

We  have  used  the  words  analytical  and  syn- 
thetical as  applicable  to  the  experiments  of  reso- 
lution and  composition  ;  and  in  this  sense  these 
terms  are  strictly  correct  in  reference  to  inductive 
operations.  But  the  use  of  the  terms  analysis 
and  synthesis  as  applicable  to  the  processes  of 
induction — the  former  being  the  investigation  of 
truths  by  experiment  or  observation ,  and  the 
latter  the  explaining  other  facts  by  means  of  the 
truths  so  ascertained — is  by  no  means  so  correct, 
and  rests  upon  an  extremely  fallacious  analogy, 
if  there  be  indeed  any  analogy,  for  identity,  or 
even  resemblance,  there  is  none.  The  terms  are 
borrowed  from  mathematical  science,  where  they 
denote  the  two  kinds  of  investigation  employed 
in  solving  problems  and  investigating  theorems. 
When,  in  order  to  solve  a  problem,  we  suppose 
a  thing  done  which  we  know  not  how  to  do,  we 
reason  upon  the  assumption  that  the  prescribed 
conditions  have  been  complied  with,  and  proceed 
till  we  find  something  which  we  already  possess 
the  means  of  doing.  This  gives  us  the  construc- 
tion; and  the  synthetical  demonstration  consists 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  165 

in  merely  retracing  the  steps  of  the  analysis.  And 
so  of  a  theorem :  we  assume  it  to  be  true ,  and 
reasoning  on  that  assumption,  we  are  led  to  some- 
thing which  we  know  from  other  sources  to  be 
true  ,  the  synthesis  being  the  same  operation  re- 
versed. The  two  operations  consist  here,  of  mani- 
fest necessity ,  of  the  very  same  steps  —  the  one 
being  the  steps  of  the  other  taken  in  the  reverse 
order.  In  Physics,  to  make  the  operations  similar 
to  these,  the  same  facts  should  be  the  ground  or 
component  parts  of  both.  In  analysis,  we  should 
ascend  not  only  from  particulars  to  generals,  but 
from  the  same  particulars,  and  then  the  synthesis 
would  be  a  descent  through  the  same  steps  to  the 
particular  phenomena  from  the  general  fact.  But  it 
is  a  spurious  synthesis,  unlike  the  mathematical, 
and  not  warranted  by  induction  ,  to  prove  the 
proposition  by  one  set  of  facts,  and  by  that  propo* 
sition  to  explain — that  is,  classify — another  set, 
without  examining  it  by  itself.  If  we  do  examine 
it  by  itself,  and  find  that  it  is  such  as  the  proposi- 
tion applies  to,  then  also  is  it  such  as  might  prove 
the  proposition  ;  and  the  synthesis  is  here,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  mathematical  investigation  ,  the 
analysis  reversed.  As  far  as  any  resemblance  or 
analogy  goes,  there  is  even  a  greater  affinity  be- 
tween the  inductive  analysis  and  the  geometrical 
synthesis ,  than  between  those  operations  which 


166         A  DISCOURSE  OF  NATURAL  THEOLOGY. 

go  by  the  same  name ;  and  I  hardly  know  any- 
thing in  experimental  investigation  resembling 
the  mathematical  analysis, unless  itbe  when, from 
observing  certain  facts,  we  assume  a  position^and 
then  infer  ,  that  if  this  be  true  ,  some  other  facts 
must  also  exist,  which  we  find  (from  other  proofs) 
really  do  exist.  This  bears  a  resemblance  rather 
to  the  analytical  investigation  than  to  the  compo- 
sition or  synthetical  demonstration  of  theorems 
in  the  ancient  geometry.  It  is  not  the  course  of 
reasoning  frequently  pursued  in  experimental 
sciences;  but  a  most  beautiful  example  of  it  oc- 
curs in  the  Second  Part  of  Dr.  Black's  experi- 
ments on  Magnesia  Alba  and  Quick  Lime,  the 
foundation  of  the  modern  gaseous  chemistry. 

Upon  the  whole,  the  use  of  these  terms  is  apt 
to  mislead  ;  and ,  for  the  reasons  which  have  been 
assigned,  there  seems  no  solidity  in  the  division 
of  inductive  inquiry  into  the  two  classes  x. 

1  When  this  section  was  written,  I  had  not  seen  Mr.  Stewart's 
learned  remarks  upon  analysis  and  synthesis  in  the  second  vo- 
lume of  his  Elements,  nor  was  aware  of  the  observations  of 
Dr.  Hook,  quoted  by  him,  and  which  show  a  remarkable  coinci- 
dence with  one  of  the  observations  in  the  text.  Mr.  Stewart's 
speculations  do  not  come  upon  the  same  ground  with  mine; 
but  Dr.  Hook  having  reversed  the  use  of  the  terms  analysis  and 
synthesis  in  experimental  science,  affords  a  strong  confirmation 
of  the  remark  which  I  have  ventured  to  make  upon  the  inaccu- 
racy of  this  application  of  mathematical  language. —(See  Elem. 
of  Phil,  of  Human  Mind,  vol.  ii.  p.  354,  4t0-) 


PART  THE  SECOND. 

OF    THE    ADVANTAGES    OF    THE    STUDY    OF 
NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 


The  uses  of  studying  the  science  to  which  our 
inquiries  have  been  directed  now  demand  some 
consideration.  These  consist  of  the  pleasures 
which  attend  all  scientific  pursuits,  the  pleasures 
and  the  improvement  peculiar  to  the  study  of 
Natural  Theology,  and  the  service  rendered  by 
this  study  to  the  doctrines  of  Revelation. 


SECTION  I. 

OF    THE    PLEASURES    OF    SCIENCE. 

As  we  have  established  the  position  that  Na- 
tural Theology  is  a  branch  of  Inductive  Science, 
it  follows  that  i(s  truths  arc  calculated  to  bestow 


168  A  DISCOURSE  01 

the  same  kind  of  gratification  which  the  investi- 
gation and  the  contemplation  of  scientific  truth 
generally  is  fitted  to  give. 

That  there  is  a  positive  pleasure  in  such  re- 
searches and  such  views,  wholly  independent  of 
any  regard  to  the  advantages  derived  from  their 
application  to  the  aid  of  man  in  his  physical 
necessities,  is  quite  undeniable.  The  ascer- 
taining hy  demonstration  any  of  the  great  truths 
in  the  mathematics, or  proving  by  experiment  any 
of  the  important  properties  of  matter,  would 
give  a  real  and  solid  pleasure, even  were  it  certain 
that  no  practical  use  could  be  made  of  either  the 
one  or  the  other.  To  know  that  the  square  of 
the  hypothenuse  is  always  exactly  equal  to  the 
sum  of  the  squares  of  the  sides  of  aright-angled 
triangle,  whatever  be  its  size,  and  whatever  the 
magnitude  of  the  acute  angles,  is  pleasing  ;  and 
to  be  able  to  trace  the  steps  by  which  the  abso- 
lute certainty  of  this  proposition  is  established  is 
gratifying,  even  if  we  were  wholly  ignorant  that 
the  art  of  guiding  a  ship  through  the  pathless 
ocean  mainly  depends  upon  it.  Accordingly  we 
derive  pleasure  from  rising  to  the  contemplation 
of  the  much  more  general  truth,  of  which  the  dis- 
covery of  Pythagoras  (the  -47th  proposition  of 
the  First  Book  of  Euclid  )  is  but  a  particular 
case,  and  which  is  also  applicable  to  all  similar 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  169 

triangles, and  indeed  to  eircles  and  ellipses  also, 
described  on  the  right-angled  triangle's  sides  ; 
and  yet  that  general  proposition  is  of  no  use  in 
navigation,  nor  indeed  in  any  other  practical  art. 
In  like  manner,  the  pleasure  derived  from  ascer- 
taining  that  the  pressure  of  the  air  and  the 
creation  of  a  vacuum  alike  cause  the  rise  of  the 
mercury  in  the  barometer,  and  give  the  power  to 
flies   of  walking  on    the  ceiling  of  a  room,  is 
wholly  independent  of  any  practical  use  obtained 
from  the  discovery,  inasmuch  as  it  is  a  pleasure 
superadded  to  that  of  contemplating  the  doctrine 
proved  by  theTorricellian  experiment, which  had 
conferred  all  its  practical  benefits  long  before  the 
cause  of  the  fly's  power  was  found   out.    Thus 
again  it  is  one  of  the  most  sublime  truths  in 
science,  and  the  contemplation  of  which, as  mere 
contemplation,  affords  the  greatest  pleasure, that 
the  same  power  which  makes  a  stone  fall  to 
the  ground  keeps  the  planets  in  their  course, 
moulds  the  huge  masses  of  those  heavenly  bodies 
into  their  appointed  forms,  and  reduces  to  per- 
fect order  all  the  apparent  irregularities  of  the 
system  :  so  that  the  handful  of  sand  which  for  an 
instant  ruffles  the  surface  of  the  lake,  acts  by  the 
same  law  which  governs,  through  myriads   of 
ages,  the  mighty  system  composed  of  myriads  of 
worlds.  There  is  a  positive  pleasure  in  general- 


170  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

izing  facts  and  arguments — in  perceiving  the 
wonderful  production  of  most  unlike  results  from 
a  few  very  simple  principles — in  finding  the 
same  powers  or  agents  re-appearing  in  different 
situations,  and  producing  the  most  diverse  and 
unexpected  effects  —  in  tracing  unexpected  re- 
semblances and  differences — inascertaining  that 
truths  or  facts  apparently  unlike  are  of  the  same 
nature,  and  observing  wherein  those  apparently 
similar  are  various  :  and  this  pleasure  is  quite 
independent  of  all  considerations  relating  to 
practical  application;  nay,  the  additionnal  know- 
ledge that  those  truths  are  susceptible  of  a  be- 
neficial application  gives  a  further  gratification 
of  the  like  kind  to  those  who  are  certain  never  to 
have  the  opportunity  of  sharing  the  benefits 
obtained,  and  who  indeed  may  earnestly  desire 
never  to  be  in  the  condition  of  being  able  to 
share  them.  Thus,  in  addition  to  the  pleasure 
received  from  contemplating  a  truth  in  animal 
physiology,  we  have  another  gratification  from 
finding  that  one  of  its  corollaries  is  the  con- 
struction of  an  instrument  useful  in  some  painful 
surgical  operation.  Yet,  assuredly,  we  have  no 
desire  everto  receive  advantage  from  this  corol- 
lary ;  and  our  scientific  gratification  was  wholly 
without  regard  to  any  such  view.  In  truth,  gene- 
ralizing —  the  discovery  of  remote  analogies  — 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  171 

of  resemblances  among  unlike  objects  —  forms 
one  of  the  most  pleasing  employments  of  our  fa- 
culties in  every  department  of  mental  exertion, 
from  the  most  severe  investigation  of  the  mathe- 
matician to  the  lightest  efforts  of  the  wit.  To 
trace  the  same  equality,  or  other  relation  be- 
tween figures  apparently  unlike  ,  is  the  chief 
glory  of  the  geometrician ;  to  bring  together  ideas 
of  the  most  opposite  description,  and  show  them 
in  unexpected,  yet  when  suddenly  pointed  out, 
undeniable  connexion,  is  the  very  definition  of 
wit.  Nay  ,  the  proposition  which  we  have  just 
enunciated  is  a  striking  instance  of  the  same  ge- 
neral truth  ;  for  we  have  been  surveying  the 
resemblance ,  or  rather  the  identity ,  in  one  im- 
portant particular  of  two  pursuits ,  in  all  other 
respects  the  most  widely  remote  from  each  other 
—  mathematics  and  wit. 

If  the  mere  contemplation  of  scientific  truth  is 
the  source  of  real  gratification,  there  is  another 
pleasure, alike  remote  from  all  reference  to  prac- 
tical use  or  benefit ,  and  which  is  obtained  by 
tracing  the  investigations  and  demonstration  — 
the  steps  that  lead  analytically  to  the  discovery, 
and  synthetically  to  the  proof  of  those  truths. 
This  is  a  source  of  pleasure,  both  by  giving  us 
the  assurance  that  the  propositions  of  general- 
ization —  the  statements   of  resemblance  and 


172  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

diversity  —  are  true  in  themselves,  and  also  by 
the  consciousness  of  power  which  it  imparts,  and 
the  feeling  of  difficulty  overcome  which  it  in- 
volves. We  feel  gratified  when  we  have  closely 
followed  the  brilliant  induction  which  led  New- 
ton to  the  discovery  that  white  is  the  union  of  all 
colours;  and  when  we  have  accompanied  him  in 
the  series  of  profound  researches  ,  from  the  in- 
vention of  a  new  calculus  or  instrument  of  in- 
vestigation, through  innumerable  original  geo- 
metrical lemmas,  to  the  final  demonstration  that 
the  force  of  gravitation  deflects  the  comet  from 
the  tangent  of  its  elliptical  orbit  ;  and  we  feel 
the  gratification  because  the  pursuit  of  these  in- 
vestigations assures  us  that  the  marvellous  pro- 
positions are  indeed  true  —  because  there  is  a 
consciousness  of  man's  power  in  being  able  to 
penetrate  so  far  into  the  secrets  of  nature,  and 
search  so  far  into  the  structure  of  the  universe 
—  and  because  there  is  a  pleasure,  which  we 
enjoy  individually,  in  having  accomplished  a 
task  of  considerable  difficulty.  In  these  gratifi- 
cations, derived  from  the  contemplation  and  the 
investigation  of  general  laws  ,  consists  the  Plea- 
sure of  Science  properly  so  called,  and  apart 
from  all  views  of  deriving  particular  advantages 
from  its  application  to  man's  use. 

This  pleasure  is  increased  as  often  as  we  find 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  173 

that  any  scientific  discovery  is  susceptible  of 
practical  applications.  The  contemplation  of  this 
adaptation  is  pleasing,  independent  of  any  regard 
to  our  own  individual  advantage  ,  and  even 
though  we  may  desire  never  to  be  in  a  condition 
to  reap  benefit  from  it.  We  sympathize,  perhaps, 
with  those  who  may  be  so  unfortunate  as  to  re- 
quire the  aid  afforded  by  such  applications  to 
relieve  and  assuage  pain  ;  but  the  mere  know- 
ledge that  such  a  corollary  follows  from  the 
discovery  of  the  scientific  truth  is  pleasing.  Of 
course  the  gratification  is  increased ,  if  we  know 
that  individually  we  shall  profit  by  it,  and  we 
may  perhaps  always  more  or  less  contemplate 
this  possibility  ;  but  this  is  a  pleasure ,  properly 
speaking  ,  of  a  different  kind  from  that  which 
science,  as  such  ,  bestows. 

The  branch  of  science  which  we  are  here  par- 
ticularly considering  differs  in  no  respect  from 
the  other  departments  of  philosophy  in  the  kind 
of  gratification  which  it  affords  to  those  who 
cultivate  it.  Natural  Theology  ,  like  the  other 
sciences,  whether  physical  or  mental ,  bestows 
upon  the  student  the  pleasures  of  contemplation 
— of  generalization  ;  and  it  bestows  this  pleasure 
in  an  eminent  degree.  To  trace  design  in  the 
productions  and  in  the  operations  of  nature,  or 
in  those  of  the  human  understanding  ,  is ,  in  the 


174  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

strictest  sense  of  the  word,  generalization  ,  and 
consequently  produces  the  same  pleasure  with 
the  generalizations  of  physical  and  of  psycho- 
logical science.  Every  part  of  the  foregoing 
reasoning,  therefore,  applies  closely  and  rigo- 
rously lo  the  study  of  Natural  Theology.  Thus  , 
if  it  is  pleasing  to  find  that  the  properties  of  two 
curves  so  exceedingly  unlike  as  the  ellipse  and 
the  hyperbola  closely  resemble  each  other  ,  or 
that  appearances  so  dissimilar  as  the  motion  of 
the  moon  and  the  fall  of  an  apple  from  the  tree 
are  different  forms  of  the  same  fact,  it  affords  a 
pleasure  of  the  same  kind  to  discover  that  the 
light  of  the  glow-worm  and  the  song  of  the 
nightingale  are  both  provisions  of  nature  for  the 
same  end  of  attracting  the  animal's  mate,  and 
continuing  its  kind  —  that  the  peculiar  law  of 
attraction  pervading  all  matter,  the  magnitude 
of  the  heavenly  bodies  ,  the  planes  they  move 
in,  and  the  directions  of  their  courses,  are  all 
so  contrived  as  to  make  their  mutual  actions,  and 
the  countless  disturbances  thence  arising  all  se- 
cure a  perpetual  stability  to  the  system  which 
no  other  arrangement  could  attain.  It  is  a  highly 
pleasing  contemplation  of  the  self-samekind  with 
those  of  the  other  sciences  to  perceive  every 
where  design  and  adaptation — to  discover  uses 
even  in  things  apparently  the  most  accidental — 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  175 

to  trace  this  so  constantly  ,  that  where  perad- 
venture  we  cannot  find  the  purpose  of  nature  , 
we  never  for  a  moment  suppose  there  was  none, 
but  only  that  we  have  hitherto  failed  in  finding 
it  out— and  to  arrive  at  the  intimate  persuasion 
thatall  seeming  disorder  is  harmony — all  chance, 
design — and  that  nothing  is  made  in  vain  ;  nay , 
things  which  in  our  ignorance  we  had  over- 
looked as  unimportant ,  or  even  complained  of 
as  evils ,  fill  us  afterwards  wilh  contentment  and 
delight,  when  we  find  that  they  are  subservient 
to  the  most  important  and  beneficial  uses.  Thus 
inflammation  and  the  generation  of  matter  in  a 
wound  we  find  to  be  the  effort  which  Nature 
makes  to  produce  new  flesh  ,  and  effect  the  cure; 
the  opposite  hinges  of  the  valves  in  the  veins  and 
arteries  are  the  means  of  enabling  the  blood  to 
circulate;  and  so  of  innumerable  other  arran- 
gements of  the  animal  economy.  So  ,  too  ,  there 
is  the  highest  gratification  derived  from  observ- 
ing that  there  is  a  perfect  unity,  or,  as  it  has  been 
called  ,  a  personality  ,  in  the  kind  of  the  contri- 
vances in  which  the  universe  abounds  ;  and  truly 
this  peculiarity  of  character,  or  of  manner,  as 
other  writers  have  termed  it ,  affords  the  same 
species  of  pleasure  which  we  derive  from  con- 
templating general  resemblances  in  the  other 
sciences. 


176  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

We  may  close  this  branch  of  the  subject  with 
the  observation  that  those  other  sciences  have 
often  in  their  turn  derived  aid  from  Natural 
Theology  ,  at  least  from  the  speculation  of  Final 
Causes,  for  which  they,  generally  speaking,  lay 
the  foundation.  Many  discoveries  in  the  physio- 
logy both  of  animals  and  plants  owe  their  origin 
to  some  arrangement  or  structure  being  re- 
marked, the  peculiar  object  of  which  was  not 
known  ,  and  the  ascertaining  of  which  led  to 
the  knowledge  of  an  important  truth.  The  well- 
known  anecdote  of  Harvey  related  by  Mr.  Boyle, 
is  the  best  example  of  this  which  can  be  given. 
In  his  tract  on  Final  Causes  he  thus  writes  :  — 
«  I  remember  that  when  I  asked  our  famous 
Harvey,  in  the  only  discourse  I  had  with  him, 
(which  was  but  a  while  before  he  di^d  )  what 
were  the  things  that  induced  him  to  think  of  a 
circulation  of  the  blood ,  he  answered  me ,  that 
when  he  took  notice  that  the  valves  in  the  veins 
of  so  many  parts  of  the  body  were  so  placed  that 
they  gave  free  passage  to  the  blood  towards  the 
heart,  but  opposed  the  passage  of  the  veinal 
blood  the  contrary  way  ,  he  was  incited  to  ima- 
gine that  so  provident  a  cause  as  Nature  had  not 
so  placed  so  many  valves  without  design,  and  no 
design  seemed  more  probable  than  that  since  the 
blood  could  not  well ,  because  of  the  interposing 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  177 

valves,  be  sent  by  the  veins  to  the  limbs,  it  should 
be  sent  through  the  arteries,  and  return  through 
the  veins  whose  valves  did  not  oppose  its  course 
that  way x .»  Even  the  arts  have  borrowed  from  the 
observation  of  the  animal  economy.  Those  valves 
— the  hollow  bones  of  birds — the  sockets  of  the 
joints  —  have  all  furnished  suggestions  upon 
which  some  of  our  most  useful  machinery  is 
constructed.  Nor  can  any  abuse  arise  from  this 
employment  of  the  argument ,  so  long  as  we  take 
care  only  to  let  it  occupy  the  subordinate  place 
of  a  suggestor — an  originator  of  inquiry — and 
never  suffer  it  to  usurp  the  station  of  a  sole  guide, 
or  a  substitute  for  that  induction  which  alone 
can  be  relied  on  in  forming  our  conclusions. 
The  ancients  were  ignorant  of  this  caution  ,  and 
would  probably  have  rested  satisfied  with  the 
consideration  which  only  set  Harvey  upon 
making  experiments,  instead  of  proving  in  this 
.way  what  the  argument  from  Final  Causes  only 
rendered  probable.  Hence  much  of  what,  as  we 
have  already  explained  ,  Lord  Bacon  has  said 
upon  the  subject  of  this  speculation,  abused  as 
it  certainly  has  been  in  all  ages  ,  but  especially 
in  ancient  times. 


1  Disquisition  about  the  Final  Causes  of  Natural  Things. 

Works,  v,  /|27,  4^ 


SECTION  II. 

OF  THE  PLEASURE  AND  IMPROVEMENT  PECULIAR  TO 
NATURAL  THEOLOGY. 

Hitherto  we  have  only  shown  that  thegratifica- 
lion  which  the  contemplation  of  scientific  truth  is 
calculated  to  bestow  belongs  to  NaturalTheology , 
in  common  with  the  other  branches  of  Philoso- 
phy. Cut  there  are  several  considerations  which 
make  it  plain  that  the  pleasure  must  be  greater 
which  flows  from  the  speculations  of  this  than 
any  which  the  other  sciences  confer. 

In  the  first  place,  the  nature  of  the  truths  with 
which  Natural  Theology  is  conversant  is  to  be 
considered.  They  relate  to  the  evidences  of  de- 
sign ,  of  contrivance ,  of  power,  of  wisdom ,  of 
gooduess  —  but  let  us  only  say,  of  design  or  con- 
trivance. Nothing  can  be  more  gratifying  to  the 
mind  than  such  contemplations  :  they  afford 
great  scope  to  the  reasoning  powers;  they  exer- 
cise the  resources  of  our  ingenuity  ;  they  give  a 
new  aspect  to  the  most  ordinary  appearances ; 
they  impart  life  as  it  were  to  dead  matter ;  they 


A  DISCOURSE  OF  NATURAL  THEOLOGY.        179 

are  continually  surprising  us  with  novel  and  un- 
expected proofs  of  intentions  plainly  directed  to 
a  manifest  object.  If  some  scoffers  and  superficial 
persons  despise  the  enthusiasm  with  which  these 
investigations  have  at  times  been  pursued  ,  and 
hold  the  exercise  given  by  them  to  the  ingenuity 
of  inquirers  to  be  rather  a  play  of  imagination 
than  of  reasoning,  it  is  equally  undeniable  that 
in  some  of  the  most  important  and  most  practi- 
cally useful  of  the  sciences  ,  design,  so  far  from 
being  a  matter  of  fanciful  conjecture  ,  is  always 
assumed  as  incontestable,  and  the  inquiry,  often 
with  a  merely  practical  view,  is  confined  to  dis- 
covering; what  the  object  of  the  design  is.  Thus  , 
when  the  physiologist  has  discovered  some  part 
of  the  animal  body  before  unknown,  or  observed 
some  new  operation  of  the  known  organs  ,  he 
never  doubts  that  design  exists ,  and  that  some 
end  is  to  be  answered.  This  he  takes  for  granted 
without  any  reasoning  ;  and  he  only  endeavours 
to  find  out  what  the  purpose  is  —  what  use  the 
part  can  have  —  what  end  the  operation  is  in- 
tended to  accomplish  ;  never  supposing  it  possi- 
ble thatthe  part  could  be  created,  orthe  function 
appointed,  without  an  object.  The  investigation 
conducted  upon  the  assumption  of  this  postulate 
has  frequently  led  to  the  most  brilliant  discove- 
ries —  among  others  ,  as  we  have  just  seen  ,  to 


180  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

by  far  the  most  important  ever  made  in  physiu 
logical  science.  For  the  mere  exercise  of  the  in- 
tellectual faculties ,  or  gratification  of  scientific 
curiosity,  we  may  refer  to  almost  all  the  singular 
phenomena  which  form  the  bases  of  the  reason- 
ings as  to  design  —  the  structure  of  the  ear  , 
and  still  more  of  the  eye — the  circulation  of  the 
blood  —  the  physiology  of  the  foetus  in  the  ute- 
rus, as  contrasted  with  the  economy  of  the  born 
animal ,  and  the  prospective  contrivances  of  a 
system  which  until  the  birth  is  to  be  wholly  use- 
less —  the  structure  of  the  eye  and  the  nictitat- 
ing membrane  in  different  birds ,  and  the  haw 
in  certain  quadrupeds  —  the  powers  of  the  eye 
in  birds  of  prey  —  perhaps  more  than  any  thing 
else  ,  the  construction  of  their  cells  by  bees  ,  ac- 
cording to  the  most  certain  principles  discovered 
by  men  only  with  the  help  of  the  most  refined 
analytical  calculus.  The  atheist  can  only  deny 
the  wonderful  natureof  such  operations  of  instinct 
by  the  violent  assumption  that  the  bee  works  as  the 
heavenly  bodies  roll,  and  that  its  mathematically 
correct  operations  are  no  more  to  be  wondered 
at  than  the  equally  mathematically  adjusted 
movements  of  the  planets  —  a  truly  violent  as- 
sumption ,  and  especially  of  those  who  angrily 
deny  that  men  have  a  soul  differing  in  kind  from 
the  sentient  principle  in  the  lower  animals. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  181 

Secondly.  The  universal  recurrence  of  the  facts 
on  which  Natural  Theology  rests  deserves  to  be 
regarded  as  in  creasing  the  interest  of  this  science. 
The  other  sciences,  those  of  Physics  at  least,  are 
studied  only  when  we  withdraw  from  ail  ordinary 
pursuits,  and  give  up  our  meditations  to  them. 
Those  which  can  only  be  prosecuted  by  means 
of  experiment  can  never  be  studied  at  all  without 
some  act  of  our  own  to  alter  the  existing  state 
of  things,  and  place  nature  in  circumstances 
which  force  her,  by  a  kind  of  question,  as  Lord 
Bacon  phrases  it ,  to  reveal  her  secrets.  Even  the 
sciences  which  depend  on  observation  have  their 
fields  spread  only  here  and  there ,  hardly  ever 
lying  in  our  way  ,  and  not  always  accessible 
when  we  would  go  out  of  our  way  to  walk  in 
them.  Butthere  is  no  place  where  the  evidences 
of  Natural  Religion  are  not  distributed  in  ample 
measure.  It  is  equally  true  that  those  evidences 
continually  meet  us  in  all  the  other  branches  of 
science.  A  discovery  made  in  these  almost  cer- 
tainly involves  some  new  proofs  of  design  in  the 
formation  and  government  of  the  universe. 

Thirdly  and  chiefly.  Natural  Theology  stands 
far  above  all  other  sciences  from  the  sublime  and 
elevating  nature  of  its  objects.  It  tells  of  the 
creation  of  all  things — of  the  mighty  power  that 
fashioned  and  that  sustains  the  universe — of  the 


182  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

exquisite  skill  that  contrived  the  wings ,  and 
beak,  and  feet  of  insects  invisible  to  the  naked 
eye  —  and  that  lighted  the  lamp  of  day ,  and 
launched  into  space  comets  a  thousand  times 
larger  than  the  earth,  whirling  a  million  of  times 
swifter  than  a  cannon  ball,  and  burning  with  a 
heat  which  a  thousand  centuries  could  not 
quench.  It  exceeds  the  bounds  of  material  exist- 
ence ,  and  raises  us  from  the  creation  to  the  Au- 
thor of  Nature.  Its  office  is,  not  only  to  mark 
what  things  are  ,  but  for  what  purpose  they 
were  made  by  the  infinite  wisdom  of  an  all- 
powerfull  being  ,  with  whose  existence  and  at- 
tributes its  high  prerogative  is  to  bring  us  ac- 
quainted. If  we  prize,  and  justly,  the  delightful 
contemplations  of  the  other  sciences  ;  if  we 
hold  it  a  marvellous  gratification  to  have  ascer- 
tained exactly  the  swiftness  of  the  remotest  pla- 
nets —  the  number  of  grains  that  a  piece  of  lead 
would  weigh  at  their  surfaces  —  and  the  degree 
in  which  each  has  become  flattened  in  shape  by 
revolving  on  its  axis  ;  it  is  surely  a  yet  more  noble 
employment  of  our  faculties,  and  a  still  higher 
privilege  of  our  nature,  humbly,  but  confidently, 
to  ascend  from  the  universe  to  its  Great  First 
Cause,  and  investigate  the  unity,  thepersonality, 
the  intentions ,  as  well  as  the  matchless  skill  and 
mighty  power  of  him  who  made  and  sustains  and 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  183 

moves  those  prodigious  bodies,  and  all  that  in- 
habit them. 

Now,  all  the  gratification  of  which  we  have 
been  treating  is  purely  scientific,  and  wholly  in- 
dependent of  any  views  of  practical  benefit  re- 
sulting from  the  science  of  Natural  Theology. 
The  pleasure  in  question  is  merely  that  double 
gratification  which  every  science  bestows  —  na- 
mely,  the  contemplation   of  truth,  in  tracing 
resemblances  and  differences, and  the  perception 
of  the  evidence  by  which  that  truth  is  established. 
Natural  Theology  gives  this  double  pleasure, 
like  all  other  branches  of  science  —  like  the 
mathematics — like  physics — and  would  give  it  if 
we  were  beings  of  an  order  different  from  man  , 
and  whose  destinies  never  could  be  affected  by 
the  truth  or  the  falsehood  of  the  doctrines  in 
question.  Nay,  we  may  put  a  still  stronger  case, 
one  analogous  to  the  instance  given  above  of 
the  pleasure  derived  from  contemplating  some 
fine  invention  of  a  surgical  instrument.  Persons 
of  such  lives  as  should  make  it  extremely  de- 
sirable to  them  that  there  was  no  God,  and  no 
Future  State,  might  very  well,  as  philosophers, 
derive    gratification    from    contemplating  the 
truths  of  Natural  Theology,  and  from  following 
the  chain  of  evidence  by  which  these  are  esta- 
blished, and  might,  in  such  sublime  meditation, 


184  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

find  some  solace  to  the  pain  which  reflection 
upon  the  past,  and  fears  of  the  future  are  calcu- 
lated to  inflict  upon  them. 

But  it  is  equally  certain  that  the  science  de- 
rives an  interest  incomparably  greater  from  the 
consideration  that  we  ourselves ,  who  cultivate 
it ,  are  most  of  all  concerned  in  its  truth  —  that 
our  own  highest  destinies  are  involved  in  the  re- 
sults of  the  investigation.  This,  indeed,  makes  it, 
beyond  all  doubt,  the  most  interesting  of  the 
sciences ,  and  sheds  on  the  other  branches  of 
philosophy  an  interest  beyond  that  which  other- 
wise belongs  to  them ,  rendering  them  more 
attractive  in  proportion  as  they  connect  them- 
selves with  this  grand  branch  of  human  know- 
ledge ,  and  are  capable  of  being  made  subser- 
vient to  its  uses.  See  only  in  what  contemplations 
the  wisest  of  men  end  their  most  sublime  in- 
quiries !  Mark  where  it  is  that  a  Newton  finally 
reposes  after  piercing  the  thickest  veil  that  en- 
velopes nature  —  grasping  and  arresting  in  their 
course  the  most  subtle  of  her  elements  and  the 
swiftest  —  traversing  the  regions  of  boundless 
space  —  exploring  worlds  beyond  the  solar  way 
— giving  out  the  law  which  binds  the  universe  in 
eternal  order  !  He  rests,  as  by  an  inevitable  ne- 
cessity, upon  the  contemplation  of  the  great  First 
Cause,  and  holds  it  his  highest  glory  to  have 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  185 

made  the  evidence  of  his  existence,  and  the  dis- 
pensations of  his  power  and  of  his  wisdom,  bet- 
ter understood  by  men. 

If  such  are  the  peculiar  pleasures  which  apper- 
tain to  this  science,  it  seems  to  follow  that  those 
philosophers  are  mistaken  who  would  restrict  us 
to  a  very  few  demonstrations  ,  to  one  or  two  in- 
stances of  design,  as  sufficient  proofs  of  the 
Deity's  power  and  skill  in  the  creation  of  the 
world.  That  one  sufficient  proof  of  this  kind  is 
in  a  certain  sense  enough  cannot  be  denied  :  a 
single  such  proof  overthrows  the  dogmas  of  the 
atheist,  and  dispels  the  doubts  of  the  sceptic  ; 
but  is  it  enough  to  the  gratification  of  the  con- 
templative mind?  The  great  multiplication  of 
proofs  undeniably  strengthens  our  positions;  nor 
can  we  ever  affirm  respecting  the  theorems  in  a 
science,  not  of  necessary  but  of  contingent  truth, 
that  the  evidence  is  sufficiently  cogent  without 
variety  and  repetition.  But,  independently  alto- 
gether of  this  consideration  ,  the  gratification  is 
renewed  by  each  instance  of  design  which  we 
are  led  to  contemplate.  Each  is  different  from  the 
other.  Each  step  renews  our  delight.  The 
finding  that  at  every  step  wemake  in  one  science, 
and  with  one  object  in  view,  a  new  proof  is  added 
to  those  before  possessed  by  another  science  , 
affords  a  perpetual  source  of  new  interest  and 

16 


186  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

fresh  enjoyment.  This  would  be  true  if  the 
science  in  question  were  one  of  an  ordinary 
description.  But  when  we  consider  what  its 
nature  is — how  intimately  connected  with  our 
highest  concerns — how  immediately  and  neces- 
sarily leading  to  the  religious  adoration  of  the 
Supreme  Being — can  we  doubt  that  the  perpe- 
tually renewed  proofs  of  his  power,  wisdom,  and 
goodness  tend  to  fix  and  to  transport  the  mind, 
by  the  constant  nourishment  thus  afforded  to  feel- 
ings of  pure  and  rational  devotion? It  is,  in  truth, 
an  exercise  at  once  intellectual  and  moral ,  in 
which  the  highest  faculties  of  the  understanding 
and  the  warmest  feelings  of  the  heart  alike  par- 
take ,  and  in  which  not  only  without  ceasing  to 
be  a  philosopher  the  student  feels  as  a  man ,  but 
in  which  the  more  warmly  his  human  feelings  are 
excited,  the  more  philosophically  he  handles  the 
subject.  What  delight  can  be  more  elevating  , 
more  truly  worthy  of  a  rational  creature's  enjoy- 
ment, than  to  feel ,  wherever  we  tread  the  paths 
of  scientific  inquiry,  new  evidence  springing  up 
around  our  footsteps — new  traces  of  divine  in- 
telligence and  power  meeting  our  eye !  We  are 
never  alone ;  at  least, like  the  old  Roman,  we  are 
never  less  alone  than  in  our  solitude.  We  walk 
with  the  Deity ;  we  commune  with  the  Great 
First  Cause,  who  sustains  at  every  instant  what 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  187 

the  word  of  his  power  made.  The  delight  is 
renewed  at  each  step  of  our  progress,  though  as 
far  as  evidence  is  concerned  we  have  long  ago 
had  proof  enough.  But  that  is  no  more  a  reason 
for  ceasing  to  contemplate  the  subject  in  its  per- 
petually renovated  and  varied  forms ,  than  it 
would  be  a  reason  for  resting  satisfied  with  once 
seeing  a  long  lost  friend,  that  his  existence  had 
been  sufficiently  proved  by  one  interview.  Thus  , 
instead  of  restricting  ourselves  to  the  proofs  alone 
required  to  refute  atheism  or  remove  scepticism, 
we  should  covet  the  indefinite  multiplication  of 
evidences  of  design  and  skill  in  the  universe ,  as 
subservient  in  a  threefold  way  to  purposes  of  use 
and  of  gratification  :  first ,  as  strengthening  the 
foundation  whereupon  the  system  reposes  ;  se- 
condly,  as  conducive  to  the  ordinary  purposes  of 
scientific  gratification  ,  each  instance  being  a 
fresh  renewal  of  that  kind  of  enjoyment ;  and 
thirdly ,  as  giving  additional  ground  for  devout, 
pleasing  ,  and  wholesome  adoration  of  the  Great 
First  Cause  ,  who  made  and  who  sustains  all 
nature. 

It  is,  therefore,  manifest  that  instead  of  rest- 
ing satisfied  with  details  and  reasons  barely  suf- 
ficient to  prove  tbe  existence  of  design  in  the 
universe  ,  the  gratification  of  a  laudable  scientific 
curiosity,  and  the  proper  indulgence  of  rational 


188        A  DISCOURSE  OF  NATURAL  THEOLOGY. 

devotion  ,  require  that  every  occasion  should  be 
taken  of  exhibiting  those  evidences  upon  which 
the  system  of  Natural  Theology  rests.  The  pro- 
fessed treatises  upon  that  science  do  not  suffice 
for  this  purpose,  although  they  ought  unquestio- 
nably to  enter  largely  ,  and  with  very  great 
variety  of  illustration ,  into  the  proofs  ;  but  each 
several  branch  of  science  ,  natural  and  moral , 
should  have  a  constant  reference  to  this  ,  and 
should  never  fail  to  apply  its  peculiar  doctrines 
towards  the  proof  and  the  illustration  of  the 
doctrines  of  Natural  Theology. 


SECTION  III. 

OF    THE    CONNEXION    BETWEEN    NATURAL    AND 
REVEALED    RELIGION. 

The  ordinary  arguments  against  Natural  Theo- 
logy with  which  we  have  to  contend  are  those 
of  atheists  and  sceptics ;  of  persons  who  deny  the 
existence  of  a  First  Cause  ,  or  who  involve  the 
whole  question  in  doubt ;  of  persons  who  think 
they  see  a  balance  of  reason  for  denying  the 
existence  of  a  Deity,  or  who  consider  the  reasons 
on  both  sides  as  so  equally  poised  that  they  can- 
not decide  either  way.  An  objection  of  a  very 
different  nature  has  sometimes  proceeded ,  un- 
expectedly,  from  a  very  different  quarter— the 
friends  of  Revelation — who  have  been  known  , 
without  due  reflection ,  to  contend  that  by  the 
light  of  unassisted  reason  we  can  know  absolu- 
tely nothing  of  God  and  a  Future  State.  They 
appear  to  be  alarmed  lest  the  progress  of  Natu- 
ral Religion  should  prove  dangerous  to  the  ac- 
ceptance of  Revealed ;  lest  the  former  should,  as 
it  were,  be  taken  as  a  substitute  for  the  latter. 
They  argue  as  if  the  two  systems  were  rivals,  and 
whatever  credit  the  one  gained  ,  were  so  much 


190  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

lost  to  the  other.  They  seem  to  think  that  if  any 
discovery  of  a  First  Cause  and  another  world  were 
made  by  natural  reason,  it  would  no  longer  be 
true  that  « life  and  immortality  were  brought  to 
light  by  the  gospel . »  Al  though  these  reasoners  are 
neither  the  most  famous  advocates  of  revelation , 
nor  the  most  enlightened,  we  yet  may  do  well 
to  show  the  groundlessness  of  the  alarms  which 
they  would  excite. 

1.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  worthy  of  our  con- 
sideration that  the  greatest  advocates  of  Natural 
Theology  have  always  been  sincere  and  even 
zealous  Christians.  The  names  of  Ray ,  Clarke, 
Derham ,  Keill ,  Paley ,  attest  the  truth  of  this 
assertion.  None  of  these  was  likely  to  lend  his 
support  to  any  system  the  evidence  of  which  put 
the  outworks  of  Christianity  in  jeopardy.  Some 
of  them  ,  as  Clarke  and  Paley ,  have  signalized 
themselves  as  strenuous  and  able  defenders  of 
the  truth  of  Revelation.  Derham  actually  deli- 
vered his  celebrated  work  on  the  great  truths 
of  Natural  Theology  as  a  series  of  sermons 
preached  in  Bow  Church ,  at  a  Lecture  for  the 
promotion  of  the  Christian  religion,  founded  by 
Mr.  Boyle.  At  the  same  Lecture,  in  St.  Paul's  , 
was  delivered  Dr.  Clarke's  argument  a  priori, 
and  indeed  his  whole  «  Evidence  of  Natural  and 
Revealed  Religion ,  »  aswellashis  «  Demonstra- 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  191 

tion  of  the  Being  and  Attributes  of  God;  »  and 
Dr.  Bentley,the  first  preacher  upon  that  founda- 
tion ,  delivered  in  like  manner  as  sermons  his 
argument  in  favour  of  Natural  Religion  from  the 
structure  of  the  human  mind ,  the  animal  body  , 
and  the  universe  at  large. 

This  Lecture  was  expressly  founded  by  Mr. 
Boyle  in  support  of  the  Christian  Religion  ;  and 
no  reference  to  Natural  Theology,  apart  from  its 
uses  in  supporting  Revelation ,  is  to  be  found  in 
the  terms  of  the  gift.  The  subject  of  the  eight 
sermons  is  to  be ,  in  the  words  of  the  will,  «  The 
proof  of  the  Christian  religion  against  notorious 
infidels,  viz.  atheists,  theists,  Pagans,  Jews,  and 
Mahometans ,  not  descending  lower  to  any  con- 
troversies that  are  among  Christians  themselves. » 
Yet  the  great  Christian  divines  whom  we  have 
named  so  construed  these  words  as  to  include  a 
proof  of  NaturalReligion  among  the  most  essential 
arguments  for  Christianity ;  and  almost  as  many 
of  the  sermons  preached  at  the  Boyle  Lecture , 
during  the  first  forty  years  after  its  foundation, 
relate  to  the  doctrines  of  Natural  Theology  as  to 
those  of  Revelation.  So  far  were  the  divines  of 
that  day  from  holding  the  two  subjects  as  hostile 
to  each  other  '. 

'  If  any  one  will  read  the  vituperation  rather  than  sermoi' 


192  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

1.  But ,  secondly,  Natural  Theology  is  most 
serviceable  to  the  support  of  revelation.  All  the 
soundest  arguments  in  behalf  of  the  latter  pre- 
suppose the  former  to  be  admitted.  Witness  the 
profound  work  of  Butler,  his  «  Analogy  of  Natural 
and  Revealed  Religion  to  the  Order  of  Nature, » 
the  most  argumentative  and  philosophical  defence 
of  Christianity  ever  submitted  to  the  world.  But 
Lardner  and  Paley,  and  all  other  writers  on  the 
same  side,  abound  in  references  to  Natural  Theo- 
logy, and  in  the  course  of  their  reasonings  as- 
sume its  truths  as  postulates. 

We  may  suppose  that  those  practised  contro- 
versialists and  zealous  Christians  did  not  make 
such  assumptions  gratuitously.  We  may  safely 
give  them  credit  for  not  resting  their  case  upon 
more  postulates  than  the  exigency  of  the  argu- 
ment required.  Such  a  course  if  unnecessary 
would  have  been  most  unskilful,  and  might  have 
proved  dangerous  by  opening  the  door  to  new 
attacks.  But  they  are  not  peculiar  in  their  view 
of  the  subject.  Boyle  and  Newton  were  as  since- 
rely attached  to  Christianity  as  any  men  in  any 
age,  and  they  are  likewise  the  most  zealous  advo- 


against  infidels  with  which  Dr.  Bentley  commences  his  discour- 
ses upon  Natural  Religion,  he  will  see  no  reason  to  doubt  the 
zeal  for  Christianity  of  that  most  learned  preacher. 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  193 

cates  of  Natural  Religion.  Lord  Bacon,  though 
imbued  perhaps  with  a  certain  degree  of  preju- 
dice on  this  subject,  but  of  a  philosophical  and 
not  a  polemical  origin ,  distinctly  places  the  truth 
of  Natural  Religion  at  the  entrance  of  theological 
study,  and  regards  the  evidences  of  Revelation 
as  founded  upon  the  previous  demonstration  of 
Natural  Theology.  «  The  latter, »  he  says,  « is  the 
key  of  the  former,  and  opens  our  understanding 
to  the  genuine  spirit  of  the  scriptures,  but  also 
unlocks  our  belief,  so  that  we  may  enter  upon  the 
serious  contemplation  of  the  divine  Power,  the 
characters  of  which  are  so  deeply  graven  in  the 
works  of  the  creation  >.  »  He  elsewhere  also  lays 
it  down  as  clear  that  atheism  is  to  be  refuted  not 
by  miracles  but  by  the  contemplation  of  nature, 
and  accurately  takes  the  distinction  between  Re- 
velation and  Natural  Religion  ;  that  the  former 
declares  the  will  of  God  as  to  the  worship  most 
aeceptable?  while  the  latter  teaches  his  existence 
and  powers,  but  is  silent  as  to  a  ritual 3. 

3.  Accordingly  we  proceed  a  step  farther,  and 
assert,  thirdly,  that  it  is  a  vain  and  ignorant  thing 
to  suppose  that  Natural  Theology  is  not  neces- 
sary to  the  support  of  Revelation.  The  latter  may 


De  Dig.  et  Aug.  lib. 
De  Dig  lib.  iii.  c  2. 


194  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

be  untrue,  though  the  former  be  admitted.  It 
may  be  proved ,  or  allowed ,  that  there  is  a  God, 
though  it  be  denied  that  he  sent  any  message  to 
man,  through  men  or  other  intermediate  agents; 
asindeedtbe Epicureans  believedin  the  existence 
of  the  gods ,  but  held  them  to  keep  wholly  aloof 
from  human  affairs  ,  leaving  the  world,  physical 
as  well  as  moral ,  to  itself ,  without  the  least  inter- 
ference in  its  concerns  «.  But  Revelation  cannot 
be  true  if  Natural  Religion  is  false  ,  and  cannot 
be  demonstrated  strictly  by  any  argument,  or 
established  by  any  evidence  without  proving  or 
assuming  the  latter.  A  little  attention  to  the  sub- 
ject will  clearly  prove  this  proposition. 

Suppose  it  were  shown  by  incontestable  proofs 
that  a  messenger  sent  immediately  from  heaven 
had  appeared  on  the  earth ;  suppose,  to  make  the 
case  more  strong  against  our  argument,  that  this 
messenger  arrived  in  our  own  days,  nay  appeared 
before  our  eyes,  and  shewed  his  divine  title  to  have 
his  message  believed  ,  by  performing  miracles  in 

•  It  is  singular,  too,  that  this  sect  inculcated  religious  duties 
towards  the  gods,  whom  nevertheless  they  neither  believed  to 
he  the  creators  nor  governors  of  the  universe.  Cicero  says  of 
its  founder,  «  De  sanctitate,  de  pietate  adversus  deos  libros 
scripsit  Epicurus.  Atquomodo  in  his  loquitur  ?  ut  Coruncanum, 
ut  Scarvolam,  Pontifices  maximos  te  audire  dicas.  »  «  You  would 
think,  »  says  he,  «  to  hear  him,  it  was  our  high-priests  des- 
canting upon  holiness  and  piety.  » 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  195 

our  presence.  No  one  can  by  possibility  imagine 
a  stronger  case ;  for  it  excludes  all  arguments 
upon  the  weight  or  the  fallibility  of  testimony  ; 
it  assumes  all  the  ordinary  difficulties  in  the  way 
of  Revelation  to  be  got  over.  Now ,  even  this 
strong  evidence  would  not  at  all  establish  the 
truth  of  the  doctrine  promulgated  by  the  mes- 
senger; for  it  would  not  show  that  the  story 
he  brought  was  worthy  of  belief  in  any  one  par- 
ticular except  his  supernatural  powers.  These 
would  be  demonstrated  by  his  working  miracles. 
All  the  rest  of  his  statement  would  rest  on  his 
assertion.  But  a  being  capable  of  working  mi- 
racles might  very  well  be  capable  of  deceiving 
us.  The  possession  of  power  does  not  of  neces- 
sity exclude  either  fraud  or  malice.  This  mes- 
senger might  come  from  an  evil  as  well  as  from 
a  good  being  ;  he  might  come  from  more  beings 
than  one  ;  or  he  might  come  from  one  being  of 
many  existing  in  the  universe.  When  Christia- 
nity was  first  promulgated,  the  miracles  of  Jesus 
were  not  denied  by  the  ancients ;  but  it  was 
asserted  that  they  came  from  evil  beings ,  and 
that  he  was  a  magician.  Such  an  explanation  was 
consistent  with  the  kind  of  belief  to  which  the 
votaries  of  polytheism  were  accustomed.  They 
were  habitually  credulous  of  miracles  and  of 
divine  interpositions.  But  their  argument  was 


196  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

notatall  unphilosophical.  There  is  nothing  what- 
ever inconsistent  in  the  power  to  work  miracles 
being  conferred  upon  a  man  or  a  minister  by  a 
supernatural  being,  who  is  either  of  limited 
power  himself ,  or  of  great  malignity,  or  who  is 
one  of  many  such  beings.  Yet  it  is  certain  that 
no  means  can  be  devised  for  attesting  the  super- 
natural agency  of  any  one  ,  except  such  a  power 
of  working  miracles ;  therefore  ,  it  is  plain  that 
no  sufficient  evidence  can  ever  be  given  by  direct 
Revelation  alone  in  favour  of  the  great  truths 
of  religion.  The  messenger  in  question  might 
have  power  to  work  miracles  without  end ,  and 
yet  it  would  remain  unproved  ,  either  that  God 
was  omnipotent ,  and  one  ,  and  benevolent ,  or 
that  he  destined  his  creatures  to  a  future  state  , 
or  that  he  had  made  them  such  as  they  are  in 
their  present  state.  All  this  might  be  true ,  in- 
deed ;  but  its  truth  would  rest  only  on  the  mes- 
senger's assertion ,  and  upon  whatever  internal 
evidence  the  nature  of  his  communication  af- 
forded ;  and  it  might  be  false  ,  without  the  least 
derogation  to  the  truth  of  the  fact  that  he  came 
from  a  superior  being ,  and  possessed  the  power 
of  suspending  the  laws  of  nature. 

But  the  doctrines  of  the  existence  of  a  Deity 
and  of  his  attributes ,  which  Natural  Religion 
teaches  ,  preclude  the  possibility  of  such  ambi- 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  197 

guities  and  remove  all  those  difficulties.  We 
thus  learn  that  the  Creator  of  the  world  is  one 
and  the  same  ;  and  we  come  to  know  his  attri- 
butes ,  not  merely  of  power  ,  which  alone  the 
direct  communication  hy  miracles  could  convey , 
but  of  wisdom  and  goodness.  Built  upon  this 
foundation  ,  the  message  of  Revelation  becomes 
at  once  unimpeachable  and  invaluable.  It  con- 
verts every  inference  of  reason  into  certainty, 
and  ,  above  all  ,  it  communicates  the  Divine 
Being's  intentions  respecting  our  own  lot ,  with 
a  degree  of  precision  which  the  inferences  of 
Natural  Theology  very  imperfectly  possess. 
This  ,  in  truth  ,  is  the  chief  superiority  of  Reve- 
lation ,  and  this  is  the  praise  justly  given  to  the 
Gospel  in  sacred  writ  —  not  that  it  teaches  the 
being  and  attributes  of  God  ,  but  that  it  brings 
life  and  immortality  to  light, 

It  deserves  ,  however  ,  to  be  remarked  ,  in 
perfect  consistency  with  the  argument  which 
has  here  been  maintained  ,  that  no  mere  revela- 
tion ,  no  direct  message,  however  avouched  by 
miraculous  gifts,  could  prove  the  faithfulness  of 
the  promises  held  out  by  the  messenger,  except- 
ing by  the  slight  inference  which  the  nature  of 
the  message  might  afford.  The  portion  of  his 
credentials  which  consisted  of  his  miraculous 
powers  could  not  prove  it.  For  unless  we  had 

17 


198  A  WSCOURSE  01 

first  ascertained  the  unity  and  the  benevolence 
of  the  being  that  sent  him,  as  those  miracles 
only  prove  power,  he  might  be  sent  to  deceive 
us ;  and  thus  the  hopes  held  out  by  him  might 
be  delusions.  The  doctrines  of  Natural  Religion 
here  come  to  our  aid  ,  and  secure  our  belief  to 
the  messenger  of  one  Being  ,  whose  goodness 
they  have  taught  us  to  trust. 

A.  In  other  respects,  the  services  of  Natural 
Religion  are  far  from  inconsiderable  ,  as  subsi- 
diary to  ,  and  co-operative  with  ,  the  great  help 
of  Revelation.  Thus,  were  our  whole  knowledge 
of  the  Deity  drawn  from  R.evelation,  its  founda- 
tion must  become  weaker  and  weaker  as  the 
distance  in  point  of  time  increases  from  the  ac- 
tual interposition.  Tradition  ,  or  the  evidence 
of  testimony  ,  must  of  necessity  be  its  only  proof: 
for  perpetual  miracles  must  be  wrought  to  give 
us  evidence  by  our  own  senses.  Now  ,  a  perpe- 
tual miracle  is  a  contradiction  in  terms :  for  the 
exception  to,  or  suspension  of,  the  laws  of  na- 
ture so  often  repeated  would  destroy  the  laws 
themselves,  and  with  the  laws  the  force  of  the 
exception  or  suspension.  Upon  testimony,  then  , 
all  Revelation  must  rest.  Every  age  but  the  one 
in  which  the  miracles  were  wrought ,  and  every 
country  but  the  one  that  witnessed  them  —  in- 
deed ,  all  the  people  of  that  country  itself  save 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  199 

those  actually  present  —  must  receive  the  proofs 
which  they  afford  of*  Divine  interposition  upon 
ihe  testimony  of  eye-witnesses ,  and  of  those  to 
whom  eye-witnesses  told  it.  Even  if  the  mira- 
cles were  exhibited  before  all  the  nations  of  one 
age,  the  next  must  believe  upon  the  authority  of 
tradition  :  and  if  we  suppose  the  interposition  to 
be  repeated  from  time  to  time  ,  each  repetition 
would  incalculably  weaken  its  force,  because  the 
laws  of  nature ,  though  not  wholly  destroyed  ,  as 
they  must  be  by  a  constant  violation,  would  yet 
lose  their  prevailing  force  ,  and  each  exception 
would  become  a  slighter  proof  of  supernatural 
agency.  Jt  is  far  otherwise  with  the  proofs  of 
Natural  Religion;  repetition  only  strengthens 
and  extends  them.  We  are  by  no  means  affir- 
ming that  Revelation  would  lose  its  sanction  by 
lapse  of  time  ,  as  long  as  it  had  the  perpetually 
new  and  living  evidence  of  Natural  Religion  to 
support  it.  We  are  only  shewing  the  use  of  that 
evidence  to  Revelation,  by  examining  the  ine- 
vitable consequences  of  its  entire  removal,  and 
seeing  how  ill  supported  the  truths  of  Revelation 
would  be  ,  if  the  prop  were  withdrawn  which 
they  borrow  from  Natural  Theology  ;  for  then 
they  would  rest  upon  tradition  alone.  ' 

U  5. 


200  A  DISCOURSE  OF 

In  truth  ,  it  is  with  Natural  Religion  as  with 
many  of  the  greatest  blessings  of  our  sublunary 
lot  :  they  are  so  common,  so  habitually  present 
to  and  enjoyed  by  us,  that  we  become  insensible 
of  their  value ,  and  only  estimate  them  aright 
when  we  lose  them  ,  or  fancy  them  lost.  Accus- 
tomed to  handle  the  truths  of  Revelation  in  con- 
nexion with,  and  in  addition  to,  those  of  Natural 
Theology,  and  never  having  experienced  any 
state  of  mind  in  which  we  were  without  the  latter, 
we  forget  how  essential  they  are  to  the  former. 
As  we  are  wont  to  forget  the  existence  of  the  air 
we  constantly  breathe  until  put  in  mind  of  it  by 
some  violent  change  threatening  suffocation  ,  so 
it  requires  a  violent  fit  of  abstraction  to  figure  to 
ourselves  the  state  of  our  belief  in  Revelation 
were  the  lights  of  natural  religion  withdrawn. 
The  existence  and  attributes  of  a  God  are  so  fa- 
miliarly proved  by  every  thing  around  us  ,  that 
we  can  hardly  picture  to  ourselves  the  state  of  our 
belief  in  this  great  truth  ,  if  we  only  knew  it  by 
the  testimony  borne  to  miracles,  which,  however 
authentic ,  were  yet  wrought  in  a  remote  age 
and  distant  region  *. 

■  Mr.  Locke  has  said,  upon  a  similar  question,  «  He  that  takes 
away  Reason  to  make  way  for  Revelation  puts  out  the  light  of 
hoth  ;  and  does  much  about  the  same  as  if  he  would  persuade 
a  man  to  put  out  his  eyes ,  the  better  to  receive  the  remote 


NATURAL  THEOLOGY.  201 

5.  The  use  of  Natural  Theology  to  the  believer 
in  Revelation  is  equally  remarkable  in  keeping 
alive  the  feelings  of  piety  and  devotion.  As  this 
topic  has  occurred  under  a  former  head ,  it  is 
only  to  be  presented  here  in  close  connexion 
with  Revealed  Religion.  It  may  be  observed  , 
then ,  that  even  the  inspired  penmen  have  con- 
stant recourse  to  the  views  which  are  derived 
from  the  contemplation  of  nature  when  they 
would  exalt  the  Deity  by  a  description  of  his  at- 
tributes ,  or  inculcate  sentiments  of  devotion 
towards  him.  «  How  excellent ,  »  says  the 
Psalmist ,  «  is  thy  name  in  all  the  earth  ;  thou 
hast  set  thy  glory  above  the  heavens.  I  will  con- 
sider the  heavens,  even  the  work  of  thy  fingers  ; 
the  moon  and  the  stars  which  thou  hast  or- 
dained. »  See  also  that  singularly  beautiful  poem 
the  139th  Psalm  ;  and  the  Book  of  Job  ,  from  the 
38th  to  the  41st  chapter. 

It  is  remarkable  how  little  is  to  be  found  of 
particularity  and  precision  in  any  thing  that  has 
been  revealed  to  us  respecting  the  nature  of  the 
Godhead.  For  the  wisest  purposes  it  has  pleased 
Providence  to  veil  in  awful  mystery  almost  all 
the  attributes  of  the  Ancient  of  Days  beyond 


light  of  an  invisible  star  by  a  telescope.  »  —  (  Human  Understan- 
ding, iv.  19,  /,.  ) 

IT. 


202       A  DISCOURSE  OF  NATURAL  THEOLOGY. 

what  natural  reason  teaches.  By  direct  interpo- 
sition ,  through  miraculous  agency,  we  become 
acquainted  with  his  wTill,  and  are  made  more 
certain  of  his  existence  ;  but  his  peculiar  attri- 
butes are  nearly  the  same  in  the  volume  of  na- 
ture and  in  that  of  his  revealed  word. 


NOTES. 


NOTES. 


NOTE  1.  —PAGE  6. 

OF  THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF   THE  SCIENCES. 

I  am  abundantly  sensible,  not  only,  as  is  stated  in  the  text, 
how  imperfect  all  such  classifications  must  be,  but  that 
grave  objections  may  be  urged  against  the  one  i  have 
adopted,  and  particularly  against  the  threefold  division  of 
physical y  psychological,  and  ethical  or  moral.  It  may  be 
said  that  one  part  of  the  moral  branch  of  Natural  Theo- 
logy belongs  to  psychology— namely,  the  arguments  drawn 
from  the  nature  of  the  mind  in  favour  of  a  future  state ; 
and  that  this  part  ought  therefore  to  have  been  classed 
with  the  second  division  of  the  ontological  branch — namely, 
the  psychological.  But  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the 
two  first  divisions,  comprising  the  ontological  branch,  are 
confined  to  the  doctrine  of  existences — the  investigation 
of  the  Deity's  existence  and  attributes ;  while  the  whole  of 
the  third  division,  or  second  branch,  relates  to  the  prospects 
of  man  with  respect  to  his  soul  ;  and  consequently,  although 
the  arguments  respecting  these  prospects  are  partly  of  a 
psychological  nature,  yet  they  relate  to  the  future,  and  not 
at  all  to  the  past  or  present— not  at  all  to  the  doctrine  of 
existence  or  attributes.    This   is   therefore  a  sufficiently 


206  NOTES. 

distinct  ground  for  the  separation.  In  all  such  classifications 
we  should  be  guided  by  views  of  convenience,  rather  than 
by  any  desire  to  attain  perfect  symmetry  ;  and  that  arran- 
gement may  be  best  suited  to  a  particular  purpose  which 
plants  the  same  things  in  one  order,  and  separates  them 
and  unites  them  in  one  way,  when  an  arrangement  which 
should  dispose  those  things  differently  might  be  preferable, 
if  we  had  another  purpose  to  serve.  Thus  the  three  divisions 
of  physics,  psychology,  and  morals  may  be  convenient  for 
the  purposes  of  Natural  Theology,  and  yet  it  may  not  so 
well  suit  the  purposes  of  general  science ;  although  I  own 
my  opinion  to  be  in  favour  of  that  classification  for  such 
general  purposes  also,  keeping  always  in  mind  that  whatever 
portion  of  moral  science  (using  the  term  in  its  more  ordi- 
nary sense)  belongs  to  ontology  comes  within  the  second, 
and  not  the  third,  subdivision,  and  that  the  third  deals  with 
deontology  alone. 

The  various  classifications  which,  in  ancient  as  well  as 
modern  times,  have  been  made  of  the  sciences,  are  well 
calculated  to  illustrate  the  difficulty  of  a  perfect  arrange- 
ment. The  Greek  philosophers  distinguished  them  into 
physics,  ethics,  and  logic.  Under  the  first  head  was  com- 
prehended both  the  nature  of  mind  and  of  the  Deity; 
consequently,  under  physics  were  classed  what  we  now 
term  psychology  and  theology,  as  well  as  natural  philo- 
sophy. Mr.  Locke  mainly  adopted  the  same  order  when 
he  ranged  the  objects  of  science  into  physical,  practical,  and 
logical  (^js-o^,  Kpx*7c/.vi,  tryiftuwrixi;,  orV/^oj);  or,l. Things 
in  themselves  knowable ,  whether  God  himself,  angels, 
spirits,  bodies  ;  or  their  affections,  as  number,  figure,  etc. 
2.  Actions,  as  they  depend  upon  us  in  order  to  happiness ; 
and  o.  The  use  of  signs,  in  order  to  knowledge.  Thus, 
like  the  Greek  philosophers,  he  classed  natural  philosophy, 
psychology,  and  theology  under  one  head ;  but  as  he  only 


NOTES.  207 

stated  ethics  to  he  «  the  most  considerable  of  the  second 
head ,  »  it  may  be  doubtful  whether  or  not  he  included 
under  it  any  practical  application  of  the  natural  branches 
of  the  first  head.  One  thing,  too,  is  quite  clear  in  this 
arrangement, — that  pure  mathematics  becomes  part  of 
the  science  of  ontology— that  is,  of  existences,  natural 
and  mental  5  and  yet  it  bears  a  more  close  relation  to  the 
third,  or  logical  division.  It  certainly  appears  somewhat 
violent  to  class  fluxions  with  anatomy,  metallurgy  with 
psychology ,  and  entomology  with  theology  ;  while  we 
make  separate  heads  of  ethics  and  logic.  Rut  yet  more 
violent  is  M.  Turgot's  classification,  by  which  he  ranges, 
under  the  head  of  physical  sciences,  not  only  natural  phi- 
losophy and  metaphysics  by  name,  but  also  logic  and 
history.  To  thus  classing  history  there  is,  indeed,  a 
double  objection.  Not  only  is  it  doing  unnecessary  vio- 
lence to  common  language,  to  make  that  which  bears  no 
exclusive  relation  to  natural  objects  a  part  of  physics,  but 
to  make  history  a  science  at  all  is  perhaps  yet  more  objec- 
tionable, unless  in  the  sense  in  which  inductive  science  is 
deemed  historical  by  Lord  Bacon — being  considered  by 
him  as  the  history  of  facts.  But  this,  too,  is  incorrect;  for 
the  history  or  record  of  facts  is  only  the  foundation  of 
inductive  science,  which  consists  in  the  comparison,  or 
reasoning  from  the  comparison,  of  these  facts,  and 
marking  their  differences  and  resemblances ;  whereas 
history  is  applicable  to  all  events  and  all  sciences,  being 
merely  the  record  of  things  that  have  happened,  of  what- 
ever kind,  and  implies  no  reasoning  or  comparing  at  all. 
Why  is  poetry,  music,  painting,  omitted  in  such  an  arran- 
gement as  that  of  Turgot?  They  are  as  much  sciences  as 
history. 

Lord  Bacon's  own  scientific  classification  is  certainly  not 
distinguished  by  peculiar  felicity.  He  divides  science  into 


208  NOTES. 

three  parts,  according  as  its  object  is  the  Deity,  Man  or 
External  Nature,  naming  these  branches — Natural  Theo- 
logy, Human  Philosophy,  and  Natural  Philosophy.  Hence, 
while  intellectual  and  moral  philosophy  are  separated  from 
theology,  they  are  both  classed  with  anatomy  and  medi- 
cine ;  while  optics  and  acoustics,  merely  from  their  rela- 
tion to  the  human  eye  and  the  human  ear,  are  ranged 
under  the  same  head  with  ethics,  and  separated  from  na- 
tural philosophy.  Hence,  too,  the  chemical  nature  of  the 
blood  and  bones  of  man  is  made  one  part  of  one  division 
— Human  Philosophy ;  while  the  chemical  nature  of  the 
blood  and  bones  of  all  other  animals  is  ranged  under 
another  head — Natural  Philosophy.  As  for  logic  and  the 
mathematics,  they  are  treated  as  a  kind  of  appendix  to 
physics,  rather  than  as  deserving  the  name  of  sciences. 


NOTE  2.— PAGE  54. 

OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT  FROM  FINAL  CAUSES. 

Dr.  Clarke  maintains  that  the  evidences  of  design  are 
much  more  to  be  traced  in  the  natural  than  in  the  moral 
world  5  but  he  plainly  means  by  this  proposition,  not  so 
much  to  compare  the  proofs  of  Divine  wisdom  exhibited 
in  the  phenomena  of  the  material  with  those  exhibited  in 
the  phenomena  of  the  intellectual  world,  as  to  show  that 
the  designs  or  intentions  of  the  Deity  are  more  easily 
perceived  in  the  arrangements  of  the  world  with  which 
we  are  most  conversant,  than  his  plans  for  our  happiness, 
arid  his  general  intentions  respecting  our  fate,  are  to  he 


NOTES.  209 

inferred  from  moral  considerations.  It  is,  however,  to  be 
remarked  that,  like  all  other  reasoners  upon  Natural  Theo- 
logy, Dr.  Clarke  confines  his  attention  entirely  to  physical, 
and  never  adverts  to  psychological,  proofs. 

Mr.  Smith,  in  his  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments,  has 
interspersed  with  his  reasonings  upon  the  constitution  of  the 
affections  and  feelings, reflections  upon  the  purposes  to  which 
they  are  subservient ;  and  Mr.  Stewart's  writings  afford  fre- 
quent instances  of  his  attention  having  been  alive  to  the 
soundness  of  the  same  speculation.  Indeed,  no  one  who  had 
the  accurate  and  just  views  of  the  nature  of  the  sentient  prin- 
ciple, and  the  steady  conviction  of  its  separate  and  imma- 
terial nature,  which  prevail  through  all  his  writings,  could 
fail  to  perceive  the  application  of  the  argument  a,  posteriori 
to  our  mental  constitution.  But  these  indications  of  this 
admirable  writer's  attention  to  the  subject  are  accidental, 
and  scattered  through  his  works  ;  and  it  is  exceedingly  to 
be  regretted,  nor,  indeed,  very  easily  to  be  explained, 
that  he  should  have  entirely  omitted  all  reference  to  the 
constitution  of  our  mental  faculties  in  the  otherwise  full 
and  able  treatise  upon  Natural  Religion  which  forms  so 
large  a  part— above  one-third— of  his  «  Philosophy  of  the 
Active  Powers.  »  With  the  exception  of  a  single  remark 
(vol.  ii,  p.  48),  and  that  only  upon  the  adaptation  of  our 
faculties  to  our  external  circumstances,  and  a  quotation 
from  Locke,  which  relates  more  to  the  bodily  than  to  the 
mental  powers,  there  occurs  nothing  whatever  upon  this 
important  part  of  the  subject  in  that  excellent  work, 
where  it  would  have  been  so  peculiarly  appropriate. 

This  silence  of  modern  writers  upon  Natural  Theology  is 
easily  accounted  for  by  the  same  consideration  to  which 
Dr.  Reid  has  referred  in  explaining  how  the  modern  sceptics 
have  admitted  the  existence  of  appearances  of  design  in 
the  universe,  and  denied  what  he  terms  the  major  propo- 

18 


210  NOTES. 

sition— that  design  may  be  traced  by  its  effects  ;  while  the 
ancient  sceptics,  admitting  the  latter  proposition,  denied 
the  former.  He  considers  this  as  owing  to  the  great  disco- 
veries in  physics  made  in  modern  times ;  and  to  the  same 
cause  may  be  ascribed  the  disposition  of  Natural  Theolo- 
gians to  confine  their  attention  to  the  evidences  afforded 
by  the  material  world.  The  ancients,  on  the  other  hand, 
whose  progress  in  Natural  Philosophy  was  extremely  limi- 
ted, bestow  more  attention,  and  with  considerably  greater 
success,  upon  Intellectual  Philosophy;  and  accordingly 
we  find  that  they  drew  their  arguments  a  posteriori  for 
the  existence  of  design  in  the  universe  as  much  from  moral 
as  from  physical  considerations. 

The  discussion  held  by  Socrates  with  Aristodemus ,  as 
recorded  by  Xenophon,  is  well  known.  After  enumerating 
the  various  convenient  arrangements  of  the  bodily  organs,  he 
adds — Oy  roivw  /mtovgpxsffs  rco  6m  zcu  cco/jlxzcs  sicifisktfhpou'  a/X' 
(oir-p  fxr/i.(j-a-j  c-5T«)  y.xi  t>?v  $U#jii  xpxziczyv  rco  xv$pojK(a  ivevwrr 
zivcc  yxp  xXXcv  ^cuoj  tytffl  nptazx  /XiV  6:wj,  rcov  zx  /j.;ytTZX  y.xi  /.xlhczx 
cwzxgx-jzw ,  ysSyzxi  ore  usi ;  zt  dV  vv).o»  x~>lo  ij  xvQpuKCi,  $:od; 
$-pXK?jcu7t;  kolx  <5  <puyy  z'/}sx-j$po)iuvvii7 ixxvcaztpx  KpovuXlxzz&Oxi, 
v?  hu.c-j ,  )j  tfcpcr ,  7j  ipr/y  ,  j;  Bxlny  ,  y,  voccis  ;iu/.C'jpY,<7Xi ,  y,  poiy.yv 
XT/.t]7Xc,  y,  KpjQv  fj.x$y<7iv  cXffCVijffai,  y,  ocx  av  axcjffjj,  jj  y\  J?  //.a^, 
r/Mvuzipx  c-ezi  <?txlu:iu.*jYli7$xt ; — «  Nor  has  the  Deity  been 
satisfied  with  taking  care  of  the  body  alone ;  he  has 
implanted  in  man  what  is  a  far  greater  work  to  have 
made — a  most  excellent  soul;  for  what  other  animal 
possesses  a  mind  that  can  perceive  the  existence  of  the 
Gods  by  whom  all  these  vast  and  fair  works  have  been 
formed?  What  other  creature  than  man  worships  those 
Gods  ?  What  other  intelligence  is  superior  to  man's  in 
providing  against  hunger ,  and  thirst ,  and  cold  7  and 
heat  ?  or  in  curing  diseases ,  or  in  exercising  strength . 
or  in  cultivating  learning,  or  in  storing  up  the  rccollec- 


ISOTES.  211 

Hon  of  things  heard,  and  seen,  and  learnt1?  »  —It  may 
be  observed  here,  in  passing,  that  Mr.  Stewart,  who  refers 
to  this  passage ,  has  adopted  the  paraphrastic  translation 
by  Mrs.  Fielding,  and  it  is  extremely  unlike  the  original. 
Mr.  Stewart  justly  praises  the  «  almost  divine  simplicity  » 
of  the  whole  conversation,  which  is  a  just  eulogy  j  but  the 
translation,  although  well  written,  little  resembles  the 
Greek  in  that  particular.  The  one  I  have  here  given  is  at 
least  faithful. 

In  like  manner,  the  discussion  with  Euthydemus,  after 
showing  the  goodness  of  the  Gods  in  adapting  all  things  to 
man's  use,  closes  with  mentioning  the  senses  given  us  to 
enjoy  those  gifts  of  external  nature,  and,  lastly,  the  use  of 
reason.  TcdV  xouloyurpevyptv  f/ifvcca,  etc.  etc. —  «  They  have 
imp/anted  reason  in  our  nature  ,  whereby  ive  inquire 
touching  external  things;  and,  arguing  and  remember- 
ing,  we  learn  the  uses  of  each,  and  hit  upon  many 
contrivances  for  attaining  good  and  avoiding  evil.  Have 
they  not  also  given  us  the  gift  of  speech,  by  which  we 
can  communicate  mutually  all  we  have  learnt,  and  thus 
instruct  each  other,  and  make  laws,  and  regulate  civil 
polity  *  ?  » 

Plato  pursues  the  same  course  of  reasoning.  We  may 
refer  particularly  to  the  tenth  and  twelfth  books  of  the 
treatise  De  Legg.  Thus,  towards  the  end  of  the  latter  book, 
he  states  the  argument  for  the  Deity's  existence  as  twofold 
—the  nature  of  the  mind,  and  the  order  of  the  worldly 
system.  The  first  of  his  reasons  is  drawn  from  considering 
the  qualities  of  the  mind ;  its  greater  antiquity  than  that 
of  the  body  and  its  immortality ;  for  the  Plalonists  certainly 
considered  immortality  to  be  so  much  of  the  essence  of 

i  Xen.  Memor.  I.  iv.  13. 
a  Id.,  ibid.  IV.  i.i.  II. 


213  NOTES. 

mind  as  to  deduce  from  thence,  as  the  less  clear  proposition, 
the  existence  of  a  Deity. 

The  Stoics  reasoned  in  like  manner,  with  an  equal  re- 
gard to  mental  and  to  natural  phenomena.  Epictetus,  after 
deducing  the  inference  of  design  from  the  adaptations  of 
sensible  objects,  as  of  the  eye  to  light,  adds,  correctly  and 
philosophically,  that  «  the  constitution  of  the  understand- 
ing, whereby  it  not  only  receives  impressions  through 
the  senses,  but  also  deals  with  the  ideas  thus  received, 
and  combines  or  composes  something  out  of  them,  pro- 
ceeding from  things  that  are  near  to  things  quite  remote, 
proves  the  existence  of  an  Artificer ;  since  things  carrying 
such  marks  of  contrivance  could  not,  »  he  contends, 
«  exist  spontaneously,  and  without  design  r.  » 

The  same  train  of  reasoning  is  followed  by  Cicero  in 
all  those  parts  of  his  writings  in  which  he  treats  of  the 
existence  of  a  Deity.  Thus  the  famous  passage  so  often 
quoted  from  the  treatise  De  Natura  Deoram,  ends  with 
a  reference  to  our  mental  constitution,  although  this  part 
of  it  is  not  as  frequently  attended  to.  «  An  vero  si  domum 
magnam,  pulchramque  videris,  non  possis  adduci  ut  etiam 
si  dominium  non  videas  muribus  illam  et  mustelis  sedifica- 
tam  putes ;  tantum  vero  ornatum  mundi,tantamvarietatem 
pulchritudinemque  rerum  celestium,  tantam  vim  et  magni- 
tude em  maris  atque  terrarum  si  tuum  ac  non  deorum 
immortalium  domicilium  putes,  nonne  plane  desipere 
videare?  «  Thus  far  as  to  sensible  objects.  But  he  pro- 
ceeds, «  Aliud  a  terra  sumsimus,  aliud  ab  humore,  aliud 
ab  igne,  aliud  ab  aere  eo  quem  spiritum  ducimus  :  illud 
autem  quod  vincit  haec  omnia,  rationem  dico  et  si  placet, 


Epict.  Enchir.  i.  0. 


NOTES.  M3 

pluribus  verbis,  mentem,  consilium,   cogitationem,  pru- 
dentiam  ubi  invenimus?  unde  sustulimus  »  ?  » 

And  again,  in  the  same  book,  after  speaking  at  large 
of  the  structure  of  the  body,  and  the  uses  to  which  its 
various  parts  are  adapted,  he  adds,  «  Jam  vero  animum 
ipsum,  mentemque  hominis,  rationem,  consilium,  pru- 
dentiam,  qui  non  divina  cura  perfecta  esse  perspicit,  is 
his  ipsis  rebus  mihi  videtur  carere.  «  He  proceeds  to  show 
how  great  a  gift  reason  is  from  its  productions  :  «  Ex 
quo  scientia  intelligitur  quam  vim  habeat,  qualis  sit, 
qua  ne  in  deo  quidem  est  res  ulla  praestantior ;  »  and 
he  closes  with  the  well-known  passage  in  praise  of  elo- 
quence 2. 

In  the  Tusculan  Questions  he  alludes  to  mind  in  a  dif- 
ferent manner.  After  going  through  the  various  provisions 
made  for  human  enjoyment  in  the  economy  of  nature,  he 
adds,  «  Sic  mentem  hominis  quamvis  cum  non  videas 
ut  deum  non  vides,  tamen  ut  deum  agnoscis  ex  operibus 
ejus,  sic  ex  memoria  rerum  et  inventione  et  celeritate 
motus  omnique  pulchritudine  virlutis,  vim  divinam  mentis 
agnoscilo  3.  » 

The  course  of  the  argument  in  which  he  is  engaged  in 
this  first  part  of  his  work,  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
leads  him  to  use  the  phenomena  of  its  faculties  for  the  pur- 
pose of  illustrating  its  separate  existence ;  and,  therefore, 
he  only  enumerates  the  arrangements  of  the  natural  world 
as  proofs  of  Divine  agency,  and  gives  those  proofs  not  as 
the  main  object  of  the  argument,  but  as  introductory  to 
his  statement  of  the  soul's  independent  nature. 

In  these  speculations  of  the  ancient  philosophers,  we 

1  De  Nat.  Deor.ii.  6. 

2  Ibid.  ii.  59. 

3  Tusc.  Quest,  i.  29. 

18. 


214  NOTES. 

cannot  find  any  process  of  strict  inductive  reasoning;  and, 
accordingly,  the  facts  are  not  turned  to  the  best  account 
for  the  purposes  of  the  argument.  But  this  defect  appears, 
at  the  least,  as  much  in  the  physical  as  in  the  psychological 
portion  of  the  reasoning.  Indeed,  the  latter  comes  more 
near  to  our  own  philosophy ;  and  certainly  we  must  admit 
that  those  old  writers  upon  Natural  Theology,  in  the  place 
which  they  assigned  to  intellectual  phenomena,  pursued  a 
more  sound  and  consistent  method  of  philosophising,  than 
the  moderns  have  done  when  speculating  upon  the  same 
subject. 


NOTE  Z.—  PAGE  80. 

OF  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  CAUSE  AND  EFFECT. 

The  argument  deduced  by  sceptical  writers  from  Mr. 
'Hume's  doctrine  respecting  causation  has  tended  to  bring 
some  discredit  upon  the  doctrine  itself,  by  raising  a  preju- 
dice against  it.  The  bad  use ,  however,  which  is  made  of  a 
sound  principle  is  not  fairly  a  matter  of  charge  against 
that  principle.  The  only  question  is  whether  or  not  the 
principle  be  just  in  itself,  and  it  cannot  be  just  if  legitimate 
reasoning  can  deduce  from  it  an  absurd  consequence. 
A  dangerous  consequence,  how  rigorously  soever  following 
from  it,would  of  course  form  no  reason  against  its  reception, 
though  it  might  justly  be  made  the  ground  of  examining 
very  narrowly  the  foundations  upon  which  the  doctrine 
itself  rested. 

Mr.  Stewart,  in  a  valuable  and  learned  note  to  the 
o  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,  »  (vol  i. ,  note  D,)  has 
brought  together  the  authorities,  which  have  all  more  or 


NOTES.  215 

less  not  only  countenanced,  but  even  forestalled  Mr.  Hume 
in  his  position— that  we  know  nothing  of  causation  except 
by  observing  a  constant  junction  between  two  events  or  two 
facts.  This  is  unquestionably  true.  We  expect  that  heat 
being  applied  to  combustible  bodies,  they  will  take  fire; 
and  that  air  being  excluded  they  will  cease  to  burn.  We 
expect  this,  because  between  the  application  of  heat  and 
the  ignition  of  the  heated  body,  between  the  exclusion  of 
air  and  the  extinction  of  the  fire,  we  have  constantly 
observed  the  relation  of  sequence — the  one  event  being 
always  followed  closely  by  the  other.  The  inference  which 
forms  the  grbund  of  this  expectation,  forms  the  ground 
of  our  belief  that  the  one  event  occasions  the  other— that 
there  is  between  the  two  a  connexion  beyond  the  mere 
relation  of  junction  and  sequence— and  that  the  one,  the 
preceding  event,  exerts  an  influence,  a  force,  a  power,  over 
the  other,  and  produces  the  other. 

This  constant  conjunction,  therefore,  in  point  of  fact,  is 
the  ground  of  our  belief,  and  is  the  origin  of  our  ideas  of 
causality  or  causation.  So  far  we  must  admit  the  doctrine 
in  question.  That  it  is  the  only  ground  of  the  belief,  and 
the  only  origin  of  the  idea,  may  admit  of  some  doubt. 
This  is  the  point  on  which  turns  the  connexion  between 
the  science  of  Natural  Theology  and  the  controversy  we 
are  now  referring  to ;  and  therefore  it  deserves  some  con- 
sideration in  the  present  note. 

1.  The  mere  constant  and  unvarying  succession  of  two 
events  would  not  of  itself  be  sufficient  to  make  us,  even  in 
popular  language,  denominate  the  one  a  cause  of  the  other. 
Light  uniformly  succeeds  dark— one  o'clock  always  follows 
twelve ;  but  no  man  ever  thought  of  calling  or  of  deeming 
night  to  be  the  cause  of  day,  or  noon  of  afternoon  '. 

"  Mr,  Stewart's  observation,  that  day  follows  night  as    much  as  night 


- 

Inothrr  and  a  very  imports 

-■-'---i  '■■  '---   22.2  22  2.  222   2  ;:_::  2-   :f:.: 
v    •    -7  2122  22  r  2.2:  -  :i:  227:  :r;  2-2  ::2_l_  :. 

•--t  22222  :i:  ^::::riN  222  22,  2-2  :;- 


2  —  '-  "--  -i   :i-  :~f    22122  :« 
-:  :•:•-  .::::  22227  2  :::•     .22,.  2: 
: .  -^  .  .-.  272  :z-  2  i  ::  .22   1:2  22  .:  .2  2227 
previoasij-  pointed  to  twebre  :  bat  it  is  reckoned  the 

2:2,  227  :,     222  .  22   22127.  -2    -_-_: 

so  it  is  also  reckoned  the  effect  of  a 

i:;::.  2222  -2:2  22.  -r.fi:  :j  2.22 
in  its  descent,  the  whole  machinery  stops. 

-  :  _:  2  -222  2.:  222  2.2.2  2  22222  :'-;r  222 
this  doable  proof —the  positrre  and  negative  romhmrd — 
2-  :~.i  2  2  12.2,  22  2.:  22:  _>_-,  2.2  -.2 : 
other,  and  that  it  ceases  when  the  other  ceases.  The  of 
2:^:^2;  .2:7  222  2:  2.:2:2~2;  :z,  -  :2  :i.-:- 

2t    22  2   -1.2-   2222:2   2:2.:.  2 

2'  2.::-  :   :2.  -27:2-2-  2-  2  ".  ::  2:. 

the  one  exerting  a  power  over  the  otter  by  an  inherent 
force;  and  this  is  the  idea  of  carnation.  Whence  do  we 

fed  that  we  hare  a  will  and  a  power — that  we  can  move  a 

i-222  .    2.:    122  22-    222    22  :  .22.    2  22  1   22.    222   22 

Tofitk».  a  change  upon  external  objects.  Now  from  thiscon- 

22-2--=2:2:2:22    22  2..    212    2  22'    22 
--:::-::_  j  .-:.-*:-   -:.-._;    2     ::  •_;  i->:  •__:.     :    "5-    -    2..:  .i  -  V  -_-.= 


NOTES.  217 

idea  and  the  relation  on  which  it  Is  founded  between  our 
own  will  and  the  change  produced,  to  the  relations  between 
events  wholly  external  to  ourselves — assuming  them  to  be 
connected,  as  we  feel  our  volition  and  our  movements  arc 
mutually  connected. 

If  it  be  said  that  this  idea  by  no  means  involves  that  of 
necessary  connexion,  nothing  can  be  more  certain.  Tho 
whole  is  a  question  of  fact — of  contingent  truth.  Just  as  the 
world  might  be  so  constituted  that  heat  applied  should  not 
ignite,  nor  air  excluded  extinguish — so  might  our  volition 
cease  to  make  our  limbs  move,  as  it  does  cease  in  paralysis. 
As  it  is,  and  because  our  will  has  hitherto  had  the  power  to 
move  our  limbs,  we  have  acquired  the  idea  of  power  am. 
of  causation,  but  if  it  had  always  been  otherwise,  and  that 
no  connexion  of  succession  had  ever  existed  between  ou: 
volition  and  our  movements,  I  do  not  see  how  the  idea  of 
power  or  causality  could  ever  have  been  obtained  by  w 
from  any  observation  of  the  sequence  of  events.  The  idee,, 
of  design  or  contrivance,  in  like  manner,  must  have  beer 
wanting  to  us ;  and  hence,  I  cannot  understand  how,  but 
for  the  consciousness  of  power ,  we  could  ever  have  been 
led  to  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  a  First  Cause.  This  is 
another,  and,  to  my  mind,  a  very  strong,  additional  reason 
for  resting  the  evidences  of  Natural  Theology  upon  the 
argument  a  posteriori  alone. 

That  they  are  greatly  in  error  who  confound,  as  has 
been  too  common,  causation  with  necessary  connexion, 
and  who  deny  the  existence  of  the  relation  of  causality 
merely  because  the  relation  is  contingent  and  not  neces- 
sary, is  sufficiently  manifest.  Our  ideas  of  power  and  of 
causation  are  solid  and  well  founded,  although  they  only 
refer  to  a  power  or  a  causation  which  may  or  may  not 
exist.  That  one  event  causes  another  may  be  a  proposition 
quite  true,  to  which  we  affix  a  precise  and  definite  mean- 


218  NOTES. 

ing,  and  which  we  have  learnt  from  observation  and  from 
consciousness,  although  the  order  of  nature  might  easily 
have  been  so  constituted  as  that  the  two  events  should 
never  have  been  found  in  sequence.  At  present  the  order  of 
nature  connects  them,  and  we  affirm  that  there  exists  the 
relation  of  cause  and  effect — a  relation  contingent,  however, 
and  not  necessary.  Of  necessary  causation  we  can  by  no 
possibility  know  any  thing;  but  causation  may  be  real 
enough  though  contingent. 


NOTE  4.— PAGE  59,  105. 

OF  THE  0  SYSTEME  DE  LA  NATURE,  »  AND  THE  HYPOTHESIS 
Of  MATERIALISM. 

There  is  no  book  of  an  atheistical  description  which  has 
ever  made  a  greater  impression  than  the  famous  Systeme 
de  la  Nature.  It  bears  the  impression  of  London,  1780, 
but  was  manifestly  printed  in  France;  also,  it  purports  to 
be  written  by  Mirabaud,  secretary  of  the  Academie  Fran- 
chise;'and  in  a  prefatory  advertisement  by  the  supposed 
editor,  who  pronounces  a  great  panegyric  upon  the  work, 
enough  appears  to  engender  doubts  of  Mirabaud  having  been 
its  author.  He  died  in  1760  ;  and  it  was  twenty  years  before 
the  work  appeared— found,  says  the  writer,  among  a  col- 
lection of  manuscripts  made  by  a  «  savant  curieux  de  ras- 
sembler  des  productions  de  ce  genre.  »  Robinet,  the  author 
of  another  work  of  similar  tendency,  called  De  la  Nature, 
has  been  at  different  times  said  to  be  its  author,  without 
any  proof,  or  indeed  probability ;  but  the  general  opinion 
now  ascribes  it  to  the  Baron  d'Holbach,  aided,  in  all  pro- 
bability, by  Diderot,   Helvelius,  and  other  members  of 


NOTES.  219 

the  freelhinking  society,  who  frequented  the  Baron's  house, 
and  who  used  to  complain  of  Voltaire's  excess  of  religious 
principle,  not  unfrequenlly  ridiculing  him  for  his  fana- 
ticism. Mirahaud,  upon  whom  this  publication  most  un- 
justifiably charges  the  book,  by  placing  his  name  in  the  title- 
page  without  any  doubt  expressed,  and  reserving  the  doubts 
for  the  preface,  was  a  man  of  unimpeachable  integrity  and 
amiable  disposition.  He  had  been  educated  in  the  College 
of  the  Jesuits,  and  afterwards  was  preceptor  to  some  bran- 
ches of  the  royal  family  ;  he  died  at  the  age  of  eighty-five, 
universally  esteemed  for  his  unblemished  character,  his 
strict  probity,  and  his  attractive  manners.  The  Diderots 
and  Grimms,  though  not  perhaps  persons  of  abandoned 
life,  were  very  far  from  attaining  such  praise  :  indeed, 
the  licentious  works  that  proceeded  from  Diderot's  pen 
attest  his  deficiency,  at  least,  in  one  branch  of  morals. 

It  is  impossible  to  deny  the  merits  of  the  Systeme  de  la 
Nature.  The  work  of  a  great  writer  it  unquestionably  is  ; 
but  its  merit  lies  in  the  extraordinary  eloquence  of  the  com- 
position, and  the  skill  with  which  words  substituted  for 
ideas,  and  assumptions  for  proofs,  are  made  to  pass  cur- 
rent, not  only  for  arguments  against  existing  beliefs,  but 
for  a  new  system  planted  in  their  stead.  As  a  piece  of  reason- 
ing, it  never  rises  above  a  set  of  plausible  sophisms — 
plausible  only  as  long  as  the  ear  of  the  reader  being  filled 
with  sounds,  his  attention  is  directed  away  from  the  sense. 
The  chief  resource  of  the  writer  is  to  take  for  granted  the 
thing  to  be  proved,  and  then  to  refer  back  to  his  assumption 
as  a  step  in  the  demonstration,  while  he  builds  various  con- 
clusions upon  it,  as  if  it  were  complete.  Then  he  declaim? 
against  a  doctrine  seen  from  one  point  of  wiew  only,  and 
erects  another  for  our  assent,  which,  besides  being  liable 
to  the  very  same  objections,  has  also  no  foundation  what- 
ever to  rest  upon.  The  grand  secret,  indeed,  of  the  author 


220  NOTES. 

goes  even  further  in  petitione  princlpii  than  this ;  for  wc 
oftentimes  find,  that  in  the  very  substitute  which  he  has 
provided  for  the  notions  of  belief  he  would  destroy,  thero 
lurks  the  very  idea  which  he  is  combating ,  and  that  his 
idol  is  our  own  faith  in  a  new  form,  but  masked  under 
different  words  and  phrases. 

The  truth  of  these  statements  we  are  now  to  examine  ; 
but  first  it  may  be  fitting  to  state  why  so  much  attention  is 
bestowed  upon  this  work.  The  reason  is,  that  its  bold  cha- 
racter has  imposed  on  multitudes  of  readers,  seducing 
eome  by  its  tone  of  confidence,  but  intimidating  others  by 
its  extreme  audacity.  It  is  the  only  x  work  of  any  conside- 
ration wherein  atheism  is  openly  avowed  and  preached — 
avowed,  indeed,  and  preached  in  terms.  (See,  particularly, 
part,  ii,  chap,  ii.)  This  effect  of  its  hardihood  was  certainly 
anticipated  by  its  author ;  for  the  supposed  editor,  in  his 
advertisement,  describes  it,  somewhat  complacently,  if  not 
boastingly,  as  «  l'ouvrage  le  plus  hardi  et  le  plus  extraor- 
dinaire que  1'esprit  humain  ait  os<5  produire  jusqu'a  pre- 
sent, m 

The  grand  object  of  the  book  being  to  show  that  there 
is  no  God,  the  author  begins  by  endeavouring  to  establish 
the  most  rigorous  materialism,  by  trying  to  show  that  there 
is  no  such  thing  as  mind — nothing  beyond  or  different 
from  the  material  world.  His.  whole  fabric  is  built  on  this 
foundation ;  and  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  in  the  history 
of  metaphysical  controversies  such  inconclusive  reasoning, 
and  such  undisguised  assumptions  of  the  matter  in  dispute 
as  this  fundamental  part  of  his  system  is  composed  of.  He 
begins  with  asserting  that  man  has  no  means  of  carrying 


1  The  treatise  of  Robinet,  De  la  Nature,  winch  ,  though  far  less  elo- 
quent and  dexterous,  is  superior  in  real  merit,  has  never  attracted  anything 
like  the  same  notice. 


NOTES.  221 

his  mind  beyond  the  visible  world ;  that  he  is  necessarily 
confined  within  its  limits ;  and  that  there  exists  nothing , 
and  there  can  exist  nothing,  beyond  the  boundary  which 
incloses  all  beings — that  is,  the  material  world.  Nature,  we 
are  told,  acts  according  to  laws,  simple,  uniform,  invaria- 
ble, which  we  discover  by  experience.  We  are  related  to 
Universal  Nature  by  our  senses,  which  alone  enable  us  to 
discover  her  secrets;  and  the  instant  we  abandon  the 
lessons  which  those  senses  teach  us,  we  plunge  into  an  abyss 
where  we  become  the  prey  of  imagination. 

Thus  the  very  first  chapter— the  opening  of  the  work — 
has  already  made  the  gratuitous  assumption  of  a  being 
whom  the  author  calls  Nature,  without  either  defining  what 
that  is,  or  how  we  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  its  existence. 
He  has  also  assumed  another  existence,  that  of  matter,  or 
the  material  world ;  and  then  he  asserts— what  is  absolutely 
contrary  to  every  day's  experience,  and  to  the  first  rudi- 
ments of  science — that  we  know,  and  can  know,  nothing 
but  what  our  senses  tell  us.  It  is  a  sufficient  answer  to  ask, 
how  we  know  anything  of  mathematical  truth?  And  in  case 
a  cavil  should  arise  upon  geometrical  science  (though  it 
would  be  but  a  cavil)  we  shall  speak  only  of  analytical;  and 
then  it  is  certain  that  the  whole  science  of  numbers,  from 
the  rules  of  elementary  arithmetic  up  to  the  highest  bran- 
ches of  the  modern  calculus,  could  by  possibility  have  been 
discovered  by  a  person  who  had  never  in  his  life  been  out 
of  a  dark  room— who  had  never  touched  any  body  but  his 
own — nay,  whose  limbs  had  all  his  life  been  so  fixed,  that 
he  had  never  exercised  even  upon  his  own  body  the  sense 
of  touch  :  indeed,  we  might  even  go  so  far  as  to  say,  who 
had  never  heard  a  sound  uttered ;  for  the  primitive  ideas 
of  number  might  by  possibility  have  suggested  themselves 
to  his  mind,  and  been  made  the  grounds  of  all  further  cal- 
culations. What  becomes  now  of  all  our  knowledge  depend- 

19 


222  NOTES. 

ing  on  the  senses?  Bud  we  need  not  go  to  so  extreme  a  case 
as  the  one  just  put  :  there  would  be  an  end  of  the  position 
we  are  dealing  with,  if  a  person  so  circumstanced  could 
have  discovered  any  one  analytical  or  common  arithmeti- 
cal truth.  Enough,  indeed,  is  knowbto  every  one,  how  mo- 
derately soever  imbued  with  mathematical  learning,  to  sa- 
tisfy him  how  little  the  intimations  received  from  the  senses 
have,  or  can  have,  to  do  with  the  whole  science  of  number 
and  quantity.  That  those  intimations  of  the  senses  are 
themselves  not  at  all  of  a  material  nature,  we  shall  pre- 
sently see. 

After  many  discussions  and  much  eloquence,  in  the 
course  of  which  various  agents  are  introduced  besides  Na- 
ture, as  Necessity,  Relation,  and  so  forth,  without  defini- 
tion of  their  qualities  or  proof  of  their  existence, — we  come 
to  the  great  demonstration  that  no  soul,  no  mind  ,  nothing 
separate  from  the  body  and  from  matter,  exists,  or  indeed 
can  exist  :  for  this  book  is  not  content  with  scepticism  ;  it 
rests  not  even  satisfied  with  disproof  :  it  affects  to  show  the 
impossibility  of  the  doctrines  which  it  combats ;  and  while 
perpetually  complaining  of  dogmas,  it  is  perhaps  the  most 
dogmatical  work  that  was  ever  written.  The  sixth  and  se- 
venth chapter,  but  the  seventh  especially,  treat  of  this  fun- 
damental doctrine — the  corner-stone  of  the  whole  building. 
The  argument  is,  in  fact,  a  mere  vague  and  unintelligible 
combination  of  words,  as  when  the  author  concludes  by 
saying, — The  result  of  the  whole  is,  that  «  the  soul,  far 
from  being  anything  distinguishable  from  the  body,  is 
only  the  body  itself  regarded  relatively  to  some  of  its  func- 
tions, or  to  some  of  the  manners  of  acting  or  of  being , 
whereof  it  is  capable  as  long  as  it  enjoys  life  »  — (n'est  que 
ce  corps  lui-m6me  envisage  relalivement  a  quelques  unesde 
ses  fonctions  ou  a  quelques  facons  d'etre  et  d'agir  dont  il 
est  susceptible  tant  qu'il  jouit  de  la  vie. )  —Or  when  he  de- 


NOTES.  233 

scribes  those  faculties  which  are  vulgarly  called  intellectual, 
as  modes  or  manners  of  being  and  of  acting,  which  result 
from  the  organization  of  the  body — (les  faculty  que  Ton 
nomme  intellectuelles  ne  sont  que  des  modes  ou  des  fagons 
d'etre  et  d'agir  resultant  de  l'organisalion  de  notre  corps.) 
— Part  i,  chap.  viii. 

But  there  is  still  more  to  be  remarked  throughout  the 
Treatise,  an  inconceivable  forgetfulness  of  the  evidence  on 
which  each  party  in  the  controversy  most  relies,  a  constant 
assumption  of  the  thing  in  question ,  and  even  an  involun- 
tary assumption  of  that  very  separate  and  spiritual  exist- 
ence which  it  is  the  author's  object  to  disprove. 

Like  all  materialists,  but  far  more  grossly  and  dogmati- 
cally than  almost  any  other,  the  author  begins  by  assuming 
that  Matter  exists,  that  we  can  have  no  doubt  whatever  of 
this,  and  that  any  other  existence  is  a  thing  to  be  proved. 
Now,  what  is  this  Matter  ?  Whence  do  we  derive  any  know- 
ledge of  it  ?  How  do  we  assure  ourselves  of  its  existence  ? 
What  evidence  at  all  have  we  respecting  either  its  being  or 
its  qualities?  We  feel,  or  taste,  or  smell  something — that 
is,  we  have  certain  sensations  which  make  us  conclude  that 
something  exists  beyond  ourselves.  It  will  not  do  to  say 
beyond  our  bodies ;  for  our  bodies  themselves  give  us  the 
same  sensations.  What  we  feel  is  something  beyond,  or  out 
of,  or  external  to ,  or  other  than  and  apart  from  ourselves 
— that  is,  from  our  minds.  Our  sensations  give  us  the  inti- 
mation of  such  existences.  But  what  are  our  sensations?  The 
feelings  or  thoughts  of  our  minds.  Then  what  we  do  is 
this  :  From  certain  ideas  in  our  minds,  produced  no  doubt 
by,  and  connected  with  our  bodily  senses,  but  independent 
of,  and  separate  from  them,  we  draw  certain  conclusions 
by  reasoning ,  and  those  conclusions  are  in  favour  of  the 
existence  of  something  other  than  our  sensations  and  our 
reasonings,  and  other  than  that  which  experiences  the  sen- 


224  NOTES. 

sations  and  makes  the  reasonings — passive  in  the  one  case 
— active  in  the  other.  That  something  is  what  we  call  Mind. 
But  plainly,  whatever  it  is,  we  owe  to  it  the  knowledge  that 
Matter  exists  :  for  that  knowledge  is  gained  by  means  of  a 
sensation  or  feeling,  followed  by  a  process  of  reasoning ;  it 
is  gained  by  the  mind  having  first  suffered  something,  and 
then  done  something,  and,  therefore,  to  say  there  is  no  such 
thing  as  Matter  would  be  a  much  less  absurd  inference 
than  to  say  there  is  no  such  thing  as  Mind.  The  very  act 
of  inferring ,  as  we  do  by  reasoning ,  that  the  object  which 
affects  our  senses  exists  apart  from  ourselves ,  is  wholly 
incapable  of  giving  us  any  knowledge  of  the  object's  exist- 
ence without ,  at  the  same  time ,  giving  us  a  knowledge 
of  our  own  —  that  is ,  of  the  Mind's  existence.  An  external 
implies  necessarily  an  internal;  that  there  maybe  anything 
beyond  or  without ,  there  must  needs  be  something  beyond 
or  without  which  it  is  said  to  exist  •  that  there  may  be  a  body 
which  we  feel  abiding  separate  from  us ,  namely ,  our  own 
body ,  one  part  of  which  gives  us  sensations  through  an- 
other part — there  must  be  a  ive,  an  us — that  is ,  a  mind. 
If,  as  the  Systeme  de  la  Nature  often  contends ,  we  have 
a  right  to  call  spirit ,  or  soul ,  or  Mind ,  a  mere  negation 
of  the  qualities  of  Matter ,  surely  this  might  just  as  well  be 
retorted  by  saying ,  that  Matter  is  only  a  negation  of  the 
qualities  of  Mind.  But ,  in  truth ,  the  materialists  cannot 
stir  one  step  without  the  aid  of  that  Mind  whose  existence 
they  deny. 

Then  what  are  those  qualities  of  Matter  they  are 
always  speaking  about?  What  but  the  effects,  or  the  power 
of  causing  those  effects  produced  by  Matter  upon  the  Mind 
through  the  senses?  A  remarkable  instance,  and  a  very 
instructive  one,  of  the  impossibility  of  a  materialist  arguing 
legitimately,  strictly,  or  consistently,  is  to  be  found  in  the 
passage  of  this  book,  where  the  argument  is  as  it  were 


NOTES.  225 

summed  up  against  the  existence  of  mind  :  «  La  maliere 
seule  peut  agir  sur  nos  sens  sans  lesquels  ii  nous  est  im- 
possible que  rien  se  fasse  connaitre  de  nous.  »  Here  the 
author,  in  order  to  deny  the  possibility  of  Mind,  or  any  thing 
else  than  Matter  having  an  existence,  uses,  in  two  lines,  ex- 
pressions, six  times  over,  all  drawn  from  the  assumption  of 
a  something  existing  separate  from  and  independent  of 
Matter.  Our — senses — which — us — known — by  us — all 
these  are  words  absolutely  without  meaning  if  there  is 
nothing  but  matter  in  existence;  and  these  are  expressions 
conveying  the  ideas  of  which  this  fundamental  proposition 
wholly  consists.  But  that  the  author  refers  to  Bishop  Ber- 
keley, as  well  as  Mr.  Locke,  it  might  have  been  supposed 
that  he  had  never  been  made  aware  of  the  controversy  upon 
the  existence  of  matter.  Indeed  the  manner  in  which  he 
mentions  the  speculations  of  Berkeley  is  quite  sufficient  to 
show  his  ignorance  of  the  nature  of  the  question,  and  re- 
minds us  forcibly  of  the  remark  made  by  D'Alembert ,  that 
whoever  had  not  at  times  doubted  the  existence  of  matter, 
might  be  assured  he  had  not  any  genius  for  metaphysical 
inquiries.  Would  any  one  believe  it  possible,  that  an  author 
who  could  dogmatically  deny  the  possibility  of  Mind  exist- 
ing in  any  form  apart  from  Matter,  should  be  so  little 
competent  to  discuss  questions  like  this,  as  to  speek  in  these 
terms  of  Berkeley?  «  Que  dirons-nous  d'un  Berkley  qui  s'ef- 
force  de  nous  prouver  que  tout  dans  ce  monde  n'est  qu'une 
illusion  chim^rique  ;  que  l'univers  entier  n'existe  que  dans 
nous-m6mes,  et  dans  notre imagination,  etc.  Pour  justifier 
des  opinions  si  monstrueuses,  »  etc. 

The  truth  is,  that  we  believe  in  the  existence  of  Matter, 
because  we  cannot  help  it.  The  inferences  of  our  reason 
from  our  sensations  impel  us  to  this  conclusion,  and  the 
steps  are  few  and  short  by  which  we  reach  it.  But  the  steps 
are  fewer  and  shorter,  and  of  the  self-same  nature,  which 

19. 


226  NOTES. 

lead  us  to  believe  in  the  existence 
have  the  evidence  within  ourselves,  and  wholly  independent 
of  our  senses.  Nor  can  we  ever  draw  the  inference  in  any 
one  instance  of  the  existence  of  matter  without  at  the  same 
time  exhibiting  a  proof  of  the  existence  of  mind ;  for  we 
are,  by  the  supposition,  reasoning,  inferring,  drawing  a 
conclusion,  forming  a  belief ;  therefore  there  exists  some- 
body, or  something,  to  reason,  to  infer,  to  conclude,  to 
believe;  that  is,  we — not  any  fraction  of  matter,  but  a 
reasoning,  inferring,  believing  being — in  other  words,  a 
Mind.  In  this  sense  the  celebrated  argument  of  Descartes — 
cogito,  ergo  sum— has  a  correct  and  a  profound  meaning. 
If,  then,  scepticism  can  have  any  place  in  our  system,  as- 
suredly it  relates  to  the  existence  of  Matter  far  more  than 
of  Mind ;  yet  the  Sysleme  de  la  Nature  is  intirely  founded 
upon  the  existence  of  Matter  being  a  self-evident  truth, 
admitting  of  no  proof,  and  standing  in  need  of  none. 

We  have  combated  the  main  body  of  the  argument  which 
runs  through  the  whole  book,  and  passed  over  some  of  the 
gross  errors,  apparently  proceeding  from  ignorance  of 
physical  science,  in  which  it  abounds.  Of  these  the  most 
notable,  no  doubt,  is  that  which  Voltaire,  in  his  Essai  sur 
le  Sysleme  de  la  Nature,  considers  (chap,  i)  as  the  founda- 
tion of  the  whole  theory  —  the  absurd  passage  respecting 
the  formation  of  eels.  Certain  it  is,  that  in  the  Second 
chapter  of  Part  I,  the  experiment  of  moistening  flour,  and 
thereby  producing  live  microscopic  insects,  is  referred  to 
as  a  proof  that  «  inanimate  matter  can  pass  into  life,  » 
«  which,  »  adds  the  book,  «  is  itself  but  the  union  of  no- 
lions.  »  No  one  indeed  can  accuse  Voltaire  of  taking  an 
unfair  advantage  when  he  relies  on  this  piece  of  extraordi- 
nary ignorance;  but  it  is  not  altogether  just  to  represent 
the  whole  book  as  resting  on  this  blunder. 

As  for  the  kind  of  comparisons  or  analogies  by  which, 


NOTES.  227 

like  all  materialists,  this  writer  tries  to  illustrate  his  hypo- 
thesis, and  by  which  many  materialists  really  are  deceived 
—the  mechanism  of  a  watch,  for  example,  consisting  of 
parts  each  separately  incapable  of  producing  any  result,  but 
altogether  forming  a  moving  instrument  that  measures  the 
efflux  of  time— nothing,  surely,  can  be  more  puerile  than 
the  attempt  to  draw  from  thence  an  argument  in  favour  of 
the  confused,  and,  when  examined  closely,  unintelligible 
position  that  Mind  is  a  modification  of  Matter,  or  the  result 
of  a  collocation  of  material  particles.  For  the  watch  is  ma- 
terial, doubtless,  both  in  its  whole  and  in  each  part  sepa- 
rately 5  the  combination  never  produces  any  effect  that  is 
not  strictly  of  a  material  kind ;  the  motions  and  the  registra- 
tion of  time  resulting  from  them  are  all  as  purely  mechanical 
as  the  form  of  each  part,  and  each  part  has  in  it  every  qua- 
lity and  incident  in  kind  which  the  whole  possesses.  The 
difference  in  the  case  of  Mind  is,  that  we  have  something 
wholly  of  a  new  and  peculiar  kind,  and  in  no  respect  re- 
sembling or  belonging  to  the  same  class  with  any  of  the 
exertions  or  operations  of  the  material  parts,  the  combi- 
nation of  which  is  alleged  by  the  materialist  to  have  given 
it  birth. 

The  first  part  having  laid  the  foundation  by  disproving 
the  existence  of  Mind,  the  second  part  of  the  «  Systeme  » 
proceeds  to  raise  upon  it  the  conclusion  that  the  Deity's 
existence  is  impossible.  This  part  is  much  more  declamatory 
than  the  former,  though  often  displaying  great  powers  of 
elocpience,  and  reminding  us  of  the  more  striking  parts  of 
Rousseau's  early  writings,  especially  his  paradoxes  against 
knowledge,  perhaps  in  a  more  choice  style,  and  with  colour- 
ing more  subdued.  But  reasoning  it  contains  absolutely 
none,  with  the  exception  of  the  Fourth  chapter,  where 
Dr.  S.  Clarke's  argument  a  priori  is  dissected  and  refuted 
— a  task,  unfortunately,  not  very  difficult  to  accomplish. 


228  NOTES. 

though  it  is  here  done  in  an  illegitimate  manner.  We  can 
not,  however,  fail  to  observe,  that  while  the  author  proposes 
to  go  through  the  arguments  of  the  various  philosophers 
who  have  maintained  the  existence  of  a  Deity;  and  while  he 
does  remark  on  Descartes,  Malebranche,  Newton  and 
Clarke  ( in  a  chapter  which  forms  by  far  the  most  argu- 
mentative part  of  his  book) ,  he  never  approaches  those 
who  have  treated  the  question  by  the  argument  a  posteriori. 
In  one  place  (chap,  vii)  he  refers  to  Final  Causes ,  but  this 
passage  only  relates  to  the  subject  of  man's  superiority  and 
the  arguments  of  the  optimists,  and  does  not  at  all  touch 
upon  the  evidences  of  design  derived  from  the  structure  of 
the  universe— the  great  foundation  of  Natural  Theology.'  It  is 
impossible  to  suppose  the  author  ignorant  of  the  argu- 
ment a  posteriori,  for  he  in  one  place  refers  to  Derham  by 
name.  The  omission  of  all  reference  to  the  most  important 
branch  of  the  subject  is  one  of  the  things  that  most  bring 
the  good  faith  of  this  writer  into  cpiestion. 

The  purpose  of  this  note  having  been  to  show  how  the 
atheistical  argument  grounded  on  materialism  fails  when 
examined  in  its  connexion  with  the  evidences  of  the  Mind's 
independent  existence,  to  pursue  further  the  Second  Part 
of  the  work  is  unnecessary.  But  a  few  remarks  are  added 
to  show  how  exactly  the  same  assumption  of  the  things  to 
be  proved  prevails  here  which  we  observed  in  the  First 
Part. 

The  first  proposition,  and  supported  at  great  length,  is 
that  all  the  ideas  which  man  has  formed  of  a  First  Cause 
have  resulted  from  the  evils  of  his  lot,  and  that  but  for 
human  suffering  a  Deity  would  never  have  been  thought  of. 
«  Inquiry  and  speculation,  »  says  the  author,  «  is  itself  an 
evil;  and  no  creature  living  easy  and  happy,  without  pain 
and  without  wants,  would  ever  give  himself  the  trouble 
and  annoyance  of  arguing  on  a  First  Cause.  But  fear  and 


NOTES.  220 

evil,  especially  pain  and  death— the  terrors  of  earthquake, 
eclipse,  tempest— the  horrors  of  death — drove  the  mind  to 
seek  out  the  source  of  all  these  dangers,  and  to  appease  or 
disarm  its  supposed  wralh;  and  thus  the  sky  was  peopled 
with  gods  and  spirits.  » 

Now,  that  the  fears  and  the  ignorance  of  men  have  heen 
the  fruitful  source  of  polytheism,  no  one  doubts ;  hut  it  is 
wholly  false  to  assert  that  genuine  and  philosophical  religion 
could  have  had  no  other  origin.  To  affirm  that,  but  for 
their  sufferings  and  fears, men  never  would  have  encountered 
the  pain  or  the  trouble  of  speculating  on  a  First  Cause,  is 
quite  contrary  to  the  most  obvious  facts.  Those  specula- 
tions, far  from  being  painful  or  troublesome,  are  gratifying 
in  the  highest  degree.  As  well  might  it  be  said  that  all  the 
pleasures  of  scientific  discovery  and  study  would  have 
been  foregone  by  all  men,  but  for  some  physical  inconve- 
nience that  drove  them  into  those  paths  of  investigation. 
Of  all  writers,  the  authors  of  the  great  improvements  in 
physical  science  are  they  who  have  been  the  least  under 
the  pressure  of  want,  and  have  gained  the  least  by  their 
labours.  But  such  speculations  are  productive  of  the  greatest 
gratification,  both  to  the  guide  who  originally  points  out 
the  way,  and  to  those  who  more  humbly  follow  in  his 
footsteps.  So  the  sublime  contemplations  of  Natural  Theo- 
logy have  engaged  men's  attention  and  exercised  their 
faculties,  wholly  independent  of  any  sufferings  they  were 
exposed  to,  or  any  fears  they  entertained  5  and  far  from 
being  a  source  of  pain,  this  study  has  ever  been  found  to 
reward  its  votaries  with  the  purest  enjoyment. 

That  the  study  and  the  knowledge  of  a  Deity  would  have 
existed  without  any  relation  to  evil  is  therefore  clear. 
Man's  curiosity — his  natural  desire  of  tracing  the  origin  of 
what  he  saw  around  him— his  anxiety  to  know  whence 
he  came,  and  whither  he  was  going,  and  how  the  frame  of 


230  NOTES. 

the  universe  was  contrived  and  sustained — would  have  led 
to  the  study  and  knowledge  of  a  Creator  without  any  such 
motives  as  this  hook  supposes. 

It  is  remarkable,  that  in  the  latter,  as  in  the  former 
portion  of  the  work,  blind  assumptions  are  not  only  always 
made,  but  an  entire  disregard  is  shown  to  the  evidence 
which  often  arises  out  of  those  very  assumptions,  and  proves 
the  truth  its  author  is  endeavouring  to  subvert.  Thus,  in 
the  Second  chapter,  he  says  :  «  Whether  the  human  race 
has  always  existed  on  this  earth,  or  that  it  is  a  recent  and 
transitory  production  of  nature....  »  Now  ,  if  it  be  a  recent 
production  of  nature,  surely  this  admits  the  creative  power 
— the  very  divinity  the  book  is  contending  against;  for  "what 
can  be  the  meaning  of  a  state  of  things ,  in  which ,  up  to  a 
certain  time  —  i.  e.  six  or  seven  thousand  years  ago  —  the 
human  species  had  no  existence ,  and  then  this  species  com- 
ing into  existence,  or,  as  the  book  says,  being  produced 
by  nature?  What  but  that  a  superintending  power,  which 
had  not  before  acted  in  this  way ,  now  for  the  first  time 
began  thus  to  act?  To  call  this  Nature  is  only  changing  the 
name  —  a  Deity  is  the  plain  and  the  true  meaning,  and 
the  only  thing  which  can  be  meant. 

Indeed,  nothing  can  be  more  absurd  and  unreflecting 
than  the  play  made  throughout  the  book  with  mere  words. 
Thus ,  in  the  same  chapter ,  it  is  asked  —  whether  a  Theo- 
logian «  can  really  be  sincere  in  believing  himself  to  have 
made  a  step  by  substituting  the  vague  words  spirit,  incor- 
poreal substance,  divinity,  etc.,  for  those  intelligible  words  » 
—  what?  what  words  so  much  less  vague  and  more  intel- 
ligible •  than  spirit?  —  «  those  intelligible  words,  matter, 
nature,  mobility,  necessity!  »  Now,  we  may  safely  ask,  if 

i  There  occurs  every  where  in  this  hook  a  vague  and  mysterious  idea  of 
a  force  or  living  power  belonging  to  Matter;  and  almost  a  deification  of 


NOTES.  231 

all  language  furnishes  two  words  more  vague  and  less  intel- 
ligible than  two  out  of  these  four  —  viz.  nature  and  neces- 
sity ?  But  we  have ,  in  truth,  already  shown  that  Matter,  as 
far  as  the  present  controversy  is  concerned  ,  offers  no  more 
precise  idea  to  our  contemplation  than  Mind  or  spirit, 
and  that  its  existence  and  qualities  rest  on  less  conclusive 
evidence  than  do  those  of  Mind.  Possibly  the  reader  of  this 
passage ,  and  especially  if  he  casts  his  eye  back  upon  the 
former  parts  of  the  argument,  may  be  inclined  to  adopt  the 
writer's  description  of  Theology ,  and  apply  it  to  the  dogma- 
tical Atheism  of  the  Systeme  de  la  Nature. 


NOTE  5.— PAGE  199. 
of  ran.   iiume's  sceptical  writings  ,  and  the  argument 

RESPECTING    PROVIDENCE. 

The  two  most  celebrated  and  most  dangerous  treatises  of 
this  great  author,  upon  religious  subjects,  are  those  in 
which  he  has  attacked  the  foundations  of  Natural  and  of 
Revealed  Religion  —  the  Essay  on  Providence  and  a 
Future  State ,  and  the  Essay  on  Miracles.  Others  of  his 

this  power,  utterly  unintelligible ;  hut  in  a  hater  of  Deity  —  a  derider  of 
all  gods  —  quite  marvellous.  The  passage  in  which  this  idea  is  most  stri- 
kingly announced  is  the  11th  chapter  of  part  ii,  where  he  is  answering  the 
position  that  theie  is  no  such  thing  as  an  Atheist  in  the  world  —  «  Si  pat 
A thee  Von  dcsigue  un  homme  qui  nierait  l'existence  d'une  Jbrce  inherent* 
ii  la  nature  et  sans  lnquelle  Ton  ne  peut  concevoir  la  Nature ,  et  si  c'est 
a  cette  force  motive  qu'on  donne  le  nnm  de  Dieu  ,  il  n'eiiste  point  d'A- 
thee  ,  et  le  mot  sous  lequel  on  les  de'signe  n'annoncerait  que  des  fons.  »  — 
Can  any  one  doubt,  that  after  rejecting  all  reasonable  and  consistent  notions 
of  a  Deity,  this  writer  had  really  made  unto  himself  other  gods,  and  Lowed 
down  before  them  ,  and  worshipped  them  ?  For  what  is  *<  the  force  inherent 
in  matter?  »  and  what  is  «  nature,  »  and  the  essence  of  nature,  or  th;,t 
thinj  «  without  which  nature  cannot  be  conceived  ?   » 


232  NOTES. 

writings  have  a  similar  tendency ,  and  more  covertly  though 
as  surely  sap  the  principles  of  religion.  But  the  two  essays  to 
which  we  have  referred  are  the  most  important  writings  of 
this  eminent  philosopher, because  they  bring  his  sceptical  opi- 
nions more  directly  to  bear  upon  the  systems  of  actual  belief. 

I.  The  argument  of  Tillotson  against  the  doctrine  of  the 
Real  Presence  is  stated  to  have  suggested  that  against  the 
truth ,  or  rather  the  possibility  of  Miracles ;  but  there  is  this 
most  material  difference  between  the  two  questions  —  that 
they  who  assert  the  Real  Presence  drive  us  to  admit  a  pro- 
position contrary  to  the  evidence  of  our  senses ,  upon  a 
subject  respecting  which  the  senses  alone  can  decide,  and 
to  admit  it  by  the  force  of  reasonings  ultimately  drawn 
from  the  senses— reasonings  far  more  likely  to  deceive  than 
they ,  because  applicable  to  a  matter  not  so  well  fitted  for 
argument  as  for  perception,  but  reasonings  at  any  rate  in- 
capable of  exceeding  the  evidence  the  senses  give.  Nothing, 
therefore,  can  be  more  conclusive  than  Tillotson's  argument 
—  that  against  the  Real  Presence  we  have  of  necessity  every 
argument,  and  of  the  selfsame  kind  with  those  which  it 
purports  to  rest  upon,  and  a  good  deal  more  besides;  for 
if  we  must  not  believe  our  senses  when  they  tell  us  that  a 
piece  of  bread  is  merely  bread ,  what  right  have  we  to  be- 
lieve those  same  senses ,  when  they  convey  to  us  the  words 
in  which  the  arguments  of  the  Fathers  are  couched ,  or  the 
quotations  from  Scripture  itself,  to  make  us  suppose  the 
bread  is  not  bread,  but  flesh?  And  as  ultimately  even  the 
testimony  of  a  witness  who  should  tell  us  that  he  had  heard 
an  apostle  or  the  Deity  himself  affirm  the  Real  Presence , 
must  resolve  itself  into  the  evidence  of  that  witness's  senses, 
what  possible  ground  can  we  have  for  believing  that  he 
heard  the  divine  affirmation ,  stronger  than  the  evidence 
which  our  own  senses  plainly  give  us  to  the  contrary  ? 

This  is  very  far  from  being  the  case  with  the  argument 


NOTES.  235 

on  Miracles.  There ,  the  evidence  for  and  the  evidence 
against  do  not  coincide  inland ,  but  take  opposite  directions. 
There,  we  have  not  to  disbelieve  indications  of  the  same 
nature  with  those  upon  which  our  belief  is  challenged.  The 
testimony  of  witnesses  is  adduced  to  prove  a  Miracle ,  or 
deviation  from  the  ordinary  laws  of  nature 5  but,  says  Mr. 
Hume ,  it  is  more  likely  that  the  witnesses  should  be  deceived 
or  should  deceive,  than  that  the  laws  of  nature  should  be 
broken  5  and  at  all  events  we  believe  testimony  only  because 
it  is  a  law  of  nature  that  men  should  tell  the  truth.  This 
may  very  possibly  be  true  ;  doubtless  it  is ,  generally  speak- 
ing, so  likely  to  be  true,  that  the  belief  of  a  miracle  is, 
and  ought  to  be,  most  difficult  to  bring  about;  but  at  least, 
it  is  not  like  the  belief  in  the  Real  Presence  :  it  does  not  at 
one  and  the  same  time  assume  the  accuracy  of  the  indica- 
tions given  by  our  senses,  and  set  that  accuracy  at  nought; 
—  it  does  not  at  once  desire  us  implicitly  to  trust ,  and 
entirely  to  disregard  the  evidence  of  testimony ,  as  the  doc- 
trine of  Transubstantiation  calls  upon  us  at  once  to  trust 
and  disregard  the  evidence  of  our  senses. 

There  are  two  answers,  however,  to  which  the  doctrine 
proposed  by  Mr.  Hume  is  exposed,  and  either  appears  suffi- 
cient to  shake  it. 

First— Ourbelief  in  the  uniformity  of  the  laws  of  nature 
rests  not  altogether  upon  our  own  experience.  We  believe 
no  man  ever  was  raised  from  the  dead — not  merely  because 
we  ourselves  never  saw  it,  for  indeed  that  would  be  a  very 
limited  ground  of  deduction ;  and  our  belief  was  fixed  on 
the  subject  long  before  we  had  any  considerable  experience 
— fixed  chiefly  by  authority — that  is ,  by  deference  to  other 
men's  experience.  We  found  our  confident  belief  in  this 
negative  position  partly,  perhaps  chiefly,  upon  the  testimony 
of  others ;  and  at  all  events ,  our  belief  that  in  limes  before 
our  own  the  same  position  held  good,  must  of  necessity  he 

20 


254  NOTES. 

drawn  from  our  trusting  the  relations  of  other  men— that 
is ,  it  depends  upon  the  evidence  of  testimony.  If,  then,  the 
existence  of  the  law  of  nature  is  proved,  in  great  part  at 
least ,  by  such  evidence ,  can  we  wholly  reject  the  like  evid- 
ence when  it  comes  to  prove  an  exception  to  the  rule — a 
deviation  from  the  law?  The  more  numerous  are  the  cases 
of  the  law  being  kept— the  more  rare  those  of  its  being 
broken — the  more  scrupulous  certainly  ought  we  to  be  in 
admitting  the  proofs  of  the  breach.  But  that  testimony  is 
capable  of  making  good  the  proof  there  seems  no  doubt.  In 
truth ,  the  degree  of  excellence  and  of  strength  to  which 
testimony  may  rise  seems  almost  indefinite.  There  is  hardly 
any  cogency  which  it  is  not  capable  by  possible  supposition 
of  attaining.  The  endless  multiplication  of  witnesses — the 
unbounded  variety  of  their  habits  of  thinking,  their  pre- 
judices, their  interests — afford  the  means  of  conceiving  the 
force  of  their  testimony  augmented  ad  infinitum }  because 
these  circumstances  afford  the  means  of  diminishing  inde- 
finitely the  chances  of  their  being  all  luistaken  ,  all  misled, 
or  all  combining  to  deceive  us.  Let  any  man  try  to  calculate 
the  chances  of  a  thousand  persons  who  come  from  different 
quarters,  and  never  saw  each  other  before,  and  who  all 
vary  in  their  habits ,  stations ,  opinions ,  interests— being 
mistaken  or  combining  to  deceive  us ,  when  they  give  the 
same  account  of  an  event  as  having  happened  before  their 
eyes — these  chances  are  many  hundreds  of  thousands  to 
one.  And  yet  we  can  conceive  them  multiplied  indefinitely  • 
for  one  hundred  thousand  such  witnesses  may  all  in  like 
manner  bear  the  same  testimony ;  and  they  may  all  tell  us 
their  story  within  twenty-four  hours  after  the  transaction  , 
and  in  the  next  parish.  And  yet,  according  to  Mr.  Hume's 
argument,  we  are  bound  to  disbelieve  them  all,  because  they 
speak  to  a  thing  contrary  to  our  own  experience ,  and  to  the 
accounts  which  other  witnesses  had  formerly  given  us  of 


NOTES.  235 

the  laws  of  nature ,  and  which  our  forefathers  had  handed 
down  to  us  as  derived  from  witnesses  who  lived  in  the  old 
time  before  them.  It  is  unnecessary  to  add  that  no  tes- 
timony of  the  witnesses  whom  we  are  supposing  to  concur 
in  their  relation  contradicts  any  testimony  of  our  own 
senses.  If  it  did ,  the  argument  would  resemble  Archbishop 
Tillotson's  upon  the  real  presence,  and  our  disbelief  would 
be  at  once  warranted  ». 

Secondly — This  leads  us  to  the  next  objection  to  which 
Mr.  Hume's  argument  is  liable,  and  which  we  have  in 
part  anticipated  while  illustrating  the  first.  He  requires 
us  to  withhold  our  belief  in  circumstances  which  would 
force  every  man  of  common  understanding  to  lend  his 
assent,  and  to  act  upon  the  supposition  of  the  story  told 
being  true.  For  suppose  either  such  numbers  of  various 
witnesses  as  we  have  spoken  of-  or,  what  is  perhaps 
stronger,  suppose  a  miracle  reported  to  us,  first  by  a 
number  of  relators,  and  then  by  three  or  four  of  the  very 
soundest  judges  and  most  incorruptibly  honest  men  we 
know  —  men  noted  for  their  difficult  belief  of  wonders  7 

«  Prophecy  is  classed  by  Mr.  Hume  under  the  same  head  with  Mira- 
cle—  every  prophecy  being  ,  he  says,  a  miracle.  This  is  not  ,  however, 
quite  correct.  A  prophecy  —  that  is  ,  the  happening  of  an  event  which  was 
foretold  —  may  be  proved  even  by  the  evidence  of  the  senses  of  the  whole 
world.  Suppose  it  had  one  thousand  years  ago  been  foretold  ,  that,  on  a 
certain  day  this  year,  one  person  of  every  family  in  the  world  should  Jig 
seized  with  a  particular  distemper,  it  is  evident  that  every  family  would  be 
at  once  certain  that  the  event  had  happened,  and  that  it  had  been  foretold. 
To  future  generations  the  fulfilment  would  no  doubt  come  within  the  des- 
cription of  a  miracle  in  all  respects.  The  truth  is  ,  that  the  event  happening 
which  was  foretold  maybe  compared  to  the  miracle;  and  Mr,  Hume's  ar- 
gument will  then  be,  not  that  there  is  any  thing  miraculous  in  the  event 
itself,  but  only  in  its  happening  after  it  had  been  foretold.  Bishop  Sherlock 
wrote  discourses  on  this  subject,  which  Dr.  Middleton  answered  :  the 
former  denying  that  prophecy  was  more  exempt  from  the  scope  ofthe  sceptic*  I 
argument  ilj^n  miracles.  On  the  whole,  however,  ildoes  seem  more  exempt. 


236  NOTES. 

and,  above  all,  steady  unbelievers  in  Miracles,  without  any 
bias  in  favour  of  religion,  but  rather  accustomed  to  doubt, 
if  not  disbelieve  —  most  people  would  lend  an  easy  belief 
to  any  Miracle  thus  vouched.  But  let  us  add  this  circum- 
stance ,  that  a  friend  on  his  death-bed  had  been  attended 
by  us,  and  that  we  had  told  him  a  fact  known  only  to  our- 
selves —  something  that  we  had  secretly  done  the  very  mo- 
ment before  we  told  it  to  the  dying  man  ,  and  which  to  no 
other  being  we  had  ever  revealed  —  and  that  the  credible 
witnesses  we  are  supposing  inform  us  that  the  deceased  ap- 
peared to  them,  conversed  with  them  ,  remained  with  them 
a  day  or  two ,  accompanying  them ,  and  to  avouch  the  fact 
of  his  reappearance  on  this  earth  ,  communicated  to  them 
the  secret  of  which  we  had  made  him  the  sole  depository 
the  moment  before  his  death ;  —  according  to  Mr.  Hume . 
we  are  bound  rather  to  believe  ,  not  only  that  those  credi- 
ble witnesses  deceive  us ,  or  that  those  sound  and  unpreju- 
diced men  were  themselves  deceived,  and  fancied  things 
Without  real  existence,  but  further,  that  they  all  hit  by 
chance  upon  the  discovery  of  a  real  secret ,  known  only  to 
ourselves  and  the  dead  man.  Mr.  Hume's  argument  re- 
quires us  to  believe  this  as  the  lesser  improbability  of  the 
two  —  as  less  unlikely  than  the  rising  of  one  from  the  dead ; 
and  yet  every  one  must  feel  convinced,  that  were  he  placed 
in  the  situation  we  have  been  figuring,  he  would  not 
only  lend  his  belief  to  the  relation,  but ,  if  the  relators  ac- 
companied it  with  a  special  warning  from  the  deceased 
person  to  avoid  a  certain  contemplated  act ,  he  would,  ac- 
ting upon  the  belief  of  their  story,  take  the  warning,  and 
avoid  doing  the  forbidden  deed.  Mr.  Hume's  argument 
makes  no  exception.  This  is  its  scope;  and  whether  he 
chooses  to  push  it  thus  far  or  no  .  all  Miracles  are  of  neces- 
sity denied  by  it ,  without  the  least  regard  to  the  kind  or 
the  quantity  of  the  proof  on  which  they  are  rested;  and  the 


NOTES.  257 

testimony  which  we  have  supposed,  accompanied  hy  the 
test  or  check  we  have  supposed ,  would  fall  within  the  grasp 
of  the  argument  just  as  much  and  as  clearly  as  any  other  Mi- 
racle avouched  by  more  ordinary  combinations  of  evidence. 

The  use  of  Mr.  Hume's  argument  is  this ,  and  it  is  an 
important  and  a  valuable  one.  It  teaches  us  to  sift  closely 
and  rigorously  the  evidence  for  miraculous  events.  It  bids 
us  remember  that  the  probabilities  are  always,  and  must 
always  be,  incomparably  greater  against  than  for  the  truth 
of  these  relations ,  because  it  is  always  far  more  likely  that 
the  testimony  should  be  mistaken  or  false ,  than  that  the 
general  laws  of  nature  should  be  suspended.  Further  than 
this  the  doctrine  cannot  in  soundness  of  reason  be  carried. 
It  does  not  go  the  length  of  proving  that  those  general  laws 
cannot,  by  the  force  of  human  testimony,  be  shown  to 
have  been,  in  a  particular  instance,  and  with  a  particular 
purpose, suspended. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  add ,  that  the  argument  here  has 
only  been  conducted  to  one  point ,  and  upon  one  ground 
—  namely,  to  refute  the  doctrine  that  a  Miracle  connot  be 
proved  by  any  evidence  of  testimony.  It  is  for  those  who 
maintain  the  truth  of  any  revelation  to  show  in  what  man- 
ner the  evidence  suffices  to  prove  the  Miracles  on  which 
that  revelation  rests.  This  treatise  is  not  directed  to  that 
object;  but  in  commenting  upon  Mr.  Hume's  celebrated 
argument ,  we  have  dealt  with  a  fundamental  objection  to 
all  Revelation ,  and  one  which ,  until  removed ,  precludes 
the  possibility  of  any  such  system  being  established. 

II.  The  Essay  on  Miracles  being  supposed  by  its  author 
sufficient  to  dispose  of  Revelation  ,  the  Essay  on  Providence 
and  a  Future  State  appears  to  have  been  aimed  as  a  blow 
equally  fatal  to  Natural  Religion.  Its  merits  are,  however  . 
of  a  very  superior  order.  There  is  nothing  of  the  sarcasm  so 
unbecoming  on  subjects  of  this  most  serious  kind ,  which 

9.O. 


238  NOTES. 

disfigures  the  concluding  portion  of  the  former  treatise. 
The  tone  is  more  philosophic ,  and  the  sceptical  character 
is  better  sustained.  There  cannot ,  indeed ,  be  said  to  pre- 
vail through  it  anything  of  a  dogmatical  spirit ,  and  cer- 
tainly we  here  meet  with  none  of  that  propensity  to  assume 
the  thing  in  question ,  to  insist  upon  propositions  as  proved 
which  have  only  been  enunciated ,  to  supply  by  sounds  the 
place  of  ideas ,  which  we  remark  in  the  «  Systeme  de  la 
Nature.  »  On  the  contrary,  the  argument,  whether  sound 
or  not ,  is  of  a  substantial  nature ;  it  is  rested  on  very 
plausible  grounds  ;  and  we  may  the  rather  conclude  that  it 
is  not  very  easily  answered ,  because ,  in  fact,  it  has  rarely, 
if  ever,  been  encountered  by  writers  on  theological  subjects. 
Nevertheless  ,  it  strikes  at  the  root  of  all  Natural  Religion, 
and  requires  a  careful  consideration. 

Mr.  Hume  does  not  deny  that  the  reasoning  from  the 
appearances  and  operations  of  nature  to  the  existence  of 
an  intelligent  cause  is  logical  and  sound ;  at  least  he  admits 
this  for  argument's  sake.  But  he  takes  this  nice  and  subtle 
distinction.  We  are  here,  he  observes,  dealing  with  an 
agent ,  an  intelligence ,  a  being ,  wholly  unlike  all  we  else- 
where see  or  hitherto  have  known  :  our  inferences ,  there- 
fore, must  be  confined  strictly  to  the  facts  from  whence 
they  are  drawn.  When  we  see  a  foot-mark  imprinted  on 
the  sand ,  we  conclude  that  a  man  has  walked  there ,  and 
that  his  other  foot  had  likewise  left  its  print,  which  the 
waves  have  effaced.  But  this  inference  is  not  drawn  from 
the  inspection  of  the  foot  alone  ;  it  comes  from  a  previous 
knowledge  of  the  human  body,  of  which  the  foot  makes  a 
part.  Had  we  never  seen  that  body,  or  any  other  that  walked 
on  feet ,  the  observation  of  the  mark  in  the  sand  could  have 
led  to  no  other  conclusion  than  that  some  body  or  thing 
bad  been  there  with  a  form  like  the  mark.  So,  when  we 


NOTES.  239 

are  entitled  to  conclude  that  a  being  exists  whoso  power 
and  skill  created  them  such  as  we  behold  them  ,  and  conse- 
quently that  this  being  is  possessed  of  skill  and  power  suf- 
ficient to  contrive  and  to  execute  those  works  —  that  is , 
those  precise  works,  and  no  more.  We  have  no  right  to 
infer  that  this  being  has  the  skill  or  the  power  to  contrive 
and  create  one  single  blade  of  grass  or  grain  of  sand  be- 
yond what  we  see.  It  follows  ,  then,  that  the  argument  a 
posteriori  only  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  a  finite  and  not 
an  infinitely  or  an  indefinitely  wise  and  powerful  Being 
exists  5  and  it  further  follows  that  we  are  left  without  any 
evidence  of  his  power  (  much  less  of  his  intention )  to  per- 
petuate our  existence  after  death  ,  as  well  as  without  any 
proof  of  the  capacity  of  the  soul  to  receive  such  a  con- 
tinuation of  being  after  its  separation  from  the  body.  This 
is  the  sum  of  the  very  ingenious ,  subtle ,  and  original  ar- 
gument of  Mr.  Hume ,  affording  a  mighty  contrast  to  the 
flimsy  sophisms  ,  the  declamatory  assertions ,  of  the  French 
writers ,  and  giving  the  Natural  Theologian ,  it  must  be 
allowed,  a  good  deal  to  answer.  We  have  stated  it  as 
strongly  as  we  could,  in  order  to  meet  it  fully;  and  it 
appears  capable  of  a  satisfactory  answer. 

The  whole  argument  a  posteriori  rests  upon  the  as- 
sumption, that  if  we  perceive  arrangements  made,  by 
means  of  which  certain  effects  are  produced,  and  if  seeing 
such  arrangements  among  the  works  of  men ,  we  should 
at  once  conclude  that  they  were  designed  to  produce  those 
effects,  we  are  entitled  to  say  thatthe  arrangements  which  we 
see  and  which  we  know  not  to  be  the  work  of  man,  are  the 
work  of  an  intelligent  cause,  contriving  them  for  the  purpose 
of  producing  the  effects  observed.  In  truth,  such  must  needs 
be  the  assumption  on  which  the  argument  rests,  because 
we  have  no  other  knowledge  of  what  design  and  contrivance 
are.  They  necessarily  bear  reference  to  our  own  nature 


240  MOTES. 

and  the  knowledge  we  have  of  our  own  minds ,  derived 
from  our  own  consciousness  and  experience ;  and  of  this 
we  have  treated  in  the  text,  Sect.  Ill  and  IV,  of  Part  I. 

If  we  found  anywhere  a  mechanism  of  any  kind ,  a 
watch  for  instance,  as  Paley  puts  the  case,  we  should  at 
once  conclude  that  some  skilful  and  intelligent  being  had 
been  there,  and  had  left  his  works  on  the  spot.  We  should 
conclude  (indeed  this  is  involved  in  the  former  inference  ) 
that  he  was  capable  of  doing  what  we  saw  he  had  done, 
and  that  he  had  intended  to  produce  a  particular  effect  by 
the  exercise  of  his  skill ;  but  we  should  also  conclude  that 
he  who  could  do  this  could  repeat  the  operation  if  he  chose, 
and  the  probability  would  be  that  his  skill  had  not  been 
confined  to  the  single  exertion  of  it  which  we  had  observed. 
There  is  nothing  peculiar  in  the  nature  of  human  work- 
manship or  of  the  human  character  to  make  us  draw  this 
conclusion.  We  arrive  at  it  just  as  we  arrive  at  the  infer- 
ence of  design  and  contrivance ;  we  believe  in  them  be- 
cause we  are  wholly  unable  to  conceive  such  an  adaptation 
without  such  an  intention ;  and  we  are  equally  unable  to 
conceive  that  any  being,  or  any  intelligence,  or  any  power, 
which  had  sufficed  to  perforin  the  operation  we  see,  should 
be  confined  to  that  single  exertion.  We  can  conceive  no 
reason  whatever  why  the  same  power  should  not  be  capable 
of  repeating  the  operation.  There  is  nothing  peculiar  — 
no  limit  —  no  sufficient  reason,  of  an  exclusive  nature, 
why  the  same  power  should  not  be  again  exercised  and 
with  the  same  result.  All  induction  proceeds  upon  similar 
grounds.  It  is  the  generalization  of  particulars;  it  is  the 
concluding  from  a  certain  limited  number  of  instances  to 
an  indefinite  number — to  any  number  unless  circum- 
stances arise  to  restrict  the  generality— to  any  number, 
where  nothing  arises  to  vary  or  limit  the  conclusion.  We 
mix  an  acid  and  alkali,  and  form  a   neutral   salt,  having 


NOTES.  241 

peculiar  properties.  We  pass  a  sun-beam  or  the  light  of  a 
candle  through  a  prism,  and  observe  the  rays  separated 
into  lights  making  certain  colours.  Why  do  we  conclude 
from  hence  that  all  the  acid  made  by  burning  sulphur,  in 
what  way  soever  the  sulphur  was  produced  or  the  com- 
bustion effected,  will  be  neutralized  by  soda  wheresoever 
produced  and  howsoever  obtained,  and  that  their  union 
will  always  make  Glauber's  salts?  Or,  that  all  light,  of  all 
kinds,  even  that  obtained  by  burning  newly-discovered 
bodies,  as  the  metal  of  potassium,  unseen,  unknown  before 
the  year  1807,  will  be  found  resolvable  into  the  seven  pri- 
mary colours?  According  to  Mr.  Hume's  argument,  we 
have  no  right  to  infer  that  any  one  portion  of  acid  or 
alkali,  save  the  one  we  have  subjected  to  our  experiments, 
or  any  light  save  that  of  the  formerly-known  combustible 
bodies,  or  rather  of  those  classes  of  them  on  which  we  had 
experimented  —  nay  of  the  individuals  of  those  classes 
which  we  have  burnt — will  produce  the  effects  we  have 
experienced  in  our  laboratory,  or  in  our  darkened  cham- 
ber. In  other  words,  according  to  this  argument,  all  ex- 
perimental knowledge  must  stand  still,  generalizing  be  at 
an  end,  and  philosophers  be  content  never  to  make  a  sin- 
gle step,  or  draw  one  conslusion  beyond  the  mere  facts  ob- 
served by  them  :  in  a  word,  Inductive  Science  must  be  turned 
from  a  process  of  general  reasoning  upon  particular  facts  , 
into  a  bare  dry  record  of  those  particular  facts  themselves. 
If,  indeed,  it  be  said  that  we  never  can  be  so  certain  of 
the  things  we  infer  as  we  are  of  those  we  have  observed , 
and  on  which  our  inference  is  grounded,  we  may  admit 
this  to  be  true.  But  no  one  therefore  denies  the  value  of  the 
science  which  is  composed  of  the  inferences.  So  we  cannot 
be  so  well  assured  of  the  Deity's  power  to  repeat  and  to 
vary  and  to  extend  his  operations,  as  we  are  of  his  having 
created  what  we  actually  observe  ;  and  yet  our  assurance 


242  NOTES. 

may  be  quite  sufficient  to  merit  entire  confidence.  Nor  will 
any  student  of  Natural  Theology  complain  if  the  only  re- 
sult of  the  argument  we  are  combating  be  to  place  the 
higher  truths  of  the  science  but  a  very  little  lower  in  point 
of  proof  than  the  inferences  of  design  in  the  works  actually 
examined.  The  self-same  difference  is  to  be  found  in  the  in- 
ferences composing  the  other  branches  of  inductive  science, 
and  it  in  no  perceptible  degree  lessens  our  confidence  in 
the  inductive  method. 

It  has  oftentimes  been  asked ,  why  we  believe  that  the 
same  result  will  happen  from  the  same  cause  acting  in  the 
like  circumstances— the  foundation  of  all  induction  ;  and  no 
answer  has  ever  been  given  except  that  we  cannot  help  so 
believing — that  the  condition  of  our  being — the  nature  of 
our  minds — compels  us  so  to  believe ;  and  we  take  this  as 
an  ultimate  fact  incapable  of  being  resolved  into  any  fact 
more  general.  Can  we  help  believing  that  a  being  capable 
of  creating  what  we  see  and  examine ,  is  also  capable  of 
exercising  other  acts  of  skill  and  power?  Can  we  avoid 
believing  that  the  same  power  which  made  all  the  animals 
and  vegetables  on  our  globe  suffices  to  people  and  provide 
other  worlds  in  like  manner?  Again,  can  we  by  any  effort 
bring  our  minds  to  suppose  that  this  being's  whole  skill  and 
power  were  exhausted  by  one  effort ,  and  that  having  suf- 
ficed to  create  the  universe,  it  ceases  to  be  effective  for  any 
other  purpose  whatever?  The  answer  is,  that  we  cannot — 
that  we  can  as  soon  believe  in  the  sun  not  rising  to-morrow, 
or  in  hislight  ceasing  to  be  differently  refrangible. 

Much  is  said  in  the  course  of  arguments  like  the  present 
of  the  word  «  infinite.  »  Whether  or  not  we  are  able  to 
form  any  precise  of  that  which  has  no  bounds  in  power 
or  in  duration  may  be  another  question.  But  when  we  see 
such  stupendous  exertions  of  power  ,  upon  a  scale  so  vast 
as  far  to  pass  all  our  faculties  of  comprehension ,  and  with 


NOTES.  243 

a  minuteness  at  the  same  time  so  absolute  ,  that  as  we  can 
on  the  one  hand  perceive  nothing  beyond  its  grasp,  so  we 
are  on  the  other  hand  unable  to  find  anything  too  minute 
to  escape  its  notice,  we  are  irresistibly  led  to  conclude  that 
there  is  nothing  above  or  below  such  an  agent,  and  that 
nothing  which  we  can  conceive  is  impossible  for  such  an 
intelligence.  The  argument  of  Mr.  Hume  supposes  or  admits 
that  the  whole  universe  is  its  work  ,  and  that  animal  life 
is  its  creation.  We  can  no  more  avoid  believing  that  the 
same  power  which  created  the  universe  can  sustain  it — that 
the  same  power  which  created  our  souls  can  prolong  their 
existence  after  death— than  we  can  avoid  believing  that 
the  power  which  sustained  the  universe  up  to  the  instant 
we  are  speaking ,  is  able  to  continue  it  in  being  for  a  thou- 
sand years  to  come.  But  indeed  Mr.  Hume's  argument 
would  go  the  length  of  making  us  disbelieve  that  the  Deity 
has  the  power  of  continuing  the  existence  of  the  creation 
for  a  day.  We  are  only  entitled,  according  to  this  argu- 
ment ,  to  conclude  that  the  Deity  had  the  power  of  working 
the  works  we  have  seen  and  no  more.  Last  spring  and  au- 
tumn we  observed  the  powers  of  nature  in  vegetation ,  that 
is,  we  noted  the  operations  of  the  Deity  in  that  portion  of 
his  works ,  and  were  entitled ,  Mr.  Hume  admits ,  to  infer 
that  he  had  the  skill  and  the  power  to  produce  that  harvest 
from  that  seed  time ,  but  no  more.  We  had  ,  says  the  ar- 
gument, no  right  whatever  to  infer  that  the  Deity's  power 
extended  to  another  revolution  of  the  seasons.  The  argu- 
ment is  this,  or  it  is  nothing.  Confining  its  scope,  as 
Mr.  Hume  would  confine  it ,  to  the  universe  as  a  whole , 
and  excluding  all  inferences  as  to  a  future  state  or  other 
worlds ,  is  wholly  gratuitous.  The  argument  applies  to  all 
that  we  have  seen  of  the  already  past  and  the  actually  exe- 
cuted in  this  universe,  and  excludes  all  respecting  this 
same  universe  which  is  yet  to  come  ;  consequently  if  it  be 


244  NOTES. 

good  for  anything ,  it  is  sufficient  to  prove  that ,  although 
our  experience  may  authorise  us  to  conclude  that  the  Deity 
has  skill  and  power  sufficient  to  maintain  the  world  in  its 
present  state  up  to  this  hour ,  yet  that  experience  is  wholly 
insufficient  to  prove  that  he  has  either  skill  or  power  to 
continue  its  existence  a  moment  longer.  Every  one  of 
the  topics  applied  by  him  to  a  Future  State  applies  to  this. 
If  we  have  no  right  to  believe  that  one  exertion  of  skill 
proves  the  author  of  nature  adequate  to  another  exertion 
of  a  kind  no  more  difficult  and  only  a  little  varied ,  we  can 
have  no  right  to  believe  that  one  exertion  of  skill  proves 
him  adequate  to  a  repetition  of  the  same  identical  opera- 
tion. Now  no  man  living  carries  or  can  carry  his  disbelief 
so  far  as  this.  Indeed  such  doubts  would  not  only  shake  all 
inductive  science  to  pieces  ,  but  would  put  a  stop  to  the 
whole  business  of  life.  And  assuredly  we  may  be  well  con- 
tented to  rest  the  truths  of  Natural  Theology  on  the  same 
foundation  upon  which  those  of  all  the  other  sciences ,  as 
well  as  the  practical  conduct  of  all  human  affairs ,  must 
for  ever  repose. 


NOTE  6.— PAGE  94. 

OF  THE  ANCIENT  DOCTRINES  RESPECTING  MIND. 

The  opinions  of  the  ancient  philosophers  upon  the  nature 
of  the  Soul  were  not  very  consistent  with  themselves ;  and 
in  some  respects  were  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  doctrine 
of  its  immateriality  which  most  of  them  maintained.  It 
may  suffice  to  mention  a  few  of  those  theories. 

Plato  and  his  pupil  Aristotle  may  certainly  be  said  to 
have  held  the  Soul's  immateriality;  at  least,  they  main- 


NOTES.  245 

tained  that  it  was  of  nature  wholly  different  from  the 
body;  and  they  appear  often  to  hold  that  it  was  unlike 
all  matter  whatever,  and  a  substance  or  existence  of  a 
nature  quite  peculiar  to  itself.  Their  language  is  nearly 
the  same  upon  this  subject.  Plato  speaks  of  the  mix  x^y.xza 
x.cu  vojr/jtr — a  bodiless  or  incorporeal  and  intelligent 
being ;  and  of  such  existences  he  says ,  in  one  place ,  zx 
atrooy.xzx  xxlli^zx  o-jzx  xxi  /Kyiczx  leyta  fiovev  ,  a/v  co  de  ow&vi  caoco? 
*Dttwwtt— «  Things  incorporeal  being  the  most  excellent 
and  the  greatest  of  all,  are  made  manifest  by  reason 
alone,  and  no  otherwise.  »  (Politicus. )  So  again  in  the 
Cratilus,  he  derives  cco/jk  from  au^aQxi,  and  represents 
the  body  as  a  prison  of  the  soul,  a/.c-jx  fctT/j.czyfACj  u-jxi  cw  r>;; 
ipvyXi  x<jzo  =w?  y,v  zx  cvulc/j.rjx  zo  cojux  ,  following  herein  the 
doctrine  said  to  have  been  delivered  by  Orpheus.  Aristotle, 
too,  speaks  of  a  being  separable  and  separated  from  things 
perceivable  by  the  senses  —  c'jtlx  yjufAszy  y.xt  y.iycxifAc/j.tvy}  tcov 
uitjQyzoiv.  Nevertheless,  these  philosophers  frequently  speak 
of  the  soul  as  being  always,  and  as  it  were  necessarily, 
connected  with  matter  of  some  kind  or  other— xu  fjy-q 
(iziz-zx-jtj.i'j-fi  cco//.a-;  zoz-  fJLiv  x)loi,  tots  tft  */).«.  The  SOU  I  is 
always  annexed  to  a  body,  sometimes  to  one  and  some- 
times to  another,  —  De  Legg.  x.  Thus  Aristotle  {De 
Gener.  Anim.  ii.  4.),  y  yeta  fj/y  mix  go>/j.xzos  zvjo^  iszi  — 
the  soul  is  the  substance  of  some  kind  of  body.  And  in 
the  treatise  De  Anima,  ii.  2,  he  says  —  jau  dka  zpjzo  x«).w; 
imo),x{x.fixvc'J7L'j  ct  c.  dW  i  fr.yz:  x-jiu  coj/j-xzo^  uvxi  juyz;  cw/j.x  z:  tyr/y, , 
G(a[j.x  /j.-v  yxp  cvx  cszc,  7(a/j.xzcc  £  zi —  «  Those  therefore 
rightly  hold  who  think  that  the  soul  cannst  exist  without 
the  body,  and  yet  that  it  is  not  body :  it  is  not  the  body, 
but  somewhat  of  the  body. » 

This  corporeal  connexion  is  stated  by  Plutarch,  in  the 
Qucest.  Platon.,  still  more  plainly  to  have  been  the  Pla- 
tonic  doctrine — fpuyv,v  icpt<rj&jT=6:v  zcj  uoifj.xzo:,  xlziv.-j  xt  z\z 


248  NOTES. 

txitvau  */;v.:ff.;co;  xxi  xpyyv  cux  x  yivioGxi  <pvyyj  «v.u  aoifuxTCff  eutlV 
voti-j  av;'j  tyr/yiz,  x)lx  <pryyv /j.iv  c-v  (jOi[xxTt ,  veuv c^  fVTij  i/"^1?-  ft  TVJe 
jow/  w  ofcfer  than  the  body,  and  the  cause  and  origin 
of  its  existence  :  not  that  the  soul  exists  without  the 
body,  or  the  understanding  without  the  soul;  but  that  the 
soul  is  in  the  body,  and  the  understanding  in  the  soul. » 

According  to  these  representations  and  quotations  taken 
together,  Plato  held  the  soul  to  be  an  immaterial  substance, 
separable  from  any  given  body,  but  incapable  of  existing 
without  some  body  or  other,  and  the  mind  or  understand- 
ing to  be  a  part  of  the  soul.  The  residue  of  the  soul  was  , 
as  we  shall  afterwards  see,  its  sensitive  or  moral  portion. 

The  idea  of  motion  seems  to  have  been  intimately  con- 
nected in  their  views  with  mind  or  spirit,  and  in  so  far 
their  doctrines  approach  those ,  if  we  can  call  them  doc- 
trines, of  the  modern  atheists  (See  Note  4.)— zo  Uuzo  xivuv 
(says  Plato),  ptjff  loyc-j  iyjw  t>jv  ocunipi  oii7tocv  yx~:p  tcjvo/j.x  o  o1-: 
»r«vTss  kryyp  it/Mffeeyoppjofiru ;  ftfurji  —  You  say  that  the 
substance  (or  being)  to  which  we  all  give  the  name  of 
soul,  has  for  its  definition  «  that  which  moves  itself?  » 
I  certainly  do  say  so. — De  Legg.  x. 

Rut  the  same  philosophers  also  held  the  soul  to  be  an 
emanation  from  the  Deity,  and  that  each  individual  soul 
was  a  portion  of  the  Divine  Essence,  or  Spirit  :  conse- 
quently, they  could  not  mean  to  assert  that  the  divine 
essence  was  inseparable  from  matter  of  some  kind,  but 
only  those  portions  of  thatessence'which  they  represented  to 
be  severed,  and  as  it  were  torn  off  from  the  divine  mind  — 

TJVX'fl WTO)  £;'0>,  XX-  XVZCV/J.Opt.X  0V71X  XXI  XirC7TVX7fJjXTX. —  (  Epict.) 

Plutarch,  in  the  work  already  cited,  says  —  y  cl\  fijyj  em 
ipyc-j  taxi  [J.S-J0-J  x)lx  xxi  fx-poi'  eucP'  on  xuzcv  a//'  cir  x'jtco,  xxi  ;; 
muwu,  yr/ovrj—  «  The  soul  is  not  only  his  work,  but  a 
part  of  himself ;  it  was  not  created  by  him  but  from  him 
and  out  of  him .  » 


NOTES.  247 

NOTE  7.  —  PAGE  94. 


OF  THE  ANCIENT  DOCTRINES  RESPECTING  THE  OEITY    AND 
MATTER. 

The  notions  of  the  Supreme  Being  entertained  by  the 
ancient  philosophers  were  more  simple  and  consistent  than 
their  theory  of  the  soul  ;  and  but  for  the  belief,  which 
they  never  shook  off,  in  the  eternity  of  matter,  would  very 
nearly  have  coincided  with  our  own.  They  give  him  the 
very  same  names,  and  clothe  him  apparently  in  the  like 
attributes.  He  is  not  only  xGx-jxzcs  ,  xf$xpzoq ,  ocjothQ poq  — 
immortal,  incorruptible ,  indestructible  —  but  aywjres, 
aureyc-wj;,  aj-ofuva ,  aorfkncoaraxoc, —  uncreated,  self-made, 
self-originating,  self-existing.  Zwcv  iraeav  tyo-j  [/.xxxfAorrj-x 
fjLzT  uvQxpaixi,  says  Epicurus  —  v.  A  Being  having  all  hap- 
piness, with  an  incorruptible  nature.  »  Again,  he  is 
Tc<xvToxpxTo>p,  izxy/.pxzY^ — omnipotent,  all-powerful ;  dl/vocrai 
yxp  xkx-jtx,  says  Homer  {Odyss.%)  —  v.  He  has  power 
over  all  things.  »  The  creative  power  is  also  in  words  at 
least  ascribed  to  him  — xotr/Micotyniis,  fy/uat/r/os  —  the  maker 
of  the  world,  the  great  artificer.  Aristotle,  too,  in  a  very 
remarkable  passage  of  the  Metaphysics,  says  that  God  seems 
to  be  the  cause  of  all  things,  and,  as  it  were,  a  beginning, 
or  principle  —  ®ioe  tfoxu  zo  xtziov  kxgvj  avxi  xxt  xpyy  xie,  : 
and,  indeed,  by  implication,  this  is  ascribed  in  the  terms 
uncreated,  self-created,  and  self-existing ;  for  in  sound- 
ness of  reason  the  being  who  had  no  creator ,  and  much 
more  the  being  who  created  himself  (if  we  can  conceive 
such  an  idea),  must  have  created  all  things  else.  Never- 
theless, such  was  certainly  not  so  plain  an  inference  of 
reasoning  with  the  ancients;  for  whether  it  be  that  by 
taxomnjS  and  oeyreyjvjjs  5  the  only  meant  to  convey  the  idea  of 


248  NOTES. 

xyivy-ez— of  a  being  uncreated  and  existing  from  all  eternity 
—  or  that  they  took  some  nice  distinction ,  to  us  incompre- 
hensible, between  self-creation  and  the  creation  of  other 
beings  or  things  —  certain  it  is,  that  the  same  philosophers 
who  so  described  the  Deity  clung  to  the  notion  of  matter 
being  also  eternal,  and  co-existent  with  the  supreme  power, 
and  that  by  creator  and  artificer  they  rather  seem  to  have 
meant  the  arranger  of  atoms  —  the  power  giving  form  to 
chaotic  matter,  than  the  power  calling  things  into  existence. 
They  appear  to  have  been  all  pressed  by  the  difficulty  (and 
who  shall  deny  it?)  of  conceiving  the  act  of  creation— the 
act  of  calling  existences  out  of  nothing.  Accordingly,  the 
maxim  which  generally  prevailed  among  most  of  the  Greek 
sects,  and  which  led  to  very  serious  and  even  practical  con- 
sequences in  their  systems,  was  cuslb  vx  tou  py  ovrej  (or  sx 
ew£ye<r)  ytmuBeu  —  that  nothing  is  made  of  what  has  no 
existence,  or  of  nothing.  Aristotle  represents  this  as  the 
common  opinion  of  all  natural  philosophers  before  him  — 
xennpj  obcf/jv  r»«  f tn-ucuv.  He  says,  in  another  passage  (De 
Ccelo,  iii.  I. )  —  01  fjuv  corcov  {tcpvzipov  fd,c7ovy?xvT:i)  caiitlov 
o\(ti<j  yiv-aiv  xxia>9;puv'  cjc^v  yxp  out;  yiyj;<7$xi  oxzlv  &jt-  &$up;(7&xi 
rcov  ovrcoy  —  «  Some  of  those  ( older  philosophers  )  took 
away  (or  abolished)  all  generation  and  destruction,  for 
they  hold  that  none  of  the  things  which  exist  are  either 
created  or  destroyed.  »  Nevertheless,  it  cannot  be  doubted 
that  the  Platonic  doctrine  was  of  the  same  kind,  and 
that  Aristotle,  in  truth,  ascribed  only  a  qualified  creative 
power  to  the  Deity.  Plutarch's  statement  of  the  Platonic 
doctrine  is  precise  to  this  point.  —  j3-)xiov  wj  Tllxzwji 
v:;r.$s/JLrjovi  rev  //.;v  xcv/j.cv  wro  6;ou  y;ycv;vxi  hyuv  xxi  ac/W  oy.-v 
yxp  xx>lt?zoz  rcov  yr/cyjrcov,  oefe  xptczo^  rcov  xizmv'  mp  <?;  o'Jtrtxv 
s.ut  j/ijv  i\  5j^  y-yevcv  ,  eu  ygvajnempi^  «).).«  VKCxujj.iVV]V  an  Tto 
fy/juovpyy ,  u$  &ix6;giv  xxt  rx'i-cj  OQJTJflS  >M  tcpou  xmzov  ^ojj.oi(a<n-j  , 
co?  dtv««v  >jv  nxpxzyycj   em  yxp  ex  wj  y.)j  <5vrc;  youciq  a),)i   zx  rou 


NOTES.  249 

M  xa/w?,  fj.ni^  emmf  tycvzoc,  co?  oixix^  xxi  ipsmov,  xxi  xvfyutvns 
—  a  Better  then  be  convinced  by  Plato,  and  say  and 
sing  that  the  world  was  made  by  God;  for  the  world 
is  the  most  excellent  of  all  created  things,  and  he  the 
best  of  all  causes.  But  the  substance  or  matter  (litteraly 
timber)  of  which  he  made  it,  was   not  created,  but 
always  lay  ready  for  the  artificer,  to  be  arranged  and 
ordered  by  him ;  for  the  creation  was  not  out  of  nothing, 
but  out  of  what  had  been  without  form  and  unfit,  as 
a  house,  or  a  garment,  or  a  statue  are  made.  »  And 
thus  it  seems  that  when  Maker  or  Creator  is  used  by  the 
Academics ,  we  are  rather  to  regard  them   as  meaning 
Maker  in  the  sense  in  which  an  artificer  is  said  to  make  or 
fabricate  the  object  of  his  art.  Eawnjarfti  (says  Aristotle)  cov 
-o-j'h  row  xssy/.cv  i%  xirxexg  rqs  Jlx$ — He  made  the  world  of 
all  kinds  of  matter. — DeAn.  Mund.  Indeed,  I  can  in  no 
other  way  understand  that  very  obscure,  and  but  for  some 
such  gloss,  contradictory  passage  of  Aristotle,  in  the  first 
book  of  the  Physics,  where  he  is  giving  his  own  doctrine 
in  opposition  to  the  tenets  of  the  elders  philosophers  on  this 
point  —  H/xug  c/V  xxi  x'jzot  &x/y.cV  yiyiaQxi  ftiv  soefa)  anrAcos"  ex  tov 
l>:t\  cvtcs,  W//-C05  //.ivrct  yiyv-cOxi  ex  fj.yj  cvrog  cne  xxtx  tm/jifiefiyxos' 
ex  yxp  th$  vTzprpitazoitj-L  xxtf  xvzo  //.vj  cv,  cvx  wrcxpyovrcc,  yiyverxt 
zi.  6xv/j.x^czxt  cP;  zovro  xxt  adiivarev  eurto  cToxa  yiyv:c$xi  it  ex  Toy  /*jj 
ovcos —  «  We  ourselves  however  say  that  nothing  is 
absolutely  (or  merely)  produced  from  what  has   no 
existence,  yet  that  something  is  produced  from  that 
which  has  no  existence  as  far  as  regards  accident  (or 
accessory  qualities ) ;  for  someting  is  produced  from 
privation,   which  has  no  existence  in  itself,  and  not 
from  anything  inherent. But  this  is  wonderful,  and  seems 
impossible,  that  something  should  be  produced  out  of 
that  which  has  no  existence.  *  —  (Phys.  i.  8.)  Indeed 
he  had  said  in  the  same  treatise,  just  before  ,  that  all  con- 


250  NOTES. 

fessed  it  impossible  and  inconceivable  that  any  being  could 
either  be  created  out  of  nothing,  or  be  utterly  destroyed 
—  ex  to\>  ay  o-j-ci  ytvseQxi  tot-  oj  ;%olh79xi  ocvywziv  /.xi  «pp^xrov' 
(Ib.i.5.) 

Upon  the  uncreated  nature  of  things  —  for  the  doctrine 
extended  to  mind  as  well  as  to  matter  —  the  ancient  philo- 
sophers founded  another  tenet  of  great  importance.  Matter 
and  soul  were  reckoned  not  only  uncreated,  but  indestruc- 
tible ;  their  existence  was  eternal  in  every  sense  of  the 
word,  without  end  as  without  beginning  :  py&v  <x  tou  //.yj 
evws  yw-ffSxt,  /sujtfc  as  to  /jlyj  ov  vbuptcQxt  —  o  ]\othlng  can  be 
produced  out  of  that  which  has  no  existence,  nor  can 
any  thing  be  reduced  to  nonentity.  »  Such  is  Diogenes 
Laerlius's  account  of  Deinocritus's  doctrine  or  the  Atomic 
principle, 

«  Principium  hinc  cujus  nobis  exordia  sumet, 
Nullam  rem  e  nihilo  gignidiviukus  unquam  »  — 

«  Hue  occedit  uti  quidtiue  in  sua  corpora  rursum 

Dissolvat  natura  ,  npque  ad  niliilum  intereunt  res  u  — 

«  Baud  iqitur  redit  ad  nihilum  res  ulla  ,  sed  omnes 
Discidio  redeunt  in  corpora  materia;  »  — 

are  the  expressions  of  Lucretius,  in  giving  an  account  of 
the  Epicurean  Philosophy  (i.  151,  217,  249),  or  as  Persius 
more  shortly  expresses  it, 

«  De  nihilo  nihil ,  in  nihilum  nil  posse  reverti.  »  —  Sat.  iii.  84. 

Ant  it  must  be  admitted  that  they  reasoned  with  great 
consistency  in  this  respect ;  for  if  the  difficulty  of  com- 
prehending the  act  of  creation  out  of  nothing  was  a 
sufficient  ground  for  holding  all  things  to  be  eternal  a 
parte  ante — the  equal  difficulty  comprehending  the  act 
of  annihilation  was  as  good  a  ground  for  believing  in  their 
eternity  a  parte  post  —  there  being  manifestly  just  as 
much  difficulty,  and  of  the  same  kind,  in  comprehending 


NOTES.  251 

how  a  being  can  cease  to  exist,  as  how  it  can  come  into 
existence. 

From  this  doctrine  mainly  it  is  that  the  Greek  philoso- 
phers derive  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  as  far  as  the 
metaphysical  and  more  subtle  arguments  for  their  belief 
go  j  and  accordingly  its  pre-existence  is  a  part  of  their 
faith  as  much  as  its  future  life ,  the  eternity  ab  ante  being 
as  much  considered  as  the  eternity  post.  Thus  Plato  says 
that  «  our  soul  was  somewhere  before  it  existed  in  the 
human  form,  as  also  it  seems  to  be  immortal  afterwards* 
—  Jjv  km  IJ//.WV  i\  fpuy-/;  xptv  £V  rcoJV  tco  avfycojttvco  ;rJu  '/:v:<j$ca , 
coff-i    y.at    rxjzy   a£avarcv  zi   lci/.-v  >j  rpuyy  uvea.  —  (Phced.) 
Nevertheless,  it  must   be  admitted  that  their  doctrine  of 
future  existence  is  most  unsatisfactory  as  far  as  it  is  thus 
derived,  that  is,  their  psychological  argument  :  and  for  two 
reasons— first,  because  it  is  coupled  with  the  tenet  of  pre- 
existence,  and  having  no  kind  of  evidence  of  that  from  rea- 
soning, we  not  only  are  prone  to  reject  it,  but  are  driven 
to  suppose  that  our  future  existence  will  in  like  manner  be 
severed  by  want  of  recollection  from  all  consideration  of 
personal  identity  j  secondly,  because  ,  according  to   the 
doctrine  of  the  soul  being  an  emanation  from  the  Deity,  its 
future  state  implies  a  return  to  the  divine  essence,  and  a 
confusion  with  or  absorption  in  that  supreme  intelligence, 
and  consequently  an  extinction  of  individual  existence  :  a 
doctrine    which   was  accordingly   held  by   some  of  the 
metaphysical  philosophers  who  maintained  a  Future  State. 
In  one  important  particular  there  was  an  entire  differ- 
ence of  opinion  among  the  ancient  philosophers  —in  truth, 
so  important  a  difference ,  that  those  were  held  not  to  be 
theists,  but  atheists,  who  maintained  one  side  of  the  argu- 
ment—I  mean  as  to   Providence.  The  Atomists  and  Epi- 
cureans held  that  there  were  Gods,  and  upon  the  subject  of 
creative  power  they  did  not  materially  differ  from  those 


252  NOTES. 

generally  called  theists ;  but  they  denied  that  these  Gods 
ever  interfered  in  the  affairs  of  the  universe.  The  language 
of  Plato  and  the  other  theists  upon  this  subject  is  very 
strong.  They  regard  such  a  doctrine  as  one  of  the  three 
kinds  of  blasphemy  or  sacrilege ;  and  in  the  Republic  of 
that  philosopher,  all  the  three  crimes  are  made  equally 
punishable  with  death.  The  first  species  is  denying  the 
existence  of  a  Deity,  or  of  Gods  —  zo  o\-  dhtzipovj  evrao-  (0;cj;) 
<?j  fpavrigmi  avfycojrev.  «  The  second,  admitting  their  exist- 
ence, but  denying  that  they  care  fore  man.  »  The  third 
kind  of  blasphemy  was  that  of  men  attempting  to  propitiate 
the  Gods  towards  criminal  conduct,  as  &$ovci  and  ochxyjuxzx, 
slaughters  and  outrages  upon  justice ,  «  by  prayers, 
thanksgivings,  and  sacrifices  —  thus  making  those  pure 
beings  the  accomplices  of  their  crimes,  by  sharing  with 
them  a  small  portion  of  the  spoil,  as  the  wolves  do  with 
the  dogs.  »  —  De  Legg.  x.  l 


'  Who  can  read  these ,  and  such  passages  as  these,  without  wishing  that 
some  who  call  themselves  Christians,  some  Christian  Principalities  and 
Powers,  had  taken  a  lesson  from  the  heathen  sage  ,  and  (  if  their  nature 
forbade  them  to  abstain  from  massacres  and  injustice  )  at  least  had  not 
committed  the  scandalous  impiety,  as  he  calls  it,  of  singing  in  places  of 
Christian  worship  ,  and  for  the  accomplishment  of  their  enormous  crimes  , 
Te  Deums. ,  which  in  Plato's  Republic  would  have  been  punished  as 
blasphemy  ?  Who  ,  indeed,  can  refrain  from  lamenting  another  pernicious 
kind  of  sacrilege  (  an  anthropomorphism  )  yet  more  frequent  —  that  of 
making  Christian  temples  resound  with  prayers  for  victory  over  our  ene- 
mies,  and  thanksgiving  for  their  defeat?  Assuredly  such  a  ritual  as  this  is 
not  taken  from  the  New  Testament. 


NOTES.  253 

NOTE  8.  —  PAGE  127. 


OF  THE  ANCIENT  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  IMMORTALITY  OF  THE 
SOUL. 

That  the  ancient  philosophers  fort  the  most  part  be- 
lieved in  the  Future  Existence  of  the  Soul  after  death  is 
undeniable.  It  is  equally  certain  that  their  opinions  upon 
this  important  subject  varied  exceedingly,  and  that  the 
kind  of  immortality  admitted  by  one  class  can  hardly  be 
allowed  to  deserve  the  name.  Thus  they  who  considered  it 
as  a  portion  of  the  Divine  essence  severed  for  a  time,  in 
order  to  be  united  with  a  perishable  body,  believed  in  a 
future  existence  without  memory  or  consciousness  of  per- 
sonal identity,  and  merely  as  a  reuniting  of  it  with  the 
Divine  mind.  Such,  however,  was  not  the  belief  of  the  more 
pure  and  enlightened  theists,  and  to  their  opinion,  as  ap- 
proaching nearest  our  own,  it  is  proposed  to  confine  the 
present  notice. 

In  one  respect,  even  the  most  philosophical  of  those 
theories  differed  widely  from  the  Christian  faith ,  and 
indeed  departed  almost  as  widely  from  the  intimations  of 
sound  reason.  They  all  believed  in  the  soul's  pre-existence. 
This  is  expressly  given  as  proved  by  facts,  and  as  one  ar- 
gument for  immortality  or  future  existence ,  by  Plato  in 
the  most  elaborate  treatise  which  remains  upon  the  subject, 
the  Phccdo.  He  considers  that  all  learning  is  only  recollec- 
tion. t>jv  /y.x$y<nv  x-ix^vrpw  avxi ,  and  seems  to  think  it  incon- 
ceivable that  any  idea  could  ever  come  into  the  mind,  of 
which  the  rudiments  had  not  formerly  been  implanted  there. 
In  the  Timceus  and  other  writings  the  same  doctrine  is 
further  expounded.  Hv  %vj  yjj.cvj,  jj  ^vyy  KfAV  <rv  tco  <fc  rco 
ctv$/0(x>izivo>  idiit  yiv.G&ou,  w?t=  ym  rccury  xQxvktov  zt  toiy.-v  vj  tyvyy 


254  NOTES. 

nvou  «  Our  soul  existed  somewhere  before  It  was  produ- 
ced In  the  human  form  (or  body),  so  it  seems  to  be 
immortal  also,  n  The  arguments  indeed,  generally  speak- 
ing, on  which  hoth  Plato  and  other  philosophers  ground 
their  positions,  derive  their  chief  interest  from  the  import- 
ance of  the  subject,  and  from  the  exquisite  language  in 
which  they  are  clothed.  As  reasonings  they  are  of  little  force 
or  value.  Thus  it  is  elaborately  shown,  or  rather  asserted 
in  the  Phcedo,  that  contraries  always  come  from  contra- 
ries, as  life  from  death,  and  death  from  life,  in  the  works 
of  Nature.  Another  argument  is  that  the  nature  or  essence 
of  the  soul  is  immortality,  and  hence  it  is  easily  inferred 
that  it  exists  after  death,  a  kind  of  reasoning  hardly  deserving 
the  name  —  'Okozi  cfy  zo-j  xQxvxzov  y.xi  oc&x&Qopov  saztv ,  xlhzi 
tyjyy  57,  a  x$xvxzc$  zvyyxvu  0V7X  y.xi  oaxahOpos  x-j  wj  —  «  Since 
that  which  is  immortal  is  also  indestructible,  what  else 
can  we  conclude  but  that  the  soul  being  (or  happening 
to  be)  immortal,  must  also  be  imperishable?  »  ( Phced. ) 
A  more  cogent  topic  is  that  of  its  simplicity,  from  whence 
the  inference  is  drawn  that  it  must  be  indestructible, 
because  what  we  mean  by  the  destruction  of  matter  is  its 
resolution  into  the  elements  that  compose  it.  In  one  passage, 
Plato  comes  very  near  the  argument  relied  on  in  the  text 
respecting  the  changes  which  the  body  undergoes;  but  it 
appears  from  the  rest  of  the  passage  that  he  had  another 
topic  or  illustration  in  view  — x)lx  yxp  «v  yxiyj  sxaemjv  tcov 
ipvywj  itcilx  ff(x)fj.xzx  xxzxzpifiuv ,  «/)>cog  zs  y.otv  «•«).).«  c-nj  /3<co.  Et 
yxp  pict  zo  ffto/JLX  xxi  xkoT/wizo  izl  £covr«s  «'J  uv$p(oicou  «»'  y 
ip'jyvi  xu  zo  y.xzxzprj3ojj.£ycj  ctvjfxrjoi  xvxyxxicv  p.-vz'  xv  uy ,  oiecre 
xirolhsizo  V)  <p'jyj,  zov  zs  Itvzxicv  vvxf/j.x  vjyuv  aurijv  c^oiwav,  c/V 
zcvzvj  fiowv  icpczzpxv  XTvoTiurfxi  —  «  But  I  should rather  say 
that  each  of  our  souls  wears  out  many  bodies,  though 
these  should  live  many  years  ;  for  if  the  body  runs  out 
and  is   destroyed,  the  man  still  living,  but  the  soul 


NOTES.  255 

always  repairs  that  which  is  worn  out,  it  would  follow 
of  necessity  that  the  soul  when  it  perished  would 
happen  to,  have  its  last  covering  y  and  to  perish  only 
just  before  that  covering.  »  —  Phced.  A  singular  instance 
of  the  incapacity  of  the  ancients  to  observe  facts,  or  at 
least  the  habitual  carelessness  with  which  they  admitted 
relations  of  them,  is  afforded  in  another  of  these  arguments. 
Socrates  is  made  to  refer,  in  the  Phwdo,  to  the  apparence 
of  ghost  near  places  of  burial  as  a  well-known  and  admitted 
fact,  and  as  proving  that  a  portion  of  the  soul  for  a  while 
survived  the  body,  but  partook  of  its  nature  and  likeness , 
and  was  not  altogether  immortal.  The  distinction  between 
the  mortal  or  sensitive  and  the  immortal  or  intellectual 
part  of  the  soul  pervades  the  Platonic  theism.  We  have 
observed  already  in  the  statement  of  Plutarch,  that  the 
Platonists  held  the  iwjs  or  intellect  to  be  contained  in  the 
<\rr/y  or  soul,  and  the  same  doctrine  occurs  in  other  pas- 
sages. Aristotle  regards  the  soul  in  like  manner  as  composed 
of  two  parts  —  the  active,  or  vau;,  and  the  passive  :  the 
former  he  represents  as  alone  immortal  and  eternal ;  the 
latter  as  destructible,  tojzo  /j.c-jcj  uGkvxzc-j  xxt  ou&ccv,  o  oV 
mxByziiafi  yBotpcos.  —  JSic.  Eth. 

It  must,  however,  be  admitted,  that  the  belief  of  the 
ancients  was  more  firm  and  more  sound  than  their  reason- 
ings were  cogent.  The  whole  tenor  of  the  doctrine  in  the 
Phcedo  refers  to  a  renewal  or  continuation  of  the  soul  as  a 
separate  and  individual  existence,  after  the  dissolution  of 
the  body,  and  with  a  complete  consciousness  of  persona! 
identity  —  in  short,  to  a  continuance  of  the  same  rational 
being's  existence  after  death.  The  liberation  from  the  body 
is  treated  as  the  beginning  of  a  new  and  more  perfect  life 
—  tot-  yxp  «ut/j  y.xO'  aurijv  >j  i/'J^vj  savca  xoiptv  t;u  <jU>/j.octc7' 
xpoTtpav  ov  c\)  {rtkMfnpiouti).  Xenophon  thus  makes  Cyrus 
deliver  himself  to  his  children  on  his  death-bed—  Ojtci  lyouy-, 


256  NOTES. 

GU)fj.x7i  y ,  £>jv ,  utocv  JV  Tflursv  XKxllxyy ,  T.:0v>jXcV  —  cjcJV  '/;  cjtco? 
afpttiv  irrzxi  >j  ^'J^jj  ,   =rc-:£c!*av  tcj  u&povos  ato^xzo^  cft^a  y-vyzxi  , 

CUcJV  TCUTO  KcKctfffJLCtC    xll'    07XV  XXpCCZOZ,    XSCl    XxQxfCC,  0    VOU?    c'Xy5<5lJ  , 

tots  xxl  fpcvi/j.(x>7X7ov  totes  xutov  uvxt  I.  Cicero  has  translated 
the  whole  passage  upon  this  subject  beautifully ,  though 
somewhat  paraphrastically ;  but  this  portion  he  has  given 
more  litterally — «Mihi  quidem  nunquam  persuaderi  potuit, 
animos  dum  incorporibus  essent  mortalibus,  vivere;  quum 
exissent  ex  iis,  emori :  nee  vero  turn  animura  esse  insipien- 
tem,  quum  ex  insipienti  corpore  evasisset;  sed  quum  omni 
admixtione  corporis  liberatus  purus  et  integer  esse  cospis- 
set,  eum  esse  sapientem  2.  » 

None  of  the  ancients,  indeed,  has  expressed  himself 
more  clearly  or  more  beautifully  upon  the  subject  than 
this  great  philosopher  and  rhetorician.  His  reasoning ,  too, 
respecting  it  greatly  exceeds  in  soundness  and  in  sagacity 
that  of  the  Grecian  sages.  Witness  the  admirable  argument 
in  the  Tusculan  Questions.  They  who  deny  the  doctrine , 
says  he,  can  only  allege  as  the  ground  of  their  disbelief 
the  difficulty  of  comprehending  the  state  of  the  soul 
severed  from  the  body,  as  if  they  could  comprehend 
its  state  in  the  body.  «  Quasi  vero  intelligant,  qualis  sit  in 
ipso  corpore,  quse  conformatio,qu8emagnitudo,  qui  locus.  » 
—  «  Hsec  reputent  isti  (he  adds)  qui  negant  animum  sine 
corpore  se  intelligere  posse ;  videbuntquem  in  ipso  corpore 
intelligant.  Mihi  quidem  naturam  animi  intuenti,  multo 
difficilior  occurrit  cogitatio,  multoque  obscurior,  qualis 
animus  in  corpore  sit,  tanquam  alienee  domi,  quam  qualis, 
cum  exierit,    et  in  liberum  coelum  quasi   domum  suum 


'  Cyrop.  ii. 

»  Do    Sm«=ct.    80. 

ded. 


NOTES.  257 

venerit.  '  »  That  he  derived  the  most  refined  gratification 
from  such  contemplations ,  many  passages  of  his  writings 
attest.  None  more  than  those  towards  the  close  of  the  Cato 
Major,  which  must  often  have  cheered  the  honest  labourers 
for  their  country  and  their  kind  in  the  midst  of  an  ungra- 
teful and  unworthy  generation.  «  An  censes  (ut  de  me  ipso 
aliquid  more  senum  glorier )  me  tantos  labores  diurnos 
nocturnosque,  domi  militiseque  suscepturum  fuisse,  si  iisdem 
finibus  gloriam  meam,  quibus  vitam  essem  terminaturus  ? 
Nonne  melius  multo  fuissetotiosamsetatem  et  quietam  sine 
ullo  labore  aut  contentione  traducere?  »  «  Think  you — to 
speak  somewhat  of  myself  after  the  manner  of  old  men  — 
think  you  that  I  should  ever  have  undergone  such  toils,  by 
day  and  by  night,  at  home  and  abroad,  had  I  believed  that 
the  term  of  my  life  was  to  be  the  period  of  my  renown? 
How  much  better  would  it  have  been  to  while  away  a  listless 
being  and  a  tranquil,  void  of  all  strife,  and  free  from  any 
labour?  2  »  And  again,  that  famous  passage  :  «  0  prsecla- 
rum  diem  quum  ad  illud  divinum  animorum  concilium 
coetumque  proficiscar ;  quumque  ex  hac  turba  el  colluvione 
discedam!  »  «  Delightful  hour!  when  I  shall  journey 
towards  that  divine  assemblage  of  spirits,  and  depart  from 
this  crowd  of  polluted  things !  3  » 

The  Platonic  ideas  of  a  future  state,  as  well  as  those 
adopted  by  the  Roman  sage,  distinctly  referred  to  an  ac- 
count rendered  ,  and  rewards  or  punishments  awarded  for 
the  things  done  in  the  body  —  ypv\  tc«vt«  kouw  ,  says  Plato, 
wore  ocpix^i  ym  c?y5cv»)7:'co;  iv  Tw  fiua  /j.-T(xayuV  x.u)ov  yap  zx9).g-j 
x«£  Yi  f)ur£5  fAc-yxXyj—  «  JVe  ought  to  act  in  ail  things  so  as 
to  pursue  virtue  and  wisdom  in  this  life ,  for  the  labour 


i  Tusc.  Qusest.  i.  22. 
a  De  Senect.  82. 
3  Ibid.  85. 


258  NOTES. 

is   excellent  and  the  hope  great.*  —  (De  Legg.   x.) 

To-J  JV  C'JXX  y  [JMV  c /.XGZCV  CV~(OZ  xQxVXTCV  UVXt,  ^O/IJV  ;iTOVC{J.Cx£c{/.cWV, 

nxpx  $;cig  x^lcii  XKttvxt,  oWcvrx  /cycv,  xxOxitsp  c  vo/j.Oi  c  Kxzpto; 
5u-y£f,  rw  fs.;v  xyxSoi  Gxppxhov,  zca  elV  xaxco  ju.xlx  vofizpcv —  «  In 
truth  each  of  us — that  is  to  say,  each  soul  —  is  immor- 
tal and  departs  to  other  Gods  (or  Gods  in  another 
world )  to  render  an  account  as  the  laws  of  the  state 
declare.  This  to  the  good  is  matter  of  confidence,  but  to 
the  wicked  of  terror.  »  —  {De  Legg.  xii. )  So  in  the  be- 
ginning of  the  Epinomis ,  he  says  that  a  glorious  pro- 
spect (xxly  tints)  is  held  out  to  us  of  attaining,  when  we 
die,  the  happiness  not  to  be  enjoyed  on  earth,  and  to  gain 
which  after  death,  we  had  exerted  all  our  efforts.  In  the 
Phcedo,  where  he  is  giving  a  somewhat  fanciful  picture  of  the 
next  world,  he  tells  us  that  souls  which  have  committed 
lesser  crimes  come  c«;T)jv).f//.wjvx««  ;xu  oixowi  re  xxi  xx$xi  pop.ivot 

TCOV   cfc    O.tJ'uVlfJ.XTtoV    oWWc'S    (PlXXS    XKcXvCVZXt.    a  MS    Zl    TJC&VVJffc    — 

«  they  remain  in  that  space,  and  being  cleansed  (or 
purged)  of  their  offences,  are  released;  »  (from  whence 
the  idea  and  the  name  of  purgatory  has  been  taken ) .  But 
such  as  have  been  incurable  wicked,  murderers  and  others, 
are  driven,  he  says,  into  Tartarus,  oQtv  wxon  ixfittntouatv, 
«  whence  they  never  more  escape.  l  »  It  is  remarkable  , 
that  in  the  same  work,  Plato,  if  some  words  have  not  been 
interpolated  in  the  text,  looks  forward  to  some  direct  divine 
communications  of  light  upon  this  subject  j  but  recom- 
mends abiding  by  the  light  of  reason  till  that  shall  be  granted . 
Let  us  ,  he  says ,  choose  the  best  human  reason ,  and, 
sitting  on  it  like  a  raft,  pass  through  the  dangers  of  life  , 
unless  ( or  until )  a  pc<izi$  &jvxtzo  uawikeax-pw  y.xt.  ay.ivJ\jnioz-pov 
cat  /3;j3ctioz;pov  cyypjxzoz  q  loyov  Guou  zivot  $1x1:0 p:v$v}vxt  — 
«  unless  some   one   can    pass   us   over  more  easily 


NOTES.  259 

and  safely  upon  some  stronger  vehicle  or  divine  word.u 
The  passage  in  the  Somnium  Scipionis,  where  celestial 
enjoyments  are  held  out  as  the  rewards  of  public  virtue , 
is  well  known.  The  precision  indeed  of  the  language  touch- 
ing a  future  state,  which  marks  this  treatise,  in  singular, 
approaching  to  that  of  the  New  Testament  —  «  beali  sevo 
sempiterno  fruuntur  »  —  «ea  vita  via  est  in  coelum  et  in 
hunc  coetumeorum  qui  jam  vixeruntet  corpore  laxati  ilium 
incollunt  locum  n  —  «  immo  vero  ii  vivunt ,  qui  ex  corpo- 
rum  vinculis,  tanquam  e  carcere,  evolaverunt;  vestra  vero, 
quse  dicitur  vita,  mors  est  »  —  «  sic  habeto,  non  esse  te 
mortalem,  sed  corpus  hoc;  nee  enim  tu  is  es,  quem  forma 
ista  declarat,  sed  mens  cujusque,  is  est  quisque »  — 
«  animus  in  domum  suam  pervolabit,  itque  ocius  faciet, 
si  jam  turn,  quum  erit  inclusus  in  corpore,  eminebitforas, 
et  ea  quae  extra  erunt  contemplans ,  quam  maxime  se  a 
corpore  abstrahet.  »  These  things  have  given  rise  to  doubts 
of  the  authenticity  of  the  treatise — doubts  easily  removed 
by  looking  to  the  many  absurdities  respecting  the  celestial 
bodies  and  the  other  accompaniments  of  heaven  with  which 
the  work  abounds ;  to  the  Platonic  doctrine  respecting  mo- 
lion  as  the  essence  of  mind,  which  it  adopts ;  and  also  to 
the  doctrine  distinctly  stated  of  the  pre-existent  state. 


NOTE  9.  PAGE  127. 

OF   BISnOP    WARBUETOiN'S    THEORY    CONCERNING   THE  ANCIENT 
DOCTRINE  OF  A  FUTURE  STATE. 

To  any  who  had  read  the  extracts  in  the  last  Note ,   but 


260  NOTES. 

still  more  to  one  who  was  familiar  with  the  ancient  writers 
from  whose  works  they  are  taken ,  it  might  appear  quite 
impossible  that  a  question  should  ever  be  raised  upon  the 
general  belief  of  antiquity  in  a  Future  State  ,  and  the  be- 
lief of  some  of  the  most  eminent  of  the  philosophers ,  at 
least,  in  a  state  of  rewards  and  punishments.  Nevertheless 
as  there  is  nothing  so  plain  to  which  the  influence  of  a  pre- 
conceived opinion  and  the  desire  of  furthering  a  favourite 
hypothesis  will  not  blind  men ,  and  as  ther  blindness  in 
such  cases  bears  even  a  proportion  to  their  learning  and  in- 
genuity, it  has  thus  fared  with  the  point  in  question,  and 
Bishop  Warburton  has  denied  that  any  of  the  ancients  ex- 
cept Socrates  really  believed  in  a  future  state  of  the  soul 
individually,  and  subject  to  reward  or  punishment.  He  took 
up  this  argument  because  it  seemed  to  strengthen  his  ex- 
traordinary reasoning  upon  the  Legation  of  Moses.  It  is 
therefore  necessary  first  to  state  how  his  doctrine  bears  upon 
that  reasoning. 

His  reasoning  is  this.  The  inculcating  of  a  future  state  of 
retribution  is  necessary  to  the  well  being  of  society.  All 
men,  and  especially  all  the  wisest  nations  of  antiquity,  have 
agreed  in  holding  such  a  doctrine  necessary  to  be  inculca- 
ted. But  there  is  nothing  of  the  kind  to  be  found  in  the  Mo- 
saic dispensation.  And  here  he  pauses  to  observe  that  these 
propositions  seem  too  clear  to  require  any  proof .  Neverthe- 
less his  whole  work  is  consumed  in  proving  them ;  and  the 
conclusion  from  the  whole ,  that  therefore  the  Mosaic  law 
is  of  Divine  original,  is  left  for  a  further  work,  which  never 
appeared  5  and  yet  this  is  the  very  position  which  all ,  or 
almost  all  who  may  read  the  book ,  and  even  yield  their 
assent  to  it,  are  the  most  inclined  to  reject.  Indeed  it  may 
well  de  doubted  if  this  work  ,  learned  and  acute  as  it  is , 
and  showing  the  author  to  be  both  well  read  and  well  fitted 
for  controversy,  ever  satisfied  any  one   except  perhaps 


NOTES.  261 

Bishop  Hurd ,  or  ever  can  demonstrate  any  thing  so  well,  as 
it  proves  the  proposterous  and  p  erverted  ingenuity  of  an 
able  and  industrious  man. 

That  such  was  very  far  from  being  the  author's  opinion 
we  have  ample  proof.  He  terms  his  work  «  A  Demonstra- 
tion. »  He  describes  his  reasoning  «  as  very  little  short  of 
mathematical  certainty ,  »  and  «  to  which  nothing  but  a 
mere  physical  possibility  of  the  contrary  can  be  opposed ;  » 
and  he  declares  his  only  difficulty  to  be  in  « telling  whether 
the  pleasure  of  the  discovery  or  the  wonder  that  it  is  now 
to  make  be  the  greater.  »  Accordingly  in  the  correspon- 
dence between  him  and  his  friend  Bishop  Hurd ,  the  com- 
plete success  of  the  «  Demonstration  »  is  always  assumed . 
and  the  glory  of  it  is  made  the  topic  of  endless  and  even 
mutual  gratulation ,  not  without  pity  and  even  vituperation 
of  all  who  can  remain  dissatisfied,  and  who  are  habitually 
and  complacently  classed  by  name  with  the  subjects  of 
Pope's  wellknown  satire. 

The  two  things  which  the  author  always  overlooked  were 
the  possibility  of  a  human  lawgiver  making  an  imperfect 
system  ,  and  of  sceptics  holding  the  want  of  the  sanction 
in  question  to  be  no  argument  for  the  divine  origin  of  the 
Mosaic  law ,  but  rather  a  proof  of  its  flowing  from  a  human 
and  fallible  source.  As  these  «  mere  possibilities  «  are 
wholly  independent  of  the  admission  that  every  word  in 
the  book  is  correct ,  and  all  the  positions  are  demonstrated, 
and  as  nothing  whatever  is  said  to  exclude  such  supposi- 
tions ,  it  is  manifest  that  a  more  useless  and  absurd  argu- 
ment never  was  maintained  upon  any  grave  and  important 
subject.  The  merit  of  the  book  lies  in  its  learning  and  its 
collateral  argument ;  indeed  nearly  the  whole  is  collateral, 
and  unconnected  with  the  purpose  of  the  reasoning.  But 
much  even  of  that  collateral  matter  is  fanciful  and  unsound. 
The  fancy  that  the  descent  of  /Eneas  to  hell  in  the  sixth 


262  MOTES. 

book  of  the  /Eneid  is  a  veiled  account  of  the  Eleusinian 
Mysteries,  has  probably  made  as  few  proselytes  as  the  main 
body  of  the  a  Demonstration ;  »  and  if  any  one  has  lent  his 
ear  to  the  theory  that  the  ancients  had  no  belief  in  a  future 
state  of  retribution,  it  can  only  be  from  being  led  away  by 
confident  assertion  from  the  examination  of  the  facts. 

This  position  of  Bishop  Warburton  is  manifestly  wholly 
unnecessary  to  the  proof  of  his  general  theory.  But  he 
thought  it  would  show  more  strongly  the  opinion  enter- 
tained of  the  uses  to  be  derived  from  inculcating  the  doctrine 
of  a  Future  State,  if  he  could  prove  that  they  who  held  it  in 
public  and  with  political  views,  did  not  themselves  believe  it. 

The  way  in  which  he  tries  to  prove  this  is  by  observing 
that  there  prevailed  among  the  old  philosophers  as  well  as 
lawgivers  a  principle  of  propagating  what  they  knew  to  be 
false  opinions  for  the  public  benefit ,  and  of  thus  holding 
one  kind  of  doctrine  in  secret,  the  esoteric,  and  another  , 
the  exoteric,  in  public.  Of  this  fact  there  is  no  doubt ,  but 
its  origin  is  hardly  to  be  thus  traced  to  design  always  pre- 
vailing. The  most  ancient  notions  of  religion  were  the  birth 
of  fear  and  ignorance  in  the  earliest  ages  ,  and  the  fancy  of 
the  poets  mingled  with  these,  multiplying  and  improving  and 
polishing  the  rude  imaginations  of  popular  terror  and  simpli- 
city. The  rulers  of  the  community,  aiding  themselves  by  the 
sanctions  which  they  drew  from  thence,  favoured  the  conti- 
nuance and  propagation  of  the  delusions ;  and  philosophers 
who  afterwards  arose  among  the  people  were  neither  dis- 
posed themselves  nor  permitted  by  the  magistrate  openly  to 
expose  the  errors  of  the  popular  faith.  Hence  they  taught 
one  doctrine  in  private  ,  while  in  public  they  conformed  to 
the  prevailing  creed,  and  the  observances  which  it  enjoined. 

But  whatever  be  the  origin  of  the  double  doctrine,  Bishop 
Warburton  cannot  expect  that  its  mere  existence  and  the 
use  made  of  it  by  ancient  writers  and  teachers  will  prove 


NOTES.  265 

'ins  position ,  unless  he  can  show  that  the  future  state  of  re- 
tribution is  only  mentioned  by  them  upon  occasions  of  an 
exoterical  kind,  and  never  when  esoterically  occupied. 
Now  this  he  most  signally  fails  to  do  ;  indeed'he  can  hardly 
be  said  fairly  to  make  the  attempt,  for  his  rule  is  to  make 
the  tenor  of  the  doctrine  the  criterion  of  esoteric  or  exote- 
ric, instead  of  showing  the  occasion  to  be  one  or  the  other 
from  extrinsic  circumstances ,  which  is  manifestly  begging 
the  question  most  unscrupulously.  It  seems  hardly  credible 
that  so  acute  and  practised  a  controversialist  should  so  con- 
duct an  argument,  but  it  is  quite  true.  As  often  as  anything 
occurs  in  favour  of  a  Future  State ,  he  says  it  was  said 
exoterically ;  and  whenever  he  can  find  any  thing  on  the 
opposite  side,  or  leaning  towards  it  (which  is  really  hardly 
at  all  in  the  Platonic  or  Ciceronian  writings),  he  sets  this 
down  for  the  esoteric  sentiments  of  the  writer.  But  surely 
if  there  be  any  meaning  at  all  in  the  double  doctrine,  what- 
ever may  have  been  its  origin,  the  occasion  is  every  thing, 
and  there  can  be  no  difficulty  in  telling  whether  any  given 
opinion  was  maintained  exoterically  or  not ,  by  the  cir- 
cumstances in  which ,  and  the  purposes  for  which  ,  it  was 
propounded. 

The  argument  on  which  he  dwells  most  is  drawn  from 
The  allusion  made  by  Csesar  in  the  discussion  upon  the  pu- 
nishment of  the  conspirators  as  related  by  Sallust ,  «  Ultra 
(mortem)  neque  curse  neque  gaudio  locum  esse ;  a  and  from 
the  way  in  which  Cato  and  Cicero  evade  ,  ho  says  ,  rather 
than  answer  him,  appealing  to  the  traditions  of  antiquity 
and  the  authority  of  their  ancestors  instead  of  arguing  the 
point.  Div.  Leg.  III.  2.  5.)  Can  any  thing  be  more  in- 
conclusive than  this?  Granting  that  Sallust,  in  making 
speeches  for  Caesar  and  Cato  (whom  by  the  way  he  makes 
speak  in  the  self-same  style ,  that  is,  in  his  own  Sallustian 
style),  adhered  to  the  sentiments  each  delivered;  and  fur- 


264  NOTES. 

ther,  that  Ceesar  uses  this  strange  topic  not  as  a  mere  rhe- 
tjrical  figure  ,  but  as  a  serious  reason  against  capital  pu- 
nishment, and  as  showing  that  there  is  mercy  and  not 
severity  in  such  inflictions  (a  very  strong  supposition  to 
make  respecting  so  practised  and  so  practical  a  reasoner  as 
Caius  Csesar) ;  surely  so  bold  a  position  as  practical  atheism 
brought  forward  in  the  Roman  senate  was  far  more  likely  to  be 
met,  whether  by  the  decorum  of  Cato  or  the  skill  of  Cicero, 
with  a  general  appeal  to  the  prevalence  of  contrary  belief, 
and  its  resting  on  ancient  tradition ,  than  with  a  metaphy- 
sical or  theological  discourse  singularly  out  of  season  in 
such  a  debate.  To  make  the  case  our  own  :  let  us  suppose 
some  member  of  Parliament ,  or  of  the  Chamber  of  Depu- 
ties, so  ill  judged  as  to  denounce  in  short  but  plain  terms 
the  religion  of  the  country,  would  any  person  advert 
further  to  so  extravagant  a  speech  than  to  blame  it ,  and 
in  general  expressions  signify  the  indignation  it  had  exci- 
ted? Would  not  an  answer  out  of  Lardner ,  orPaley,or 
Pascal  be  deemed  almost  as  ill  limed  as  the  attack?  To  be 
sure  neither  Cato  nor  Cicero  are  represented  as  testifying 
any  great  disgust  at  the  language  of  Caesar ,  but  this,  as 
well  indeed  as  the  topic  being  introduced  at  all  by  the  lat- 
ter ,  only  shows  that  the  doctrine  of  a  Future  State  was  not 
one  of  the  tenets  much  diffused  among  the  people  ,  or  held 
peculiarly  sacred  by  them.  Had  the  orator  vindicated  Cati- 
line by  showing  how  much  less  flagitious  his  bad  life  was 
than  that  of  some  of  the  gods  to  whom  altars  were  erected 
and  worship  rendered  ,  a  very  different  burst  of  invective 
would  have  been  called  down  upon  the  blasphemous  of- 
fender. 

In  truth  ,  the  passage  thus  relied  upon  only  shows ,  like 
all  the  rest  of  the  facts ,  that  the  doctrine  of  retribution 
was  rather  more  esoteric  than  exoteric  among  the  an- 
cients. The  elaborate  dissertation  of  Bishop  "Warburton's 


INOTES.  265 

upon  the  Mysteries ,  proves  this  effectually  ,  and  clearly  re- 
futes his  whole  argument.  For  to  prove  that  the  doctrine  of 
future  retribution  was  used  at  all  as  an  engine  of  state,  he 
is  forced  to  allege  that  it  was  the  secret  disclosed  to  the 
initiated  in  the  Sacred  Mysteries;  which,  according  to  Cicero, 
were  not  to  be  viewed  by  the  imprudent  eye.  (Ne  impru- 
dentiam  quidem  oculorum  adjici  fas  est,  De  Legg.  II.  14). 
Surely  this  would  rather  indicate  that  such  doctrines  were 
not  inculcated  indiscriminately,  and  that  at  all  events,  when 
a  philosopher  gives  them  a  place  in  his  works ,  it  cannot  be 
in  pursuance  of  a  plan  for  deceiving  the  multitude  into  a 
belief  different  from  his  own.  It  is  indeed  plain  enough 
that  the  bulk  of  the  people  were  restrained ,  if  by  any 
sanctions  higher  than  those  of  the  penal  laws,  rather  by  the 
belief  of  constant  interposition  from  the  gods.  An  expecta- 
tion of  help  from  their  favour  or  of  punishment  from  their 
anger  in  this  life  and  without  any  delay ,  formed  the  creed 
of  the  Greeks  and  Romans ;  and  nothing  else  is  to  be  found 
in  either  the  preamble  to  Zaleucus  the  Locrian's  laws  quo- 
ted by  Bishop  Warburton,  or  in  the  passages  of  Cicero's 
treatise  ,to  which  he  also  refers.  (Div.  Leg.  II.  3.) 

Among  the  many  notable  inadvertencies  of  his  argument, 
concealed  from  himself  by  an  exuberant  learning  and  a  dog- 
matism hardly  to  be  paralleled,  is  the  neglecting  to  observe 
how  difficultly  the  appearance  of  the  doctrine  in  the  places 
where  we  find  it  is  reconciled  with  his  notion  of  its  having 
formed  the  subject  of  the  Mysteries.  What  part  in  those  My- 
steries did  Cicero's  and  Plato's  and  Seneca's  and  Xenophon's 
writings  bear?  There  we  have  the  doctrine  plainly  stated; 
possibly  to  the  world  at  large — possibly,  far  more  probably, 
to  the  learned  reader  only— but  assuredly  not  by  the  Hiero- 
phant  or  theMystagogue,to  the  initiated.  This  is  wholly  in- 
consistent with  the  notion  of  its  being  reserved  for  these 
alone.  It  is  equally  inconsistent  with  the  theory  that   it 


266  NOTES. 

was  promulgated  for  the  purposes  of  deception ;  for  such 
purposes  would  have  been  far  better  served  by  decidedly 
making  it  a  part  neither  of  the  instruction  given  to  the 
select  and  initiated  few,  nor  of  the  doctrine  confined  to 
the  students  of  philosophy,  but  of  the  common ,  vulgar, 
popular  belief  and  ritual  which  it  is  admitted  not  to  have 
been.  The  truth  undeniably  is  ,  that  as,  on  the  one  hand, 
it  was  not  universally  preached  and  inculcated,  so  neither 
was  it  any  mystery  forbidden  to  be  divulged — that  it  was 
no  part  of  the  vulgar  creed,  nor  yet  so  repugnant  to 
the  religion  of  the  country  as  to  be  concealed  from  pruden- 
tial considerations  ,  like  the  unity  of  the  Deity ,  the  fabu- 
lousness of  the  ordinary  polytheistic  superstitions,  as  to  the 
gods  and  goddesses,  the  demigods,  and  the  Furies.  These 
opinions  were  indeed  esoteric,  and  only  promulgated 
amond  the  learned.  A  few  allusions,  and  but  a  few,  are 
found  to  them  in  any  of  the  classical  authors  whose  writings 
were  intended  for  general  perusal,  and  chiefly  to  the  parts 
which  had  in  process  of  time  become  too  gross  even  for 
the  vulgar,  such  as  the  Furies,  Cerberus,  etc.,  which  Cicero 
describes  as  unfit  for  the  belief  of  even  an  ignorant  or  do- 
ting old  woman  (Quae  anus  tam  excors,  etc.  De  Nat. 
Deor.7  and  Tusc.  Qucest.),  and  which  are  treated  as  fa- 
bles both  by  Demosthenes  in  that  noble  passage  where  he 
exclaims  that  the  Furies  ,  who  are  represented  in  the  scene 
as  driving  men  with  burning  torches  (fkojav  dWv  ct/./ac-v3«s), 
are  our  bad  passions ,  and  by  Cicero  in  words  (Hi  faces,  hae 
flammse,  etc.)  almost  translated  from  the  Greek. 

After  all ,  can  any  thing  be  more  violent  than  the  sup- 
position that  those  philosophers,  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
ceiving the  multitude ,  delivered  opinions  not  held  by 
themselves  ,  and  delivered  them  in  profound  philosophical 
treatises?  It  is  in  the  Phsedo  and  the  Timseus  (hardly  in- 
telligible to  the  learned),  and  the  Tusculan  Questions,  and 


NOTES.  287 

the  Somnium  Scipionis,  in  an  age  when  there  were  hardly 
any  readers  heyond  the  disciples  of  the  several  sects , 
that  those  exoteric  matters  are  supposed  to  he  conveyed 
for  accomplishing  the  purposes  of  popular  delusion — not 
in  poems  and  speeches,  read  in  the  Portico  or  pronounced 
in  the  Forum.  If  then  the  records  of  their  opinions  on  the 
most  recondite  subjects  were  chosen  for  the  depositories  of 
exoteric  faith ,  where  are  we  to  look  for  their  esoteric 
doctrines  ?  Bishop  Warburton  must  needs  answer,  in  the  very 
same  records  ;  for  to  this  he  is  driven,  because  he  has  none 
other ;  and  he  cannot  choose  but  admit  that  the  whole  argu- 
ment is  utterly  defective,  if  it  stops  short  at  only  showing  those 
opinions  to  have  been  delivered,  even  if  proved  to  be  exote- 
rical,  unless  he  can  also  show  opposite  doctrines  to  have  been 
esotericaUy  entertained — inasmuh  as  a  person  might  grant 
the  former  to  have  been  delivered  for  popular  use  (which, 
however,  Bishop  Warburton  does  not  prove),  and  yet  deny 
that  they  were  assumed  for  the  purpose  of  deception.  Ac- 
cordingly he  is  driven  to  find,  if  he  can,  proofs  of  those 
opposite  doctrines  in  the  self-same  writings,  where  he  says 
the  exoteric  ones  are  eonveyed.  However,  nothing  surely 
can  be  more  absurd  than  this ;  for  it  is  to  maintain  that 
Plato  and  Cicero  pretended  to  believe  a  future  state  of 
retribution  in  order  to  deceive  the  multitude,  by  stating  it 
in  the  same  writings  in  which  they  betrayed  their  real  sen- 
timents to  be  the  very  reverse.  And  this  absurdity  is  the 
same,  and  this  argument  is  as  cogent,  if  we  take  the  dou- 
ble doctrine  to  apply,  not— as  we  are,  in  favour  of  the 
Bishop's  argument,  generally  supposing— to  a  difference 
between  what  was  taught  in  the  face  of  the  people  and  what 
was  reserved  for  the  scholars,  but  to  a  division  of  the 
scholars  into  two  classes  ,  one  only  of  whom  was  supposed 
to  see  the  whole  truth— for  the  same  writings  subject  are 
said  to  contain  both  the  statements  of  it.  Nevertheless, 


2G8  NOTES. 

let  us  shortly  see  how  he  finds  any  such  contrary  state- 
ments, or  any  means  of  explaining  away  the  positive  and 
precise  dicta,  and  even  reasonings,  cited  in  the  former 
note  (Note  8.) 

1 .  There  can  he  no  doubt  that  both  the  Greek  and  Roman 
philosophers  disbelieved  part  of  the  popular  doctrine  as  to 
future  retribution ,  those  punishments ,  to  wit ,  which  are 
of  a  gross  and  corporeal  nature  5  and,  accordingly,  what 
Timseus  the  Locrian  and  others  have  said  of  the  Tt/mpica 
genoM  proves  nothing,  for  it  applies  to  those  only.  Strabo 
plainly  speaks  of  these  only  in  the  passage  where  he  ob- 
serves that  women  and  the  vulgar  are  not  to  be  kept  pious 
and  virtuous  by  the  lessons  of  philosophy,  but  by  super- 
stition, which  cannot  be  maintained  without  mythology 
(fable-making)  and  prodigies  (eft*  tfcuK&K/toyiag'  zwto  eP'  cux 
«v:-u  fj.v$0K0i«i  /mi  T-pxTuxi),  for  he  gives  as  examples  of  these, 
Jupiter's  Thunder,  the  Snakes  of  the  Furies  ,  etc. 

2.  Nothing  can  be  more  vague  than  the  inference  drawn 
from  such  passages  as  those  in  Cicero  and  Seneca ,  where 
a  doubt  is  expressed  on  the  subject  of  a  Future  State,  and 
a  wish  of  more  cogent  proofs  seems  betrayed — as  where 
Cicero  makes  one  of  his  prolocutors,  in  the  Tusculan  Ques- 
tions, say ,  that  when  he  lays  down  the  Phsedo ,  which  had 
persuaded  him  ,  «  Assensio  omnis  ilia  elabitur  »  (  i.  II.  ) , 
and  when  Seneca  speaks  of  the  philosophers  as  «rem  gra- 
tissimam  promittentes  magis  quam  probantes,  »  and  calls 
it  «  bellum  somnium.  »  Epist.  102.  No  one  pretends  that 
the  ancients  had  a  firm  and  abiding  opinion ,  founded  on 
very  cogent  reasons ,  respecting  a  Future  State ;  and  with 
far  sounder  theologians  than  they  were ;  the  anxiety  natu- 
rally incident  to  so  momentous  an  inquiry  may  well  excite 
occasional  doubts  ,  and  even  apprehensions.  Who  questions 
Dr.  Johnson's  general  belief  in  Revelation ,  because  in  mo- 
ments of  depression  ,  when  desiderating   some  stronger 


NOTES.  269 

evidence  ,  he  was  kindly  told  by  a  religious  friend  that  he 
surely  had  enough ,  and  answered ,  «  Sir,  I  would  have 
more  ?  » 

3.  When  Strabo  speaks  of  the  Brahmins  having  invented 
fables,  like  Plato,  upon  future  judgment,  it  is  plain  that 
he  alludes  to  those  speculations  in  the  Phsedo ,  which  are 
avowedly  and  purposely  given  as  imaginary  respecting  the 
details  of  another  world.  To  no  other  part  of  the  Platonic 
doctrine  can  the  Brahminical  mythology  be  likened :  nor 
would  there  be  any  accuracy  of  speech  at  all  in  comparing 
those  fables  to  the  more  abstract  doctrines  of  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul ,  as  the  words  litterally  do— (us-nr^,  xou 

4.  The  quotation  from  Aristotle  may  refer  to  this  world 
merely,  but  is  certainly  made  a  good  deal  stronger  in  Bishop 
Warburton's  translation  —  Qo/3:p(tiztxTcv  cJV  Sxvktoz"  Kipxz  yap. 
r.ou  cuclVv  t?i  too  r^v-wrt  t^  wa  «,  cvzs  ocyocSov,  cut-  xkxov  uvxi. 
«  Death  (as  our  author  renders  it)  is  of  all  things  the  most 
terrible ;  for  it  is  the  final  period  of  existence ,  and  beyond 
that ,  it  appears  there  is  neither  good  nor  evil  for  the  dead 
man  to  dread  or  hope.  »  This  is,  at  the  best,  a  mere  para- 
phrase. Aristotle  says  —  Death  is  most  terrible,  for  it  is 
an  end  (of  us),  and  there  appears  to  be  nothing  further, 
good  or  bad,  for  the  dead.  Even  were  we  to  take  this  as 
an  avowal  of  the  Stagyrite's  opinion  in  the  sense  given  it 
by  Bishop  Warburton,  it  proves  nothing  as  to  Plato. 

4.  Some  of  the  Stoics  seem  certainly  to  have  held  that 
the  dissolution  of  the  body  closed  the  scene,  and  that  the 
body  ceased  to  exist  by  the  resolving  of  its  mortal  frame 
into  the  kindred  elements.  Nevertheless,  many  of  their  ob- 
servations may  be  conceived  to  regard  the  vulgar  supersti- 
tions, and  many  of  their  sayings,  to  flow  from  the  habit  of 
grandiloquent  contempt  for  all  bodily  suffering.  However , 
no  one  maintains  that  all  the  ancient  sects  of  Theists ,  and 

23 


270  NOTES. 

each  disciple  of  every  sect,  firmly  believed  in  a  future  state,* 
and  it  must  be  remarked  that  the  question  raised  by  Bishop 
Warburton  being  as  to  the  belief  in  a  state  of  retribution  , 
his  citations  from  Seneca  and  Epictetus  go  to  deny  the  fu- 
ture continuance  of  the  soul  altogether.  Now  he  does  not 
deny  that  at  least  some  of  the  ancients  did  believe  in  this. 
5.  But  the  authority  of  Cicero  presses  our  author  the 
most  closely ,  and  accordingly  he  makes  great  efforts  to  es- 
cape from  it.  After  showing  some  circumstances  ,  rather  of 
expression  than  any  thing  else ,  in  his  philosophical  trea- 
tises ,  he  cites  the  oration  Pro  Cluentio,  where  ,  speaking 
of  the  vulgar  superstition ,  he  says  it  is  generally  disbe- 
lieved, and  then  asks,  «  Quid  aliud  mors  eripuit  prater  sen- 
sum  doloris?  »  But  this  at  best  is  a  rhetorical  flourish  5  and 
being  delivered  in  public  ( though  before  the  judges  )  ne- 
ver could  be  seriously  meant  as  an  esoteric  attack  on  the 
doctrine.  The  doctrines  in  the  De  Officiis  relate  only  to 
the  Deity's  being  incapable  of  anger  or  malevolence ,  on 
which  account  he  praises  Regulus  the  more  for  keeping  his 
oath  when  all  philosophers  knew  nee  irasci  Deum  nee 
nocere  ;  which  shows ,  according  to  our  author ,  that 
Cicero  could  not  believe  in  future  retribution.  But  this  is  said 
by  Cicero  only  in  reference  to  immediate  punishments  ,  or 
judgments,  as  the  vulgar  term  them.  At  any  rate,  the  pass- 
age is  quite  capable  of  this  sense  ,  and  every  rule  of  sound 
construction  binds  us  to  prefer  it  as  consistent  with  the 
other  passages  on  a  future  stale  ,  while  those  passages  will 
bear  no  meaning  but  one.  We  may  here  observe],  in  pass- 
ing ,  the  gratuitous  manner  in  which  works  are  held  eso- 
teric and  exoteric,  just  as  suits  the  purposes  of  the  argu- 
ment. The  offices  contain  the  above  passage,  and  therefore, 
Bishop  Warburton  says  it  is  the  work  which  «bids  the  fair- 
est of  any  to  be  spoken  from  the  heart.  «  The  passage  in 
the  Somnium  Scipionis ,  «  Omnibus  qui  patriam  conserva- 


NOTES.  271 

rint,  adjuverint,  auxerint,  certumessein  coelo,  ad  definitum 
locum  ubi  beati  sevo  sempiterno  fruantur ,  »  (  Som. 
Scip.  57,  )  is  got  rid  of  ,  by  saying  that  the  ancients  be- 
lieved sjauls  to  be  either  human ,  or  heroic  and  demonic  , 
and  that  the  two  last  went  to  heaven  to  enjoy  eternal  hap- 
piness, but  that  the  former,  comprehending  the  bulk  of 
mankind,  did  not.  This  is  begging  the  question  to  no  pur- 
pose ,  for  it  is  also  giving  up  the  point ,  and  at  the  utmost 
only  reduces  the  author's  position  to  a  denial  that  the  an- 
cients believed  in  the  immortality  of  all  souls.  It  must , 
however,  be  observed,  that  unless  he  is  allowed  to  assume 
also  something  like  election  and  predestination  ,  he  gains 
hardly  even  this  in  his  argument ;  for  if  a  man  by  patriotic 
conduct  can  become  one  of  the  heroic  souls ,  and  so  gain 
eternal  life ,  what  more  distinct  admission  can  be  desired 
of  a  future  state  of  retribution  ?  That  the  doctrine  of  im- 
mortality was  ,  by  many  at  least ,  conferred  in  some  such 
way,  may  be  true.  The  beautiful  passage  in  Tacitus  seems 
to  point  that  way,  «  Si  non  cum  corpore  extinguuntur  mag- 
na? animae.  »  —  (  Fit.  Ag.  sub  fin. )  The  main  proof, 
however,  against  Cicero's  belief  is  drawn  from  the  Epistles, 
where  alone,  says  our  author,  we  can  be  sure  of  his  speak- 
ing his  real  sentiments.  Yet  never  did  proof  more  com- 
pletely fail.  AVriting  to  Torquatus  ,  he  says  ,  «  Nee  enim 
dum  ero,  angar  ulla  re,  cum  omni  vacem  culpa  —  et  si  non 
ero  ,  sensu  omnino  carebo  ,  »  (  Lib.  vi.  Ep.  51. )  j  —  and 
to  Toranius,  «  Ima  ratio  videtur ,  ferre  moderate  ,  prseser- 
tim  cum  omnium  rerum  mors  sit  extremum  ,  »  (  Lib.  vi. 
Ep.  21.  )  And  this,  which  really  means  nothing  more  than 
a  common  remark  on  death  ending  all  our  pains  and  trou- 
bles ,  the  learned  author  calls  «  professing  his  disbelief  in 
a  future  state  of  retribution  in  the  frankest  manner.  »  — 
Div.  Leg.  iii.  5. 

It  seems ,  therefore  ,  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  Divine 


272  NOTES. 

Legation  does  not  more  completely  fail  in  proving  the 
grand  paradox  which  forms  the  main  object  of  the  argu- 
ment ,  and  which  has  been  parodied  by  Soame  Jenyns  ,  in 
his  most  injudicious  defence  of  Christianity,  than  it  does  in 
supporting  the  minor  paradox  which  is  taken  up  inciden- 
tally as  to  the  real  opinions  of  the  ancients  ,  and  which  , 
it  must  be  admitted,  is  indeed  quite  unnecessary  to  the 
general  argument ,  and  as  little  damages  it  by  its  entire 
failure ,  as  it  could  help  it  by  the  most  entire  success. 


NOTE  10.— SECTION  VI,  PAGE  134. 

A  learned  and  valuable  work  upon  the  life  of  Lord  Bacon 
is  prepared  for  publication  by  Mr.  B.  Montague  ,  and  will 
soon  be  before  the  world.  Some  very  important  facts  are 
proved  satisfactorily  by  the  ingenious  author,  and  show 
how  much  the  criminality  of  this  great  man  is  exaggerated 
in  the  common  accounts  of  his  fall.  But  it  is  clearly  shown, 
that  he  was  prevailed  upon  by  the  intrigues  of  James  I  and 
his  profligate  minister  to  abandon  his  own  defence ,  and 
sacrifice  himself  to  their  base  and  crooked  policy  —  a  de- 
fence which  disgraces  them  more  than  it  vindicates  him. 
One  thing,  however,  is  undeniable,  that  they  who  so  loudly 
blame  Bacon ,  overlook  the  meanness  of  almost  all  the 
great  statesmen  of  those  courtly  times. 


CONTENTS. 


Dedication.  .' 

Introduction.  —  Arrangement  of  Subjects  and  Explanation 

of  Terms.  i 

Analysis  of  the  Work. 


PART  I. 

NATURE    OP    THE    SCIENCE    AND    OF    ITS    EVIDENCES. 

Section  I.  —  Introductory  View  of  the  Method  of  Investi- 
gation pursued  in  the  Physical  and  Psychological 
Sciences.  19 

Section  II.  —  Comparison  of  the  Physical  Branch  of  Natu- 
ral Theology  with  Physics.  3 1 
Section  III.  —  Comparison  of  the  Psychological  Branch  of 

Natural  Theology  with  Psychology.  54 

Section  IV.  —  Of  the  Argument  a  priori.  82 

Section  V.  —  Moral  or  Ethical  Branch  of  Natural  Theology.     97 
Section  VI.  —  Lord  Bacon's  Doctrine  of  Final  Causes.  i34 

Section  VII.  —  Of  Scientific  Arrangement,  and  the  Me- 
thods of  Analysis  and  Synthesis.  1^7 


275  CONTENTS. 

PART  II. 

OF    THE    ADVANTAGES    OF    THE    STUDY    OF    NATURAL    THEOLOGY. 

Section  I.   —  Of  the  Pleasures  of  Science.  167 

Section  II.  —  Of  the  Pleasure  and  Improvement  peculiar 

to  Natural  Theology.  178 

Section  III. — Of  the  Connexion  between  Natural  and  Re- 
vealed Religion.  189 


NOTES. 


Note  I.  — Of  the  Classification  of  the  Sciences.  ao5 

H.   —  Of  the  Psychological  Argument   from   Final 
Causes.  208 

III.  —  Of  the  Doctrine  of  Cause  and  Effect.  214 

IV.  —  Of  the  «  Systeme  de  la  Nature  ,  »  and  the  Hy- 

pothesis of  Materialism.  218 

V.  Of  Mr.  Hume's  Sceptical  Writings,  and  the  Argu- 

ment respecting  Providence.  23 1 

VI. —  Of  the  Ancient  Doctrine  respecting  Mind.  244 

VII.  —  Of  the  Ancient  Doctrine  respecting  the  Deity 
and  Matter.  347 

VIII.  —  Of  the  ancient  Doctrine  of  the  Immortality  of 
the  Soul.  253 

IX.  —  Of  Bishop  Warburton's  Theory  concerning  the 
Ancient  Doctrine  of  a  Future  State.  259 

X.  —  Of  Lord  Bacon's  Character.  27a 


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